[Policy Proposals]
1. Offer a future vision based on firm confidence in market economy.
2. Support the beneficiaries pay principle and develop a medium to long-term growth strategy.
3. Specify secure financial resources for permanent policies.
4. Set fiscal consolidation targets and develop a fiscal consolidation plan.
5. Reaffirm the significance of deregulation and structural reforms and implement them boldly.

1. Offer a future vision based on firm confidence in market economy.
　　　　　In Japan in the 21st century, economic burdens on the people are bound to increase due to population decline, the dropping birthrate, the aging population and huge budget deficits. At the same time, Japan will have to confront globalism that is expected to expand further. In order to adapt to such situation, Japan will have to improve its international competitiveness and sustain economic growth to expand the pie for redistribution.
　　　　　But the new government’s economic policy amounts to “redistribution without growth,” reminding us of old-fashioned social democratic welfare state policies that were deadlocked in the absence of economic growth. Historically, market economies have created massive wealth. No other system has outperformed the market economy system. At present, the market economy system is the most efficient conceivable system.
　　　　　In fact, in recent years, market competition has widened social and economic gaps. But it has clearly led to more efficient production methods, bringing about more benefits.
　　　　　Japan must deepen its market economy to solve its two fundamental challenges — the development of a system to achieve a good balance between a shift to sustainable stable growth and social security meeting the falling birthrate and aging population, and structural reforms (shifting resources to higher-productivity sectors) to realize such system. Therefore, the 21st century vision of the Japanese economy should build on firm confidence in market economy before appropriate safety nets are incorporated into the vision.

2. Support the beneficiaries-pay principle and develop a medium to long-term growth strategy.
(1) “An end to dependence on bureaucrats” alone cannot lead to a path to economic revitalization. As a matter of course, the elimination of wasteful spending is important. If savings from this elimination are used for income redistribution alone, however, economic recovery or growth may remain difficult to occur. Some strong supply-side policy should be taken to raise Japan’s growth potential.
(2) The “childrearing support,” “effective elimination of senior high school fees,” “abolition of expressway tolls” and other spending measures to benefit a limited range of citizens or groups cannot be expected to have any major economic expansion effects.　
　　 These measures could affect the future vision as they represent the fundamental issue involving the restructuring of values about “burdens that should be shouldered by the entire society” and “burdens that should be shouldered by individuals.” The government should not be allowed to take any easy or onrushing income redistribution measures for the reason of temporary social or economic changes.
(3) The government lacks macroeconomic policy (including short-term economic stimulus and long-term growth measures).
　　“Childrearing support” and other planned measures represent nothing more than “redistribution.” Unless new private sector demand is created and expanded, economic recovery or growth cannot be achieved. Supply-side reforms including substantial deregulation and structural reforms are required to create new demand. Particularly, structural reforms are required in agriculture, and health and nursing care areas.
　　 It is feared the Japanese economy will deteriorate further toward the second half of the current fiscal year. Most of the measures now under discussion relate to the budget for the next fiscal year. Few economic stimulus measures required for the immediate future have been offered.
(4) The proposed debt moratorium bill (a bill for measures to counter a credit crunch or withdrawal) could violate market economy principles. Resources for loans are mostly deposits. If the planned debt moratorium leads financial institutions to weaken or go bankrupt, public funds may have be injected into them to the disadvantage of not only depositors but also the general public.
　　At a time when the Bank of Japan is planning to end various corporate finance support measures introduced to counter the global financial crisis, the debt moratorium can be coupled with tougher capital adequacy regulations for financial institutions to trigger a credit crunch. Measures to counter a credit crunch or withdrawal should focus on the expansion of lending by government financial institutions and the improvement of loan guarantee systems.

3. Specify secure financial resources for permanent policies.
　　　　　Attempts to separate temporary and permanent financial resources have failed. Temporary financial resources will dry up soon. Will there be any financial resources other than tax hikes then? “Hidden treasure” special account reserves worth 5 trillion yen, which were specified as financial resources in the campaign manifesto of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, amount to a hike of some 2 percentage points of the consumption tax rate. Most of financial resources secured by the government are from a partial suspension of a large supplementary budget formed by the previous government. Whether massive financial resources could be secured through the reconfiguration of the main budget is still uncertain. The DPJ-planned reconfiguration of the budget to eliminate wasteful spending alone cannot ensure growth. It is irresponsible for the government to fall short of proposing any growth strategy or specifying financial resources over a medium to long term.

4. Set fiscal consolidation targets and develop a fiscal consolidation plan.
　　　　　It will be difficult for Japan to get on a sustainable growth path without fiscal consolidation. Since savings from the “reduction of wasteful spending” and “hidden treasure” are set aside for new policy measures, there may not be any financial resources other than tax hikes for fiscal consolidation. As the government has vowed to refrain from raising the consumption tax over the next four years, fiscal consolidation is expected to start around 2014 at the earliest. Fiscal consolidation will be difficult without comprehensive tax reform.
　　　　　In order to put Japan on a path to sustainable growth , the government should make a plan to create a primary budget surplus and should promptly work out fiscal consolidation targets and a plan for their attainment.

5. Reaffirm the significance of deregulation and structural reforms and implement them boldly.
　　　　　The DPJ manifesto has failed to touch on deregulation or structural reforms. The growth strategy under globalism should be based on new demand development through technological innovation and competitiveness improvement through deregulation and structural reforms. Deregulation and subsidy reforms are indispensable for the development of agriculture, and health and nursing care areas where demand is expected to increase.
　　　　　The government should not shrug off essential structural reforms. Efficiency and equity are not mutually exclusive. It is natural to pursue efficiency in order to sustain growth under globalism. It is important to form social consensus on equity standards for the redistribution of fruits gained on efficiency.

[Policy Proposals]
1. Do not fuel the distrust of our nation’s key ally by the so-called “East Asian Community” initiative that lacks philosophy.
2. Keep a distance from non-democratic countries.
3. Be alert to China-led Sinocentrism.
4. Do not exclude the United States from the East Asian Community initiative.

1. Do not fuel the distrust of our nation’s key ally by the so-called “East Asian Community” initiative that lacks philosophy.
　　　　　Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s “East Asian Community” initiative lacks philosophy. Japanese and foreign people who believe in freedom and democracy may naturally feel distrust of, anger at or be dishonored by the initiative.
　　　　　In his article “My Political Philosophy” contributed to the September issue of the monthly Voice magazine (an English version of the article was summarized and distributed by Tribune Media Services), Hatoyama emphasized the East Asian region as “Japan’s basic sphere of being” and said “we must continue to make efforts to build frameworks for stable economic cooperation and security across the region.” He apparently believes that Japan and China should form a community for the sole reason that Japan is “a nation located in Asia.”
　　　　　Some Americans are most outraged at the following question posed by Hatoyama in the article: “How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence and protect its national interest when it is caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its position as the world’s dominant power, and China which is seeking ways to become dominant?”
　　　　　Hatoyama views both the United States and China as the world’s dominant or hegemonistic powers. This view indicates that he does not understand the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance that has confronted totalitarian forces like the defunct Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Such an attitude could shake the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
　　　　　As the base of Japan’s foreign policy, Prime Minister Hatoyama should specify the enhancement of cooperation with countries that share with Japan the basic values of freedom and democracy and that view totalitarian forces as threats.

2. Keep a distance from non-democratic countries.
　　　　　The European integration that Prime Minister Hatoyama apparently sees as the model for the East Asian Community initiative has been based on Christianity as the common foundation and on democracy as the common philosophy. In contrast, East Asia has no such common foundation and lacks any common philosophy. The region also includes China,a one-party Communist dictatorship.
　　　　　The economic integration process may include the conclusion of economic partnership agreements (EPA) containing free trade agreements (FTA) to liberalize regional trade, a shift to a customs union to establish common tariffs against other regions, and the development of the region into an economic community with a single currency. Such process would be difficult to implement unless some philosophy is shared within the region. A political-security community as the next phase would be even more difficult to achieve unless some philosophy is shared within the region.
　　　　　Prime Minister Hatoyama apparently intends to accept China under the one-party Communist dictatorship as a member of the planned East Asian Community. At home and abroad, however, he must explain how such a community could be formed without any shared philosophy.
　　　　　Moreover the planned economic community could allow people, goods and money to freely move within the region. China’s population is 10 times as large as Japan’s. Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan has vowed to positively work to give foreigners voting rights in Japan. If people put under the totalitarian political party flow massively into Japan and obtain Japanese voting rights, China may further enhance interference with Japan’s domestic affairs. Democracy should be the minimum requirement for any participant in the regional community.

3. Be alert to China-led Sinocentrism.
　　　　　As China’s long-term national strategy is to achieve the “Great Restoration of the Chinese Nation” to mark its centennial around 2050, the proposed East Asian Community could turn into a China-led East Asian order known as Sinocentrism.
　　　　　The year 2050 reminds us of Richard Fisher’s warning that China’s ultimate goal is to become a world-dominating military power by the middle of the 21st century. (The warning given to the delegation of Japan Institute of National Fundamentals by Fisher, a U.S. specialist on Chinese military forces, during JINF’s visit to Washington, D.C. in April, 2009, is included in the book titled “Japan Should Enhance Strategic Power” (p. 161), which has been edited by Yoshiko Sakurai and published by Bungeishunju Ltd.)
　　　　　Prime Minister Hatoyama should be alert to the possibility that China could take advantage of his East Asian Community initiative promotion to achieve its own national strategy.

4. Do not exclude the United States from the East Asian Community initiative.
　　　　　In his speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on October 7, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada indicated the United States would be excluded from the East Asian Community initiative. “I would like to consider the community as consisting of Japan, China, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, Australia and New Zealand,” he said.
　　　　　The U.S. Obama Administration has grown concerned about the remark. On October 14, Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told a news conference in Beijing that critical dialogues that touched on security, economic and commercial issues should involve the United States. He thus made a check against any East Asian Community initiative excluding the United States.
　　　　　China once demonstrated its ambition to create an East Asian Community involving ASEAN plus 3 – China, Japan and South Korea – as a core group (excluding the United States). Japan, alert to China’s growing influences, took leadership in 2005 in launching an East Asian Summit including the three major democratic countries of India, Australia and New Zealand in addition to the ASEAN plus 3 group. Since then, China has seemingly lost its enthusiasm to pursue an East Asian Community.
　　　　　At the same time, China Reform Forum Chair Zheng Bijian, known as a foreign policy brain for Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a contribution to the U.S. authoritative Foreign Affairs magazine (September/October 2005 issue), said “it would not be in China’s interest to exclude the United States from the process (to form an East Asian Community).”
　　　　　Whether he knew such subtle changes in China’s attitude over the past few years, Prime Minister Hatoyama called on China and South Korea to cooperate in promoting the East Asian Community initiative at a Japan-China-South Korea summit in Beijing on October 10. He described the three countries as the core of the initiative. In response, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao retained a cautious attitude, pointing out that efforts should be accumulated since cooperation under an existing mechanism in East Asia is already underway.
　　　　　The Hatoyama government should explain why a subregional multilateral organization should be created in addition to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum which includes the United States.
　　　　　The Hatoyama government should also specify the positions of Taiwan in the East Asian Community initiative. Any community excluding democratic Taiwan as East Asia’s fifth largest economy after Japan, China, South Korea and Indonesia is inconceivable. Taiwan is an APEC member.

　　　　　　Just before and after the inauguration of the Hatoyama government, new moves emerged within the Democratic Party of Japan in regard to the issue of voting rights for foreigners. Toward the August 30 general election, the Korean Residents Union in Japan, an organization of South Korean residents known as Mindan, proactively supported candidates who were in favor of giving foreign residents voting rights. The South Korean government has enhanced its diplomatic approach to the new government regarding the matter. Last year, we announced policy proposals under the title of “Toward the Adoption of a Special Naturalization System for Special Permanent Residents.” Based on our considerations and developments since then, we would like to renew the proposals from the viewpoint that foreign residents should not be given the right to vote in Japan.^a

[Policy Proposals]
1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.

1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.
　　　　　　In Japan’s local elections, the points of contention are often made over matters that are related to the core of national policy, including the problems relating to U.S. military bases and nuclear power plant construction. Japanese citizens alone should be responsible for making choices regarding such matters that may have far-reaching effects on Japan’s future.
　　　　　　If North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were allowed to directly or indirectly interfere in choices regarding territorial disputes, U.S. military bases or any other problem linked directly to Japan’s sovereignty and national security, it could damage peace and stability in East Asia, the Japan-U.S. alliance or the Japan-South Korea friendship.^b

　　　　　　In 1995, the Supreme Court of Japan clearly rejected foreigners’ requests for voting rights in local elections, concluding: “Given that local governments are an integral part of Japan’s national governing structure, ‘residents’ (with voting rights in local elections) in Section 2 of Article 93 in Japan’s Constitution should be interpreted as Japanese citizens residing in regions under the jurisdiction of relevant local governments.”
　　　　　　Of more than 190 countries in the world, those that allow foreigners to vote in elections are limited to less than a quarter. These countries have had special reasons for accepting foreigners’ voting rights, including a long-held policy of attracting foreign workers.
　　　　　　The number of Japanese nationals with permanent resident status in South Korea is limited to several dozens, against hundreds of thousands of South Korean special permanent residents in Japan. Given the disparity in numbers, it is difficult to justify reciprocity between Japan andSouth Korea. ^c　　
　　　　　　Some view Korean residents in Japan as persons who were transported to Japan through coercion, and their offspring. However, only 320,000 persons or 16% of two million Koreans who were residing in Japan in 1945 were mobilized to work in Japan during the war. Most of them returned to Korea after the war. At one time, there was systematic discrimination against special permanent residents regarding social security and the like. Since around 1982 when Japan signed the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and implemented social security programs that treated Japanese and foreign residents as equals, however, such discrimination has vastly decreased.
　　　　　　One of motivating factors behind Korean residents’ demand for the right to vote in local elections is the fact that increasingly fewer Korean residents perceive themselves as foreigners. Tokyo Metropolitan University Professor Chung Dae-kyun says, “Allowing special permanent residents to vote in Japanese elections while holding Korean citizenship will perpetuate the gap between citizenship and identity.” It makes a great deal more sense to give Korean special permanent residents the right to vote by enabling them to become Japanese citizens. Doing so is certainly in keeping with global conventional wisdom.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.
　　　　　　Currently, special permanent residents wishing to become Japanese citizens are forced to complete the same laborious formalities as foreigners without special status. They must also select Chinese characters for their surnames from a list that excludes many of the characters used to write the most common Korean surnames such as “Choi,” “Kang,” ”Yun” and “Cho.”

　　　　　　For foreigners who have been awarded special permanent resident status and are willing to acquire Japanese citizenship and fulfill the concomitant duties and responsibilities, the current formalities are too laborious and should be simplified as follows:
(1) Identification: A census record from the applicant’s home country (or similar document) and an alien registration certificate
(2) Confirmation of intention to naturalize in Japan: A naturalization permission application, a written motivation to naturalize in Japan, and a written oath in which the applicant promises to be a law-abiding, upstanding citizen.
　　　　　　Even the simplified mechanism, like the ordinary naturalization system, should be based on approval. It is desirable to enact a temporary law to limit an effective period of time for the mechanism.
　　　　　　The special permanent resident system for those who have resided in Japan since before the war and their offspring should be reviewed after the special naturalization mechanism is implemented. One choice would be to integrate the system into the ordinary permanent resident system.
　　　　　　Naturalization means that a foreigner becomes an official member of Japan to share the same political destiny with original Japanese citizens. For all naturalization cases including special ones, the written motivation to naturalize in Japan and the written oath should be treated strictly. Some sober ceremony should be implemented when the oath is presented. But any ceremony has never been carried out.. Since July 2003, Japan has discontinued to require even the written motivation to be submitted.
　　　　　　In 1998, a stay in Japan as a condition for the ordinary permanent resident status was reduced to 10 years from 20 years. Since then, foreigners with this status have quickly increased. When granting the status, the government should strictly check whether an applicant’s permanent stay in Japan would meet the country’s national interests. From the viewpoint of Japan’s national interest, however, the government should positively address the permanent resident status for political refugees who escape from oppression under dictatorship.

————————————————————————————————–
^a The policy proposals are based on discussions after the March 2008 proposals were given. Nihon University Professor Akira Momochi was among participants in the discussions.

^b Registered foreign residents in Japan numbered 2,217,426 at the end of 2008. Of the total, Chinese (including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong) accounted for the largest share at 655,377 or 30%, followed by 589,239 South and North Koreans or 27%.
　　　　　　The number of foreigners with the special or ordinary permanent resident status stood at 912,361 including 420,305 special permanent residents. Koreans accounted for 99% of the special permanent residents. Since the early 1970s when South Koreans exceeded 50% of special permanent residents, the Japanese government has discontinued to specify the number of South or North Koreans. We estimate the number of North Koreans at 50,000 or less. We call for the government to disclose specifics. Special permanent residents include members of the General Association of Korean Residents, which is known as Chongryon and claims that all its activities are based around the concept of Juche (Chonryong Website).
　　　　　　Ordinary permanent residents numbered 492,056 including not a small number of Chinese under the CCP influence.
　　　　　　Any nationality-wise breakdown of ordinary permanent residents at the end of 2008 is not available. Of 439,757 foreigners with the ordinary permanent resident status at the end of 2007, Chinese accounted for the largest share at 128,501 persons. South and North Koreans captured the fourth largest share at 49,914 persons.

^c According to the 2003 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics on overseas Japanese residents, the number of Japanese nationals staying in South Korea stood at 55.

[Policy Proposals]
1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

　　　　　　The United States has been growingly concerned that Japan could drift away from the United States under the Hatoyama government. In his article that has been reported in the United States and interpreted as anti-American, Hatoyama said, “The Japan-U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy.” But he has failed to gain any confidence in the United States.
　　　　　　Furthermore, Katsuya Okada, who has become foreign minister in the new government, indicated his plan to limit the scope of the Japan-U.S. alliance to the Asia-Pacific region in a foreign policy vision report, which he published in 2005 when he was the president of the DPJ. Okada thus denied the concept of “the Japan-U.S. alliance in the world” as agreed between the two countries under the past Liberal Democratic Party government. His assumption of the foreign minister portfolio may be another matter of concern to the United States.
　　　　　　If Hatoyama is confident that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy, the prime minister at his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama should declare, “The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” Hatoyama should try to eliminate U.S. concerns about Japan. A declaration using the late U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield’s famous remark should help the Hatoyama government gain U.S. confidence since Mansfield was respected on a bipartisan basis in the U.S. political arena.

2. Continue the SDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.

　　　　　　On the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ refueling mission in the Indian Ocean under the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law set to expire in January 2010, the Pentagon press secretary said on September 9, “We would very much encourage them to continue those efforts.” On August 31, the State Department spokesman said: “A stable, prosperous Afghanistan is in the interests of the entire international community, including Japan. But of course, it’s up to each country to determine how they can best contribute to that effort.” These remarks indicate nuanced differences within the U.S. government. But the refueling mission is a symbol of Japan’s contributions to the war against terrorism and should be continued. The DPJ’s campaign manifesto and its coalition agreement with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party call for Japan to play a proactive role in the “eradication of poverty” and “national reconstruction” in Afghanistan to eliminate a breeding ground of terrorism. However, a return to check-book diplomacy cannot become a symbolic contribution replacing the refueling mission.

3. Be aware that any revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or the bilateral agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will never become a priority for the Obama administration.

　　　　　　The U.S. State Department spokesman has declared that the U.S. government has no intent to renegotiate an agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, while the Pentagon press secretary has urged the Hatoyama government to implement the agreement. Michael Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said, “The Obama administration is beset with foreign and security challenges globally and will have little appetite to renegotiate the Okinawa base agreements (again!) or SOFA even in a year .” Hatoyama should keep in mind that if he urges the United States to review these agreements promptly, his ability as an international politician may be doubted. At a press conference just after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama indicated a right decision to refrain from taking up the SOFA issue at his planned meeting with President Obama in late September.

4. Urge the United States to issue a new Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security to redefine the bilateral alliance in 2010, based on military changes in East Asia and in the world.

　　　　　　Since the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration was issued in 1996 to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral alliance after the Cold War, the East Asian security situation has changed dramatically on North Korea’s nuclear armament and China’s military rise. The world security situation also has changed greatly as the war against the terrorism of Islamic extremists has become an important common challenge for the civilized world.
　　　　　　In 2010 marking the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan, based on these changes, should propose a new joint declaration to redefine the Japan-U.S. alliance and get prepared for the uncertain Asian and world situations.

5. Revise the three non-nuclear principles in a bid to admit the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

　　　　　　If U.S. nuclear deterrence were to work as designed to ultimately secure Japan’s safety, not only Japan but its potential enemies would have to be led to believe that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons for Japan’s defense. If Japan changes its three non-nuclear principles — not to possess, produce or introduce into the country nuclear weapons – in a bid to admit the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, potential enemies should clearly understand the U.S. willingness to defend Japan and the U.S. nuclear deterrence against possible attacks on Japan will be enhanced.
　　　　　　 The DPJ has suspected a secret Japan-U.S. deal to allow U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan and indicated it might demand the United States to comply with the non-nuclear principles. If the DPJ pursues an “equal” Japan-U.S. relationship as urged in its campaign manifesto, however, wouldn’t it be reasonable for Japan to possess nuclear weapons before refusing the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan?

[Policy Proposals]
1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.

1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

　　　　　　Excessive environmental conservation measures are feared to impose a huge burden on the industrial circle and the people. These measures could force Japan to impose a far greater burden on itself than under the Kyoto Protocol.

(1) The medium-term GHG emission reduction target has failed to specify reasonable reduction measures and costs to secure the attainment of the target. It also has failed to make clear the burden that the industrial circle and the people would shoulder.

(2) How would the government, which has unilaterally offered such a lofty goal, take the responsibility for spending massive taxpayer money for purchasing emission credits or rights when the target turns out difficult to attain? The administration should specify the target’s net GHG emission reduction portion excluding emission credit or right purchases.

(3) Standard years for reducing GHG emissions have yet to be unified. The European Union has offered a 13% reduction from the standard year of 2005. The United States has come up with a 14% cut from the same year. Earlier, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government of former prime minister Taro Aso had proposed a 15% cut from 2005. In contrast, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has offered a 25% reduction from 1990. Such a target could become a major stumbling block discouraging the United States from taking part in a post-Kyoto Protocol framework.

How does the new government view Japan’s GHG emission reduction obligation (to reduce emissions by 6% from 1990 level) in the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period? The obligation is viewed as difficult for Japan to fulfill. Japan could be forced to spend massive amounts of taxpayer money on emission credit purchases and other measures to attain the goal. How will the new government raise funds for such purchases?

2. Do not make any easy international commitment that has not gained the endorsement of the people.

(1) It is a misuse of power for the administration to make an international commitment based on an incomplete, unspecific campaign manifesto without giving sufficient explanations to the people or having sufficient discussions in the absence of social consent. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should not have made any easy international commitment at the United Nations and the like.

(2) In his speech at the September 7 Asahi World Environment Forum 2009, Hatoyama described the medium-term target as based on emission reductions that are scientifically required to stop global warming. The prime minister should explain the relevant scientific data.

　　　　　　Hatoyama also said: “We will also pursue all major countries’ building of a fair, effective international framework. An agreement on an ambitious target among all major countries will be a precondition for Japan’s commitment to the international community.” But this approach could result in a repetition of the Kyoto Protocol experience. Domestic social consensus on any international commitment is a prerequisite for making such a commitment.
　　　　　　Hatoyama also said, “We believe that industrial countries should provide financial and technical support to developing countries that ambitiously try to reduce GHG emissions.” But we should require major GHG-emitting countries to make due payments for such support. Technical and financial grants to developing countries may delay their technological innovation to the disadvantage of global warming prevention and amount to unreasonable national wealth losses that the people cannot ignore.

3. Offer a medium-term target featuring a better balance between policies.

(1) Among DPJ initiatives, the elimination of expressway tolls and the abolition of provisional auto-related tax portions are expected to contribute to expanding automobile use and carbon dioxide emissions, contradicting the GHG emission reduction plan. These initiatives may also affect operators and users of public transportation services and hurt regional economies by leading to a decline in regional transportation networks. How will the administration address these adverse effects?

(2) If expressway tolls were to be eliminated, the government would have to specify how it would deal with 40 trillion yen in debt left by now-defunct public road corporations and their privatization.

(3) The increase of national burden accompanying the government’s environment policy would inevitably lead to a decline in Japan’s international competitiveness and to its industrial hollowing-out. Given that new financial resources will be required for the introduction of a fixed-price purchase system for renewable energy with mandatory purchase of all electricity generated and that the early introduction of an environmental tax will be difficult, further deterioration of fiscal condition would be inevitable. How will the government achieve both economic recovery and sustainable growth under such circumstances?

(4) Citing oil crises in the 1970s, the DPJ has argued that tougher environmental regulations would promote technological innovation and improve the economy. This argument is too idealistic to be persuasive. Compared with the shift from massive production and consumption before the oil crises to energy conservation, any further technological innovation over a short term of some 10 years would be far more difficult in Japan that already features the most widespread energy conservation technologies in the world.

(5) The DPJ depends on data from a certain research institute to argue that the medium-term GHG emission reduction target would be compatible with economic growth. But the DPJ has never specified objective data prepared in a manner for which the party is responsible. Any international commitment without responsible verification amounts to ignoring the people.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.
　　　　　　 In its campaign manifesto the DJP has vowed to “take steady steps toward the use of nuclear power,” while forming a coalition with the Social Democratic Party that has described itself as the only political party that has made clear a shift away from nuclear energy. It would be unrealistic to attain the medium-term CO2 emission reduction target on the condition of a shift away from nuclear energy. As a responsible ruling party, the DPJ is required to specify its attitude on the future nuclear energy policy.

September 11, 2009

Japan Should Be Prepared to Respond to Emergency Situation in North Korea
— Promote Freedom Unification by ROK
to Prevent China’s Control of the Korean Peninsula —

Policy Proposals
1. Japan should adopt the promotion of freedom unification by the Republic of Korea (ROK) as its strategic goal and be prepared to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea.
2. Japan should endorse the vision of freedom unification offered by U.S. President Barack Obama and ROK President Lee Myung-bak on June 16, 2009, which seeks “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.”
3. Japan, the United States and the ROK should expand their strategic talks at government, military and private expert levels to prepare for an emergency situation in North Korea.
4. At their strategic talks, the three countries should consider how Japan should cooperate with the United States and the ROK upon their military advancement into the North and how the United States and the ROK should cooperate with Japan in securing safety of and rescuing Japanese abductees in the North.
5. While the ROK is the primary party to the freedom unification, Japan and the United States should proactively support ROK proponents of the freedom unification to propel the trilateral friendship to new horizons.

　A medical life limit of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il has come into sight. Within several years, he could die or become incapable of working due to serious illnesses. Since early 2009, indications of Kim’s sense of urgency have emerged, including the start of the process of nominating his successor and the enhancement of the National Defense Commission.
　A dictatorship changes after the death of the dictator, as indicated by the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin and China after Mao Zedong. In North Korea, no major change came after the death of Kim Il Sung because by that time his son, Kim Jong Il, had already taken effective control of power.
　After Kim Jong Il’s death, North Korea could plunge into an emergency situation, a chaos in which the government may lose control of the country. In preparation for such a development, U.S. and ROK military advancement into the North and Chinese military intervention have been contemplated. The Korean Peninsula is entering the era of drastic changes rather than continuing the status quo.
　Desirable for Japan will be the expansion of free democracy on the Korean Peninsula and the eradication of extraordinarily anti-Japanese policies. It is ideal for people on the Peninsula to implement these measures voluntarily, peacefully and promptly.
　The problem is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a bid to maintain its totalitarian control system, the CCP has made aggressive efforts to block the expansion of freedom domestically and externally.
　In North Korea after Kim Jong Il, the CCP may attempt to secure its influence in a manner counter to Japan’s national interests through such measures as the creation of a CCP-controlled regime. Japan should contemplate its policies based on such strategic environment.
　On June 16, the U.S. and ROK presidents specified a joint vision to pursue “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” U.S. and ROK forces are preparing for their advancement into the North upon a chaos. A unified Korea under the ROK’s auspice should meet Japan’s national interests as long as the ROK maintains the U.S.-ROK alliance, the Japan-ROK Basic Relations Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
　Regrettably, it is unlikely that North Korean people who seek freedom after the current extreme suppressive regime collapses can prevent the CCP’s intervention, maintain domestic security and build a free democracy by themselves.
　Only the ROK government may (1) maintain the philosophy of free democracy, (2) maintain security to contain subversive elements and (3) be recognized internationally as a legitimate body to govern the northern part of the Korean Peninsula.
　Therefore, the promotion of the freedom unification by ROK will be a strategic goal to meet Japan’s national interests.
　Under a China-controlled North Korean regime, the Chinese army would use military facilities and other key infrastructure such as ports, airports, and expressways during a war on or around the Korea Peninsula. Japan’s support responding to an emergency situation in North Korea must be specified as being linked to the freedom unification of the peninsula by the ROK. Japan cannot support a two-stage reunification plan that might tolerate a China-controlled government in North Korea.
　With this point in mind, Japan should accumulate efforts to realize the best scenario. If Japan takes irresponsible actions to avoid its sacrifices and burdens, the Japan-U.S. alliance may weaken. This could allow the United States to consult with China and tolerate a China-controlled North Korean regime in disregard of Japan. If Japan, the United States and the ROK adopt the expansion of free democracy on the Korean Peninsula a common strategy and get prepared to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea, they may be able to prevent CCP’s hegemony in East Asia. The future of the Japan-U.S. alliance depends on responses to an emergency situation in North Korea.

Japan Should Provide for Domestic Legislation for Effective Cargo Inspections

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 June 15, 2009

　The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a new resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test on May 25. Originally Japan and the United States called for a stronger resolution featuring mandatory cargo inspections. Even if such resolution had been adopted, Japan could not have taken part in mandatory inspections, as explained below, in its surrounding waters such as the Sea of Japan while leaving other U.N. members including the United States to take risks accompanying the inspections. In that case, Japan should have come under harsh criticism from the international community.
　 For this reason, JINF urgently recommends Japan to take the following actions:

1. Overhaul defense laws to provide for the necessary domestic legislation for effective cargo inspections.
2. Straighten out the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the collective self-defense right.
3. Switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws.

1. Overhaul defense laws to provide for the necessary domestic legislation for effective cargo inspections
　　Japan has created a law named the “Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” as its legal base for cargo inspections by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But such inspections are linked to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” as indicated by the name of the law. Unless the “situations in areas surrounding Japan” are declared, the SDF cannot conduct ship inspections under the law.
　The ruling and opposition camps are considering amending the law to enable the SDF to conduct ship inspections in other situations as well. But it may be impossible to take effective actions under such limited amendment.
　This is because the “ship inspection operations” under Article 5 of the act begin with “monitoring of a ship’s passage” and cover “approaching, chasing and accompanying the ship concerned and waiting for it in its way as far as necessary.” As for “boarding to inspect and verify” as the core of ship inspection operations, the act requires the SDF “to request the captain or the person who controls the ship concerned (hereinafter referred to as ‘the captain or the like’) for stopping the ship and to get on board for inspection and verification of documents and cargoes on approval by the captain or the like.”
　The provision means that the SDF can inspect only ships whose captains or the like approve their ships’ stoppage and inspection as requested by the SDF. What can the SDF do against ships whose captains or the like reject such SDF requests? The law only provides that the SDF should “persuade the captain or the like to accept such requests.” In other words, the SDF would be able to do nothing more than persuasion.
　The law also provides that SDF inspectors may use weapons only “when they have due reasons to identify the need for using weapons to defend themselves or their colleagues engaged in inspection operations.” In addition, the act provides that SDF inspectors “shall not harm any people” for other reasons than their legitimate self-defense or averting present danger under the Penal Code.
　 Under the law, SDF inspectors are barred from issuing stoppage orders or fire warning shots at the ship concerned. No effective measures can be taken under such limitation.
　The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) now exists as an international effort for cargo inspection operations. More than 80 countries have endorsed the principles and objectives of the PSI and virtually participated and cooperated in the operations. The Japanese government has claimed that it has “proactively participated in the PSI operations” by hosting such programs as the second PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise.
　 In fact, however, Japan’s participation in PSI operations is far from proactive. This is because Japan has participated primarily in “tabletop and command post exercises” rather than actual drills hosted by other countries. Japanese participants in actual drills in the past have been limited to Japan Coast Guard patrol boats and special teams from the National Police Agency, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and customs service. Regarding the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, the Ministry’s white paper “Defense of Japan 2008” says, “in addition to dispatching Ministry of Defense personnel including SDF personnel to a variety of meetings, Japan dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas, and gathered related information.” Other PSI exercises for Japan’s participation as cited by the annual defense white paper are limited to a panel exhibition called “exhibition training.” Have such realities meet the white paper’s conclusion that the SDF has “played a proactive role on its own initiative in a number of joint exercises?”
　The white paper also says: “Through these proactive efforts, for example in the case of PSI maritime interdiction activities, the relevant information obtained through information gathering activities (such as surveillance by ships of the MSDF and by aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF) is provided to relevant organizations and countries. Furthermore, it is thought that the MSDF will be able to carry out effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships, with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard in the event that maritime security operations are ordered.”
　This indicates that what the SDF can do is limited to the provision of the “relevant information” to “relevant organizations and countries.” Unless “maritime security operations are ordered,” the SDF may be barred from carrying out “effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships.”
　“Effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships” could be based on maritime security operations that have already been ordered for the SDF to address pirates. But maritime security operations are interpreted as excluding the use of weapons for protecting foreign ships. Effective measures would be difficult to take within the scope of the maritime security operations.
　Japan should fundamentally overhaul its defense laws to resolve the above problems in the following way:

2. Straighten out the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the collective self-defense right
　The above problems have emerged as the government has interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as banning the exercise of the collective self-defense right. The government has banned stoppage orders and warning shots in ship inspection operations because these measures are expected to lead to the exercise of the collective self-defense right. Under the constraint, the SDF’s PSI operations are limited to the provision of information and participation in exhibition training.
　The Unites States and other relevant foreign countries interpret PSI including its exercises as military operations. Unless the above interpretation of the Constitution is modified, the Maritime SDF cannot participate effectively in PSI operations. Some people are exploring cooperation using Japan Coast Guard patrol boats, but this measure also will fail to secure Japan’s effective participation in PSI operations. In fact, the Japan Coast Guard Law provides that “any provision in this law shall not be interpreted as allowing the Japan Coast Guard and its officials to be organized, trained or function as military forces (Article 25).” The Japan Coast Guard, like the SDF, is barred from participating in military exercises, let alone military operations.

3. Switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws
　　Under international customary law, warships have been given the right of “boarding.” The right is also provided for by Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas and Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, Japan has failed to provide for the necessary legislation for implementing rights and obligations under international law. This is the reason Japan has had no choice but to order maritime security operations in addressing pirates.
　Legal systems of many countries allow military forces to base their operations directly on international law. Those countries use so-called “negative list” to restrict actions of military forces. This means that military forces are allowed in principle to freely conduct operations other than those banned by international law including the International Humanitarian Law. As a matter of course, military forces are bound by orders and regulations of their respective governments. But they can engage in necessary operations even if there are no domestic laws which specifically allow such operations. This is because military forces may extend their operations into enemy territories or, even if they are in their own countries, they may operate in the absence of government functions because of enemy invasion.
　 In Japan, however, the SDF that should be defined as military forces under international law is governed by laws originating from the Police Act. This is partly because the SDF was inaugurated first as the National Police Reserve. Therefore the SDF cannot engage in operations other than those specified in the “positive list” (governing laws). The SDF may be able to engage in various operations purporting to be as “education and training” or “surveys and research required for implementation of duties” (Article 4, Ministry of Defense Establishment Law) if they are not accompanied by the use of force or the use of weapons. But the SDF cannot use weapons or take other effective measures without laws which specifically allow it to. Japan is the only country where such legal constraints are put on military forces.
　This is the reason Japan had no choice but to create special measures laws for the SDF’s refueling operations in the Indian Ocean and its dispatch to Iraq. Unless new special measures laws are developed or existing laws are amended, the SDF cannot conduct new operations. Every time a new situation emerges, Japan must consume much time on developing law for actions to address the situation. This can prevent Japan from making prompt, effective contributions.
　This is the problem facing Japan now. Accumulation of stopgap measures can hurt Japan’s national interests.
　Japan should learn lessons from the present situation and switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws.

JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Yoshiko Sakurai
Tadae Takubo
Masato Ushio
Koichi Endo
Yujiro Oiwa
Yoichi Shimada
Katsuhiko Takaike
Yasushi Tomiyama
Tsutomu Nishioka

Japan Should Impose All-out Sanctions on N. Korea to Block Nuclear Arms Development
– Reconsider Interpretation on Collective Self-defense Right and Non-Nuclear Principles –

　North Korea’s Kim Jong Il regime conducted a nuclear test on May 25 following its test-firing of a missile in April. The nuclear test, though viewed as not completely successful, indicated some remarkable technological progress from the previous one three years ago.
　 Some experts still say North Korea has carried out nuclear tests to prompt the United States to sit at a bilateral negotiating table. North Korea is also viewed by some as attempting to start nuclear disarmament negotiations after its position as a nuclear power is recognized. These views have failed to understand the essence of the problem. North Korea’s nuclear missile development is not a mere diplomatic card. Their strategic goal is to possess nuclear missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland as well as Japan. On the premise of continuing to develop nuclear missiles, North Korea has staved off military pressures and economic sanctions while gaining outside support.
　North Korea’s objective is to block U.S. military intervention when it absorbs South Korea by force. The development of nuclear missiles reaching the U.S. mainland meets the objective. This is the core strategy of the Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il regime. Pyongyang will never abandon the strategy in exchange for negotiations or returns. We should recognize the reality.
　In order to block North Korea’s possession of nuclear missiles, we should prevent North Korea from having capabilities to develop nuclear missiles. North Korea has natural uranium resources. But it introduces various technologies, machines, materials, components, energy resources and hard currencies required for the nuclear missile development from Japan and other countries. In order to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear missiles, we have no way but to stop their flow into North Korea.
　The three countries of South Korea as the North’s absorption target, the United States that has formed a military alliance with South Korea, and Japan whose safety is closely linked to the safety of South Korea must correctly recognize North Korea’s nuclear strategy, adopt the derailment of that strategy as their common national objective and enhance their strategic cooperation.
　The three countries should further build up the deterrence against North Korea. To this end, the Japanese government should straighten out the interpretation of the Constitution on the collective self-defense right. The government should also reconsider its three non-nuclear principles in order to enhance the Japan-U.S.-South Korea nuclear deterrence.
　 JINF has persistently pointed to the essence of the North Korea problem and made the relevant recommendations. As a private institute, JINF has accumulated strategic discussions with government officials and experts in South Korea, the United States and Taiwan. Relevant government-to-government talks should be intensified.
　Based on the above, we hereby recommend to the Japanese government and the international community to take the following measures:

1. Japan, the United States and South Korea should lead the imposition of all-out sanctions on North Korea and shut out the flow of goods, money and people into the North completely.
　　First, Japan should implement all-out sanctions immediately. Particularly, Japan should prohibit Korean residents in Japan from visiting North Korea in principle and completely ban exports and remittances to North Korea. Then, Japan should ask the United States and South Korea to cooperate.
　　The United States should redesignate North Korea as a state sponsoring terrorism and reimpose financial sanctions as we have persistently recommended.
　　South Korea should close the Kaesong industrial park, suspend trade with, investment in and sightseeing trips to the North, shut out private-sector support for the North and raise the abduction of South Korean citizens by the North as the issue of top national priority.

2. China has supported North Korea’s nuclear development by continuing energy and food supply to and expanding trade with North Korea in spite of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718 that condemned North Korea’s previous nuclear test and called for sanctions. China has also forcefully sent back North Korean defectors in violation of the U.N. Refugee Convention.
　　Japan, the United States and South Korea should be united to urge China to comply with the UNSC resolution and stop supporting the Kim Jong Il terrorist regime. If China continues to violate the UNSC resolution, the three countries should impose sanctions on Chinese financial institutions handling North Korean money.

3. North Korea has obtained hard currencies in exchange for, among others, its provision of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran and Syria. In order to shut down the money flow, the UNSC should stipulate the enforcement of inspections on ships and aircraft in its new resolution. Even if such wording in the UNSC resolution ends up insufficient, the international community should thoroughly implement inspections within the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Japan should provide for necessary legislation to participate in such inspections proactively.

4. In order to build up the nuclear deterrence against North Korea, the Japanese government should revise the present interpretation of the Constitution on the collective self-defense right, reconsider its three non-nuclear principles, develop missile defense capabilities and take necessary steps to secure capabilities to attack enemy bases.

JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Yoshiko Sakurai
Tadae Takubo
Masato Ushio
Koichi Endo
Yujiro Oiwa
Yoichi Shimada
Katsuhiko Takaike
Yasushi Tomiyama
Tsutomu Nishioka
Osamu Eya
Ruriko Kubota
Ryutaro Hirata

Analysis
JINF Korea Study Group (Chairman: Tsutomu Nishioka, Vice Chairman: Yoichi Shimada)

　North Korea’s objective for possessing nuclear missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland as well as Japan is a Pyongyang-led unification of the Korean Peninsula. The objective of the nuclear missile development is to threaten to make nuclear attacks on the United States, as South Korea’s ally, and Japan, that supports U.S. forces by providing bases, if the two countries impede a North-led unification. North Korea would like to absorb South Korea without fighting another war with the U.S.
　In November 1968, Kim Il Sung issued a secret order (see Note) that called for North Korea’s indigenous production of nuclear missiles capable to attack the U.S. mainland so that the United States would have no choice but to withdraw from South Korea. This is the reason North Korea has continued nuclear missile development even at the cost of starving 15% of its population to death in the second half of the 1990s.

　The latest nuclear test, though viewed as not completely successful, indicated some technological breakthrough from the previous test three years ago. In April’s missile launch, North Korea successfully flew the first stage of the Taepodong 2 missile, although the missile exploded in air in some 40 seconds after firing in the previous test in 2006. It also successfully separated and flew the Rodong missile placed on the second stage.
　The latest nuclear explosion test was apparently far more powerful than the previous one. The explosion yield of the latest test is estimated at more than 2 kilotons against 0.5 kiloton for the previous one. But the yield fell short of 20 kilotons for the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki. In the latest and previous tests, North Korea may have intentionally mixed plutonium 240 with plutonium 239 to cause an immature explosion instead of successfully-designed fission of plutonium 239, according to some experts.
　At present, we can conclude that North Korea has steadily established new technologies toward its production of nuclear missiles capable to attack the United States, as noted in the Kim Il Sung order. North Korea has been persistent in this regard. Therefore, North Korea, if left unchecked, may achieve its strategic goal of possessing nuclear missiles capable to attack the U.S. mainland in the near future. In this sense, time is running out in favor of North Korea.

　The Japanese government should not overlook the fact that members of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, known as Chongryon, have made great contributions to North Korea’s nuclear missile development.
　Korean engineers who belong to the Chongryon-affiliated Korean Association of Science and Technology in Japan (KAST) have cooperated in North Korea’s ballistic missile development. KAST consists of some 1,200 researchers and medical doctors working at universities and private companies and has been put under direct control by the External Liaison Department, an espionage branch of the North Korean Workers’ Party.
　When the Metropolitan Police Department in Tokyo searched KAST offices upon the arrest of its vice chairman and some others for their alleged violation of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law in October 2005, it found that data about surface-to-air missiles for the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force had leaked from the then Defense Agency to KAST.
　Reportedly, a man called Mr. Pyon (first name is unknown), a nuclear expert of Kyoto University graduate, visited North Korea via Beijing in mid-October last year.
　From October 16 to November 13 last year, Mr. So Pan Do, a missile engineer of KAST who serves as vice president of Kumgang Motor Joint Venture Company, visited North Korea. He has studied at the University of Tokyo and is a missile engine expert given a doctorate in North Korea. He also visited North Korea when the North fired missiles in July 2006.
　Kumgang Motor Joint Venture Company has its head office and plant in Wonsan. Nominally, it is a motor maker. But the company has been developing missile engines. The company’s President, Mr. So Sok Hong, is a missile engine expert given a doctorate at the University of Tokyo. He was formerly a vice chairman of KAST and now serves as an adviser to the association. He has frequently visited North Korea. His last visit to North Korea came in September 2005. In November 2006, Japanese police searched his house.
　 In response to the latest nuclear test, Japan should invoke all-out sanctions to stop the flow of goods, money and people to North Korea. Particularly, the government should prohibit all Koreans in Japan from visiting North Korea in principle to stop any technology outflow from Japan to North Korea.
　Specifically, the government should refuse to issue reentry permits for any Koreans who leave Japan for North Korea. The residence status in Japan should be cancelled for any Koreans who will have been found to have visited North Korea while having applied for visits to other countries. Such penalties should be adopted.
　Some government officials said the government’s refusal to issue reentry permits for Chongryon-affiliated Korean residents with permanent residence permits would be problematic from the human rights perspective. Until the early 1970s, however, the Japanese government had issued no reentry permits for Chongryon-affiliated Korean residents in principle. The government is authorized to decide whether to issue reentry permits for foreign residents in Japan in consideration of the balance between their human rights and Japan’s national security.

Note: In November 1968, Kim Il Sung issued the following order for indigenous production of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles for attacks on the U.S. mainland. (Source: Kim Tong Hyok, “Kim Il Sung’s Secret Orders,” The Sankei Shimbun. The author studied Kim Il Sung’s secret orders as a “leading core agent” of the External Liaison Department in the 1970s.)
“Although we have to expel Americans from South Korea, they will never withdraw from the Korean Peninsula under the present circumstances. Therefore, we have to promote preparations for another conflict with Americans… In preparing for a war at present, we should urgently obtain the means to attack the U.S. mainland. The world has had hundreds or dozens of small and large wars. There has been no war free from U.S. intervention. Since all these wars occurred outside the United States, however, no foreign shell has reached the U.S. mainland. What would happen if shells fall on the U.S. soil? The situation may be different then. Antiwar movements may emerge in the United States. If such movements are combined with anti-U.S. movements in the Third World, Americans may have no choice but to abandon South Korea. Therefore, you must positively develop the technology for indigenous production of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as early as possible.” (A statement before a development team at the National Academy of Sciences Hamhung Branch)

Urgent Recommendations from JINF

The Japanese Government Should Impose Comprehensive Sanctions on North Korea Covering Merchandise, Financial and Human Exchanges
– In Protest to North Korea’s Firing of Missile –

　　On April 5, 2009, North Korea test-fired a long-range ballistic missile in what it called a satellite launch.
　　Whatever is mounted at the top of the missile, North Korea’s test-firing of the ballistic missile is aimed primarily at securing nuclear attack capabilities against Japan and its ally, the United States, and poses grave threats to Japan’s security.
　　United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1695 on July 15, 2006, condemning North Korea’s test-firing of ballistic missiles, said the council expressed “grave concern at the launch of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), given the potential of such systems to be used as a means to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads” and affirmed “that such launches jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond, particularly in light of the DPRK’s claim that it has developed nuclear weapons.” The resolution then demanded “that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program” and required all U.N. member states “to exercise vigilance and prevent the procurement of missiles or missile-related items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to the DPRK’s missile or WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs.”
　　The Japanese government has vowed to use its missile defense system for intercepting any missile if it were to fall on Japan’s territorial waters or land. Even if it were not to do so, the government has pledged to invoke its independent additional sanctions (including an embargo on exports to North Korea) and ask the UNSC to adopt a resolution condemning North Korea’s test-firing of the missile and calling for sanctions on that country. Leaders of many countries including the United States and South Korea have supported the attitude of the Japanese government.
　　We at JINF appreciate those measures.
　　Based on the appreciation, we here recommend the Japanese government to take the following actions:

Recommendations
- Invoke all-out sanctions and take measures to make UNSC Resolution 1695 and the like more effective.
　　(1) Suspend official development aid and all other assistances to countries that fail to comply with the resolution and the like.
　　(2) Block international organizations from providing any assistance to North Korea.
- Take measures to enhance Japan’s security capabilities and make the Japan-U.S. alliance more effective.
　　(1) Make a step to secure capabilities to attack enemy bases while developing missile defense capabilities.
　　(2) Modify the present interpretation of the collective self-defense right that contradicts the Japan-U.S. alliance.

■　Invoke all-out sanctions and take measures to make UNSC resolutions more effective
　　The Japanese government is considering a complete embargo on exports to North Korea. In addition, the government should suspend remittances to North Korea and prohibit Japanese and North Korean residents in Japan from travelling between Japan and North Korea to terminate bilateral merchandise, financial and human exchanges. It should also enhance efforts to close loopholes including exchanges through third countries.
　　It is also important for Japan to make diplomatic efforts to have the UNSC adopt a new resolution against North Korea. But any resolution may be meaningless unless it is effectively implemented.
　　In order to make past and future UNSC resolutions more effective, the Japanese government should take such actions as the following:
　　(1) Suspend official development aid and all other assistances to countries that fail to comply with the resolutions.
　　(2) Block U.N. agencies from providing any assistance to North Korea.
Regarding the second action, Japan and the United States as the two largest contributors to the United Nations should closely cooperate in exerting pressures on U.N. agencies through such measures as partial suspension of contributions. The government cannot be allowed to provide taxpayers’ money to any organizations that work to run counter to Japan’s national interests.

■ Take measures to enhance Japan’s security capabilities and make the Japan-U.S. alliance more effective
　　Posing the gravest threat to Japan are more than 150 Rodong medium-range missiles that are operational, rather than the Taepodong missile that was test-fired this time. In order to counter these missiles, the Japanese government should further develop missile defense capabilities and secure capabilities to attack enemy bases.
　　At a press conference on September 4, 1998, following North Korea’s test-firing of a Taepodong-1 missile, then Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga referred to the 1956 unified government view: “The Constitution cannot be interpreted as forcing Japan to sit down and wait for its collapse. Attacks on missile and other bases can legally be interpreted as part of justifiable self-defense unless no other options are left to defend Japan.” He then stated: “The view is still effective and such option is available.”
　　Nevertheless, the Japanese government has delayed its development of capabilities to attack enemy bases. At a time when North Korea is enhancing its attack capabilities, the Japanese government cannot be allowed to delay the development further.
　　The Japanese government should also modify the present interpretation of the collective self-defense right that contradicts the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Urgent Recommendation from JINF

The Japanese Government Should Refuse To Accept Misguided U.S.-North Korea Agreement

On October 11, the U.S. Department of State issued an agreement entitled “U.S.-North Korea Understandings on Verification.” On the same day, the Bush Administration announced that it had removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, ignoring voices of opposition even in the U.S.

We at JINF attach immense importance to the Japan-U.S. alliance. For that very reason, we feel compelled to express our disappointment in this ill-advised decision, which blemishes the reputation of the United States and undermines the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Though we have yet to determine whether or not the Japanese government issued a proper warning prior to these developments, the designation of nations as state sponsors of terrorism (as well as the removal of that designation) is, ultimately, a matter of U.S. policy. Therefore, the responsibility for such decisions sits squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. government.

Japan must bear complicit responsibility if it accepts the portion of the U.S.-North Korea deals that concerns verification of North Korean denuclearization. We urge our government to base its actions on decisions made independently.

By using the language “based on mutual consent,” U.S.-North Korea Understandings on Verification affords North Korea the right to refuse access to undeclared sites. It is difficult to envisage North Korea’s consenting to the inspection of nuclear bomb manufacturing or storage facilities. Therefore, the October 11 agreement in fact relinquishes verification rights and tolerates the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it harbors the potential for acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power.

We also urge the Japanese government to take the following actions during the next installment of the Six-Party Talks, anticipated to take place in the near future:

1.    Announce that Japan will not accept any North Korean declaration not including crucial information (e.g., nuclear weapon manufacturing facilities) as “a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” (Joint Statement of October 3, 2007).

2.    Adopt a strong, principled stance on verification. Do not accept the U.S.-North Korea deal; instead, propose that North Korea allow inspections, even of undeclared sites, should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deem them necessary.

JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS

Sakurai Yoshiko
Takubo Tadae
Ushio Masato
Endo Koichi
Oiwa Yujiro
Shimada Yoichi
Takaike Katsuhiko
Tomiyama Yasushi
Nishioka Tsutomu