Japan Should Not Abandon Nuclear Power Generation

　　The Great East Japan Earthquake has reminded us, as forcefully as the postwar devastation and the oil shocks, that a loss of stable supply of electricity and other energy causes immeasurable economic losses and disruptions to everyday life. As an emotional reaction to the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Japanese public is inclining toward abandoning nuclear power, and that could have a significant impact on Japan’s energy policy, which requires drastic revision.
　　The accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station has been serious. The impact and damage caused by the accident should in no way be underestimated.
　　Now is the time to recognize anew the importance of energy security, which refers to ensuring the supply of energy in an amount necessary for the people’s lives, social and economic activities, national defense and other essential activities at affordable prices and to reform the energy policy so as to place emphasis on national security.

【Proposals】
1. Continue nuclear power generation.
By improving the safety of nuclear power generation based on the lesson of the Fukushima accident, Japan can strengthen its energy security and fulfill its responsibility to the international community.

1. Continue nuclear power generation.
By improving the safety of nuclear power generation based on the lesson of the Fukushima accident, Japan can strengthen its energy security and fulfill its responsibility to the international community.

　　　As pursuing nuclear power generation as a key energy source is a global trend, Japan’s abandonment of nuclear power generation would not only represent the forsaking of its obligation to the international community but also undermine its energy security. By contributing to the improvement of the safety of nuclear power plants, Japan can fulfill its obligation to the international community and strengthen its energy security at the same time.
　　　Japan ranks No. 3 in the world in terms of the number of nuclear reactors and the volume of nuclear power generation (as of March 11, 2011). It has the world’s highest level of manufacturing technology for nuclear reactors. It is Japan’s obligation to maintain and further develop this key technology and use it to improve the safety of nuclear power plants in developed countries as well as in developing countries, where nuclear power generation continues to grow. By doing so, Japan can strengthen not only its energy security but also its national security.
　　　Stable supply of energy is indispensable to the prosperity of the global economy as well as the Japanese economy. By developing and exporting advanced nuclear power generation technology, Japan can contribute to the improvement of the safety of nuclear power plants around the world and the promotion of highly reliable nuclear power generation. The global population has surpassed 7 billion and is expected to reach around 9 billion by 2050. Energy, as well as foods, is essential for the well-being of people in both developed and developing countries. We are beginning to see limits to the supply of oil and other fossil fuels, so their prices may rise steeply. According to a survey conducted by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, nuclear power generation accounts for 15% of overall electricity used in 30 countries and regions around the world.
　　 　As of 2010, 140 nuclear reactors for the electricity generation purpose were under construction or on the drawing board and 432 reactors were in operation. Even after the Fukushima accident, the number of reactors is certain to increase in not only developed countries that regard nuclear power as a key energy source, such as the United States and France, but also in emerging economies like China (which accounts for 40% of all planned reactors around the world) and India. It is necessary to develop new energy sources such as solar, wind and geothermal power, to be sure. However, we must strengthen future energy security without missing the fundamentals of the issue.
　　　Nuclear power is not only a major power source for Japan and the lifeblood of the Japanese economy but also an essential energy source for the entire world. When we discuss nuclear power generation, it is important to take account of various global circumstances. For Japan, a resource-poor country, it would not be pragmatic to jump to a decision to abandon nuclear power generation as an emotional reaction. Such a decision would accelerate Japanese companies’ moves to relocate their operations out of Japan, leading to increased stagnation of domestic industrial production and other economic activities. Moreover, it would jeopardize the international position of Japan in Asia and in the world.
　　　Japan’s energy security is not an issue that depends on the choice between nuclear power and new energy. It hinges on constant efforts to reduce various risks (risks arising from the low self-sufficiency rate as well as geopolitical factors and supply-demand factors) by making effective use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas, etc.), new energy, nuclear power and hydroelectric power.
　　　In the global energy market, crude oil prices have remained high amid the tightening of the supply-demand condition caused by an increase in oil demand due to the high growth of emerging economies and a decline in oil-producing countries’ excess production capacity as well as the growing geopolitical risks, such as the instability of the Middle East. Moreover, the fight against global warming has prompted a shift to natural gas, resulting in a rise in gas prices, and this situation is expected to continue for a long time. Crude oil production in the United States and the North Sea has already declined substantially, while resource nationalism is rising in the Middle East and Russia, leading to the imposition of restrictions on foreign companies’ participation in oil development projects. As a result, competition for resources is intensifying.
　　　Nuclear power is superior to fossil fuels from the perspective of energy security because nuclear power plants do not require frequent refilling of fuels. Nuclear power plants in Japan are legally required to undergo periodic inspection at an interval of 13 months, while some other countries permit continuous plant operation lasting as long as 24 months. Meanwhile, Japan has stockpiled crude oil reserves equivalent to 200 days’ worth of consumption (as of the end of February 2010), including public- and private-sector reserves. Compared with uranium, a small amount of which is sufficient to operate a nuclear reactor, fossil fuels are needed in larger amount at thermal power plants. This means not only that the costs of fossil fuels are high but also that those fuels involve risks in each stage of procurement, transportation and stockpiling. Thus, nuclear power has a significant advantage over fossil fuels from the viewpoint of stable fuel supply, which is the key element of energy security.
　　 Therefore, Japan needs to establish fully reliable systems of safety management and operation and continue nuclear power generation while developing and promoting the use of new energy based on a pragmatic scenario. However, given the long time necessary to expand the supply of new energy sufficiently to use it as a major power generation source, the pragmatic approach for the moment will be to pursue an energy policy that focuses on highly efficient thermal power generation using coal and natural gas, which involve least energy security risk.
　 　 In recent years, trade in shale gas has increased rapidly. Shale gas is certain to become a stable energy source not only because of its advantage in terms of supply stability and price affordability but also because it is the most environment-friendly fossil fuel. Moreover, next January, Japan and the United States will start a joint experiment to develop technology to extract methane hydrate. In the seas off Japan, the presence of the world’s largest methane hydrate reserves (equivalent to natural gas reserves of 100 years’ worth at current consumption rate) has been confirmed. Under these circumstances, the importance of thermal power generation will grow in the future. For the near future, acquiring interests in shale gas development will be a critical energy security challenge, so Japan must consider effective measures to tackle the challenge.
　　 Even so, the importance of nuclear power generation remains unchanged from the medium- and long-term perspective. The most advanced nuclear power generation technology (“third generation plus”) is far superior in terms of safety to the technology used in the damaged Fukushima nuclear power station (“second generation”). By quickly making safety feature improvements to the second-generation technology and promoting upgrading to the most advanced technology at the same time, we can enhance the safety of nuclear power generation. It is essential to help better understand the importance of nuclear power generation from the perspective of energy security and promote the use of nuclear power by actively implementing measures to educate the public about the safety of nuclear technology.
　　　Proven recoverable reserves of uranium, expressed as the number of years of production at current rate, are said to be approximately 100 years. Therefore, in order to promote sustainable use of nuclear power generation, it is necessary to establish a nuclear fuel cycle centering on the use of plutonium. For the immediate future, Japan should expand the use of plutonium through the “pluthermal” program (the use of plutonium in thermal reactors), which has been implemented abroad and which has already started at some nuclear power plants in Japan, too. At the same time, Japan should steadily promote research and development on the fast breeder reactor technology.
　　　Moreover, if the government is to get the people to accept the continuation of nuclear power generation, it is essential to start the operation of a reprocessing plant in Rokkasho Village, Aomori Prefecture, which is in the final stage of examination, and select the site for nuclear waste disposal at an early date. As a long-term task, Japan should actively engage in research and development on next-generation nuclear power such as thorium nuclear power and nuclear fusion, on which other major countries are working hard.

2. Restore public trust in nuclear power generation.
The government must first examine the cause of the accident thoroughly and then create new systems of safety management and operation by establishing an independent, highly transparent expert organization with strong power.

　　　We may say that the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was caused mainly by human factors – insufficient preparation against tsunami, an inadequate organization for disaster control and inappropriate management of the organization ― rather than problems inherent in nuclear power generation technology. It is imperative to thoroughly examine problems related to the human factors and rebuild highly reliable systems of safety management and operation.
　　　The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was unable to issue relevant instructions to Tokyo Electric Power Company in dealing with the Fukushima nuclear accident largely because its role had not been clearly defined and the power granted to it was insufficient and vague. Another important problem was that NISA lacked expert management capability regarding the operation of nuclear reactors, particularly operation at the time of an accident. Organizational reform that resolves such fundamental problems must be carried out. To that end, it is essential to establish an organization which has independence and expert knowledge combined with strong power.
　　　The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the United States, L’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) of France and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of the United Kingdom are all independent organizations which have the power to approve the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and conduct safety inspection and which fulfill their responsibility for ensuring the safety of nuclear power in a scientific and objective manner.
　　　In comparison, a reform plan proposed by the Democratic Party of Japan, under which a “Nuclear Safety Agency” would be created under the Ministry of Environment through the integration of NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission under the Cabinet Office, is not only insufficient but also inappropriate. To make the new nuclear safety agency an effective organization, it is necessary to give it independence and strong power and create a system that ensures appropriate information disclosure and transparency. Moreover, given that nuclear power development is closely related to national security, the new agency must be of such a nature as to play a role in ensuring national security.

3. Do the utmost to develop and promote the use of renewable energy.
The government must present to the people specific plans and a roadmap for implementation.

　　　Challenges that must be overcome for the introduction and promotion of renewable energy are wide-ranging, from technological and cost problems to environmental problems. Unless a specific roadmap with a timetable for overcoming challenges is presented, it is impossible to choose one energy resource from nuclear power, fossil fuels and renewable energy. In particular, as concrete and objective data have not been fully examined, the ongoing energy policy debate has become detached from reality.
　　　　In the absence of concrete and objective data, we must avoid making a hasty decision to introduce new energy by following the lead of such countries as Germany, Denmark and Spain. It is not appropriate to discuss the case of Japan in the same way as the case of Europe, where an extensive power transmission network has been developed in an integrated energy market, enabling mutual supply of electricity between countries.
　　　　In particular, before introducing new energy, we need to overcome plenty of challenges, including technological constraints (physical constraints related to technology development, availability of land, environmental preservation, etc.), economic constraints (high cost commensurate with the level of technology) and policy constraints (fiscal burdens that must be shouldered to promote the use of new energy, such as expenditures related to the feed-in tariff system).
　　　　By overcoming those challenges, Japan should play a leading role in establishing an energy system that will serve mankind in the latter half of the 21st century.

(END)

October 8, 2010

North Korean Emergency Policy Proposals 2
Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

In Preparation for the Collapse of the Kim Jong Il Regime,
Japan Should Enhance Strategic Talks and Defense Cooperation with the United States and South Korea and Pass Special Abductee Rescue Measures Legislation

　　　　The Kim Jong Il regime has further destabilized. Although any future scenario is difficult to accurately predict at present, North Korea is expected to plunge into an emergency situation at any time. The government of Japan should prepare itself to respond to such an emergency situation.
　　　　At a conference of delegates of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party in September, Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong Un, officially emerged as a candidate to　be the North Korean leader’s successor. At the same time, the leader’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui, was named to key posts in the party and the military. These developments indicate that Kim Jong Il has felt the approaching end of his lifeand employed his relatives to enhance his regime because he fears that his policies could be discontinued after his death¹. He also has reconstructed the Political Bureau, the Central Military Committee and other party organizations that had not been working properly². However, it is uncertain whether Kim Jong Il’s plan for a smooth inauguration of Kim Jong Un after his death would occur.
　　　　 In September 2009, the Japan Institute for National Fundementals announced its North Korean Emergency Policy Proposals 1, titled “Japan Should Be Prepared to Respond to Emergency Situation in North Korea — Promote Freedom Unification by ROK to Prevent China’s Control of Korean Peninsula.” Since then, the United States, South Korea and China have become more prepared to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea in a bid to expand their respective national interests. Japan should keep step with them. The JINF believes Japan should implement at least the following proposals in the immediate future:
1. Japan should promote strategic talks with the United States and South Korea and adopt a more realistic interpretation of the Japanese Constitution over the right of collective self-defense, the revision of the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the development of a rule of engagement in order to enable substantive defense cooperation. Japan should also conduct coordination and joint drills with aforementioned two countries.
2. Japan should pass special abductee rescue measures legislation including the following four measures to protect and rescue Japanese nationals in North Korea, including abductees and women married to North Koreans:
(1) The government shall try to protect and rescue Japanese nationals including abductees in the event of an emergency situation in North Korea.
(2) The government shall always collect information and make close preparatory coordination with relevant countries.
(3) The minister of defense shall be empowered to order the Self-Defense Forces to protect and rescue overseas Japanese nationals.
(4) The SDF shall be empowered to use weapons for such protection and rescue missions.

Details

● Previous proposals have impacted South Korea
　　　　The JINF’s North Korean Emergency Policy Proposals 1 in September 2009 made the following points:

　　　　　After Kim Jong Il’s death, North Korea could plunge into an emergency situation, a chaos in which the government could lose control of the country. The JINF believes the Korean Peninsula is entering the era of drastic changes rather than maintaining the status quo.
　　　　　The expansion of free democracy on the Korean Peninsula and the eradication of anti-Japanese policies are desirable for Japan. A unified Korea under the auspices of South Korea would likely meet Japan’s national interests as long as South Korea sticks to its alliance with the United States, the Japan-South Korea Basic Relations Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
　　　　　Japan should attempt to realize the best scenario. If Japan takes irresponsible action, and avoids needed sacrifices and burdens, the Japan-U.S. alliance may weaken. This could result in the United States cooperating with China and tolerating a China-controlled North Korean regime while disregarding Japan. If Japan, the United States and South Korea expand democracy on the Korean Peninsula as a common strategy and prepare to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea, the three nations may be able to prevent a hegemonic China in East Asia.

　　　　　The previous JINF proposals have had a powerful impact on conservatives in South Korea³. In December 2009, the JINF sent delegates to South Korea for serious talks with the government, military and intelligence officials, private-sector experts and North Korean defectors. The JINF agreed with them on the following three points:
(1) Kim Jong Il regime could collapse, causing the country to spiral out of control.
(2) An out-of-control North Korea would provide an opportunity for South Korea to take a leadership role in the democratic unification of the Korean Peninsula.
(3) South Korea, the United States and Japan should enter into strategic talks.

● Potential antigovernment force in North Korea and pro-Pyongyang leftists in South Korea
　　　　　　A huge potential antigovernment force has been formed in North Korea. Because millions of people starved after the suspension of rationing in the second half of the 1990s, the number of people dependant on market-based trade for survival has increased and now account for approximately 80% of the country’s total population. In November 2009, Kim Jong Il regime implemented monetary reform to weaken market forces and attempt to get control of the country. The reform failed in the face of opposition from diehard citizens, forcing the leader to punish those responsible for the failure. Shortwave radios, balloon flyers, communications with defectors, smuggled South Korean dramas and songs, and the like have made North Koreans aware that South Korea is free and far more affluent than the North.
　　　　　　　After the death of Kim Jong Il, the Kim Jong Un group that is likely to take over the Kim Jong Il policy of giving priority to the military and　liberating South Korea may intensify confrontation with a group that would try to implement the Chinese-style reform and opening policy to maintain a single-party rule in the northern half of the peninsula. If social control eases in the North amid an intense confrontation, the market-supporting force that accounts for 80% of the North Korean population may look to win business freedoms, dismantle co-op farms and improve citizens’ livelihoods. If South Korea works with this force, a great movement for the democratic unification of the peninsula may emerge in North Korea.
　　　　　　　The U.S.-South Korean alliance and China are continuing political, diplomatic and military preparations to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea. But pro-Pyongyang leftists in South Korea still remain powerful. The Lee Myung Bak regime and the ruling Grand National Party have pursued middle of the road solutions and avoided any confrontation with the leftists. The group calling for a democratic unification is limited to about 30% of the South Korean population and no political force has yet represented the group. In the 2012 presidential election, a pro-Pyongyang leftist could potentially again and attempt to abolish the U.S.-South Korea alliance, thereby leading to the possibility of unification under a federation with North Korea.

● Japan left unable to provide substantive support for U.S. forces
　　　　Japan has failed to make strategic response amid a futile political struggle after the government change. Under present law, Japan may be unable to provide substantive support for U.S. forces in the event of an emergency situation. This is because the government’s interpretation of the Constitution regarding the right of collective self-defense has blocked proper legislation.
　　　　　Under the present Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Japan cannot provide U.S. forces with weapons or ammunition. Japan is also prohibited from fueling or maintaining U.S. aircraft in preparation for taking off for combat operations. Even under the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Japanese inspectors are only allowed to inspect documents and cargoes on a ship in question after asking the ship to stop, gaining its captain’s consent to an onboard inspection and getting on the stopped ship. The Maritime Self-Defense Force is only allowed to approach, tail or accompany a ship in question or wait for it in its front as required to persuade the ship. Use of weapons is tightly regulated. The cargo inspection act, which was enacted this year, prohibits Japan from inspecting or issuing any order to any foreign ship in high seas without approval by its flag state. It also bans other effective measures. Japan is thus left unable to provide even minimum support or cooperation required by the United States from one of its allies. There is a fear that the present situation could lead the Japan-U.S. alliance to collapse.
　　　　　In its Policy Index 2009, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan said the party would not stick to past conceptual discussions on individual or collective self-defense rights. The ruling party should expeditiously revise defense laws without sticking to the past government’s interpretation of the Constitution.

● Pass special abductee rescue measures legislation
　　　　　Under present law, Japan cannot effectively protect Japanese nationals in the event of an emergency situation. Legally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is required to protect overseas Japanese nationals. The SDF Act allows the SDF to transport Japanese nationals after the SDF has consulted with the minister for foreign affairs and acknowledged that the safety of the transportation is secure. Unless safety is secured, the SDF may be unable to even transport Japanese nationals instead of rescuing them.　
　　　　　 In the event of an emergency situation, the government may be required to protect many Japanese nationals in South Korea. It would be too late for Japan to revise the SDF Act or any interpretation of the Constitution if such situation emerges suddenly. Because of this, the government may eventually abandon Japanese nationals. It may also be unable to protect or rescue Japanese nationals in North Korea, including abductees and women married to North Koreans.
　　　　　 Before such a situation occurs, Japan should pass special abductee rescue measures legislation and coordinate with relevant countries including the United States and South Korea. The legislation should include the following measures:
(1) The government shall try to protect and rescue Japanese nationals including abductees in the event of an emergency situation in North Korea.
(2) To this end, the government shall always collect information and make close preparatory coordination with relevant countries.
(3) The minister of defense shall be empowered to order the Self-Defense Forces to protect and rescue overseas Japanese nationals.
(4) The SDF shall be empowered to use weapons for such protection and rescue missions.

　　　　　Such legislation would not necessarily run counter to the government’s interpretation of the Constitution. If it is expected to violate the interpretation, the government should correct the interpretation. It would be too late to do so after an emergency situation comes.
　　　　　The Future Concept of Japan’s National Security and Defense Forces in a New Age, as reported to the prime minister in August 2010 by a council on national security and defense forces in a new age, says the SDF should try to rescue overseas Japanese nationals in danger as necessary while continuing routine information cooperation and coordination with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and relevant foreign authorities. The report also says that there certain problems should be improved for the facilitation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, including the government’s traditional interpretation of the Constitution regarding the exercise of self-defense rights. It also says the government should responsibly tackle problems, reach conclusions expeditiously and prepare to respond to any emergency situation.
　　　　　Even the council set up under the DPJ government has made the above proposals. If the prime minister shelves the problems and fails to make proper efforts to create legislation, it may amount to the abdication of his responsibility. We urge the government to expeditiously enact the special measures legislation⁴.

¹ According to the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Kim Jong Il has health problems including aftereffects of a stroke and renal dialysis and can normally work only two to three days a week.
² Kim Jong Il had emphasized his dictatorship in defiance of official organizations within the Workers’ Party. Since 1980, the party had held no convention. The party’s Central Committee, which had held one or two general meetings annually when Kim Il Sung was alive, had never met since 1993. The conference of party delegates, the general meeting of the Central Committee, and the redevelopment of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Committee in September indicated a switch from Kim Jong Il’s traditional political style.
³ South Korean conservative leader Cho Gab Je cited the full text of our proposals in his Internet newspaper “Cho Gab Je. Com” and in the freedom unification strategy written in his book, Great Strategy of Reporter Cho Gab Je – Overthrowing North Korean Regime by 2012, as published in January 2010. Conservative opinion magazine Hanguk Nondan (published by Lee Do Hyeong) has also carried the full text of the proposals.
⁴ On October 3, 2010, the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (Kazoku-kai) and the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Sukuu-kai) held a joint meeting and decided to call for creating a legal framework for rescuing abductees in preparation for chaos following the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime.

September 27, 2010

Urgent Policy Proposals

Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

　　　It is very regrettable that Japan has succumbed to China’s pressure to release a Chinese fishing boat captain with a decision shelved on how to treat him after his boat deliberately rammed Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands of Okinawa Prefecture. We urgently make the following proposals to prevent China from making further arm-twisting backed by military power and to defend Japan’s territorial sovereignty and national interest.

1. Politicians should make this incident an opportunity to thoroughly reconsider Japan’s postwar national defense arrangements.

In addition, the following actions should be taken:
2. The government should publish video footage evidencing that the Chinese fishing boat deliberately rammed the Japanese patrol vessels.
3. The government should deploy Self-Defense Forces units on the Senkaku Islands.
4. The government should launch Japan’s test drilling in Shirakaba and other natural gas fields within Japan’s exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea.
5. The Diet should enact legislation to penalize foreign ships for illegal acts.

1. Since the end of World War II, Japan has considered its security under a hypothesis symbolized by the Constitution’s preface saying “we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” But Japan must admit that the hypothesis has been destroyed miserably, as indicated by this latest incident. Japan is required to revise its fundamental postwar arrangements by turning the Self-Defense Forces into real, full-fledged Armed Forces for a normal democratic country and improving and enhancing equipment for maritime security operations as one of nations with longest coastlines in the world. We would like to encourage politicians as representatives of the nation to grow more conscious of such reform.

2. The Chinese government has not buried the hatchet in response to the release of the fishing boat captain on September 25. But it has demonstrated an even more coercive attitude, demanding that the Japanese government make an apology and compensation. The Japanese government should flatly reject the unreasonable demand and publish video footage evidencing the Chinese fishing boat’s deliberate ramming against the Japan Coast Guard vessels in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of Japan’s arrest of the captain to the international community.

3. In waters near the Senkaku Islands, the Japan Coast Guard has deployed patrol boats and conducted regular patrol flights of aircraft. While the Japanese government has rented Uotsuri, Minami Kojima and Kita Kojima Islands among the Senkaku Islands from their owners since 2002, the Coast Guard has maintained and managed Uotsuri Island’s lighthouse (set up by a Japanese political group in 1988) as a national property since 2005. In order to enhance its effective control of the Senkaku Islands and defend its inherent territory, Japan should deploy Self-Defense Forces units and implement the SDF’s surveillance in airspace and waters near the islands. By taking actions to demonstrate its determination to defend its territory on its own, Japan can expect the United States to apply the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands.

4. In a retaliatory action against Japan’s arrest of the Chinese fishing boat captain, China might have unilaterally launched drilling in the Shirakaba (called Chunxiao in China) gas field in the East China Sea. Japan and China agreed in 2008 to allow a Japanese company to invest in a Shirakaba development project. Bilateral negotiations to fix the investment ratio started later and have been suspended in response to the incident. If China’s drilling is confirmed, Japan should take a counteraction to launch test drilling within Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

5. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea endorses foreign ships’ right of innocent passage in a coastal state’s territorial sea and cites 12 noninnocent passage cases including any threat or use of force, any exercise or practice with weapons, information collection, propaganda, the launching or landing of aircraft, the loading or unloading of any commodity, pollution and fishing. Among Japan’s domestic laws, the Act on Regulation of Fishing Operation by Foreign Nationals provides for the punishment of foreign fishing ships. The Act on Navigation of Foreign Ships through the Territorial Sea and Internal Waters has punitive clauses for dubious staying and wandering other than innocent passage. But no Japanese law exists to regulate other acts amounting to noninnocent passage. (In this incident, the Chinese fishing boat captain was arrested for his suspected obstruction of executive officers.)
　　　No effective law has been developed to regulate any illegal operation within the exclusive economic zone where Japan has sovereign rights. (The existing Act on the Exercise of the Sovereign Right for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone is insufficient.)
　　　The Self-Defense Forces are not authorized to conduct defense operation against unlawful territorial infringement short of armed attack. Unless an order is issued for maritime policing actions, the SDF have no legal ground for responding to such infringement. (Military forces in other countries are authorized to conduct such operations.) Japan Coast Guard officers’ use of weapons is strictly restricted, although some improvements have been achieved under the revised JCG Act. The Fisheries Agency’s patrol boats are armed only with water cannons.
　　　In order to prevent any threat to Japan’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, the nation should develop relevant legislation and improve equipment.

　　　The Japanese government has published its basic view on the Senkaku Islands as part of Japan’s territory, as summarized below (based on the view seen on the website of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs). We support this view.
(1) Based on a confirmation that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China, the Japanese government incorporated the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan in January 1895.
(2) These islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands that were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki that came into effect in May 1895.
(3) Accordingly, the Senkaku Islands are not included in the territory that Japan renounced under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Senkaku Islands were placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands and the administrative rights over these islands were reverted to Japan in accordance with the 1971 agreement for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.
(4) China began to make its territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands after the question of the development of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of the East China Sea came to the surface in the latter half of 1970.
(5) None of the points raised by China as historic or geographic evidence provides valid grounds under international law to support China’s territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands.

　　　Prime Minister Naoto Kan should point out to the international community the outrageousness of China’s arguments and stick to an attitude of rejecting China’s unrestrained intimidation firmly.

October 14, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. Offer a future vision based on firm confidence in market economy.
2. Support the beneficiaries pay principle and develop a medium to long-term growth strategy.
3. Specify secure financial resources for permanent policies.
4. Set fiscal consolidation targets and develop a fiscal consolidation plan.
5. Reaffirm the significance of deregulation and structural reforms and implement them boldly.

1. Offer a future vision based on firm confidence in market economy.
　　　　　In Japan in the 21st century, economic burdens on the people are bound to increase due to population decline, the dropping birthrate, the aging population and huge budget deficits. At the same time, Japan will have to confront globalism that is expected to expand further. In order to adapt to such situation, Japan will have to improve its international competitiveness and sustain economic growth to expand the pie for redistribution.
　　　　　But the new government’s economic policy amounts to “redistribution without growth,” reminding us of old-fashioned social democratic welfare state policies that were deadlocked in the absence of economic growth. Historically, market economies have created massive wealth. No other system has outperformed the market economy system. At present, the market economy system is the most efficient conceivable system.
　　　　　In fact, in recent years, market competition has widened social and economic gaps. But it has clearly led to more efficient production methods, bringing about more benefits.
　　　　　Japan must deepen its market economy to solve its two fundamental challenges — the development of a system to achieve a good balance between a shift to sustainable stable growth and social security meeting the falling birthrate and aging population, and structural reforms (shifting resources to higher-productivity sectors) to realize such system. Therefore, the 21st century vision of the Japanese economy should build on firm confidence in market economy before appropriate safety nets are incorporated into the vision.

2. Support the beneficiaries-pay principle and develop a medium to long-term growth strategy.
(1) “An end to dependence on bureaucrats” alone cannot lead to a path to economic revitalization. As a matter of course, the elimination of wasteful spending is important. If savings from this elimination are used for income redistribution alone, however, economic recovery or growth may remain difficult to occur. Some strong supply-side policy should be taken to raise Japan’s growth potential.
(2) The “childrearing support,” “effective elimination of senior high school fees,” “abolition of expressway tolls” and other spending measures to benefit a limited range of citizens or groups cannot be expected to have any major economic expansion effects.　
　　 These measures could affect the future vision as they represent the fundamental issue involving the restructuring of values about “burdens that should be shouldered by the entire society” and “burdens that should be shouldered by individuals.” The government should not be allowed to take any easy or onrushing income redistribution measures for the reason of temporary social or economic changes.
(3) The government lacks macroeconomic policy (including short-term economic stimulus and long-term growth measures).
　　“Childrearing support” and other planned measures represent nothing more than “redistribution.” Unless new private sector demand is created and expanded, economic recovery or growth cannot be achieved. Supply-side reforms including substantial deregulation and structural reforms are required to create new demand. Particularly, structural reforms are required in agriculture, and health and nursing care areas.
　　 It is feared the Japanese economy will deteriorate further toward the second half of the current fiscal year. Most of the measures now under discussion relate to the budget for the next fiscal year. Few economic stimulus measures required for the immediate future have been offered.
(4) The proposed debt moratorium bill (a bill for measures to counter a credit crunch or withdrawal) could violate market economy principles. Resources for loans are mostly deposits. If the planned debt moratorium leads financial institutions to weaken or go bankrupt, public funds may have be injected into them to the disadvantage of not only depositors but also the general public.
　　At a time when the Bank of Japan is planning to end various corporate finance support measures introduced to counter the global financial crisis, the debt moratorium can be coupled with tougher capital adequacy regulations for financial institutions to trigger a credit crunch. Measures to counter a credit crunch or withdrawal should focus on the expansion of lending by government financial institutions and the improvement of loan guarantee systems.

3. Specify secure financial resources for permanent policies.
　　　　　Attempts to separate temporary and permanent financial resources have failed. Temporary financial resources will dry up soon. Will there be any financial resources other than tax hikes then? “Hidden treasure” special account reserves worth 5 trillion yen, which were specified as financial resources in the campaign manifesto of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, amount to a hike of some 2 percentage points of the consumption tax rate. Most of financial resources secured by the government are from a partial suspension of a large supplementary budget formed by the previous government. Whether massive financial resources could be secured through the reconfiguration of the main budget is still uncertain. The DPJ-planned reconfiguration of the budget to eliminate wasteful spending alone cannot ensure growth. It is irresponsible for the government to fall short of proposing any growth strategy or specifying financial resources over a medium to long term.

4. Set fiscal consolidation targets and develop a fiscal consolidation plan.
　　　　　It will be difficult for Japan to get on a sustainable growth path without fiscal consolidation. Since savings from the “reduction of wasteful spending” and “hidden treasure” are set aside for new policy measures, there may not be any financial resources other than tax hikes for fiscal consolidation. As the government has vowed to refrain from raising the consumption tax over the next four years, fiscal consolidation is expected to start around 2014 at the earliest. Fiscal consolidation will be difficult without comprehensive tax reform.
　　　　　In order to put Japan on a path to sustainable growth , the government should make a plan to create a primary budget surplus and should promptly work out fiscal consolidation targets and a plan for their attainment.

5. Reaffirm the significance of deregulation and structural reforms and implement them boldly.
　　　　　The DPJ manifesto has failed to touch on deregulation or structural reforms. The growth strategy under globalism should be based on new demand development through technological innovation and competitiveness improvement through deregulation and structural reforms. Deregulation and subsidy reforms are indispensable for the development of agriculture, and health and nursing care areas where demand is expected to increase.
　　　　　The government should not shrug off essential structural reforms. Efficiency and equity are not mutually exclusive. It is natural to pursue efficiency in order to sustain growth under globalism. It is important to form social consensus on equity standards for the redistribution of fruits gained on efficiency.

October 26, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. Do not fuel the distrust of our nation’s key ally by the so-called “East Asian Community” initiative that lacks philosophy.
2. Keep a distance from non-democratic countries.
3. Be alert to China-led Sinocentrism.
4. Do not exclude the United States from the East Asian Community initiative.

1. Do not fuel the distrust of our nation’s key ally by the so-called “East Asian Community” initiative that lacks philosophy.
　　　　　Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s “East Asian Community” initiative lacks philosophy. Japanese and foreign people who believe in freedom and democracy may naturally feel distrust of, anger at or be dishonored by the initiative.
　　　　　In his article “My Political Philosophy” contributed to the September issue of the monthly Voice magazine (an English version of the article was summarized and distributed by Tribune Media Services), Hatoyama emphasized the East Asian region as “Japan’s basic sphere of being” and said “we must continue to make efforts to build frameworks for stable economic cooperation and security across the region.” He apparently believes that Japan and China should form a community for the sole reason that Japan is “a nation located in Asia.”
　　　　　Some Americans are most outraged at the following question posed by Hatoyama in the article: “How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence and protect its national interest when it is caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its position as the world’s dominant power, and China which is seeking ways to become dominant?”
　　　　　Hatoyama views both the United States and China as the world’s dominant or hegemonistic powers. This view indicates that he does not understand the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance that has confronted totalitarian forces like the defunct Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Such an attitude could shake the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
　　　　　As the base of Japan’s foreign policy, Prime Minister Hatoyama should specify the enhancement of cooperation with countries that share with Japan the basic values of freedom and democracy and that view totalitarian forces as threats.

2. Keep a distance from non-democratic countries.
　　　　　The European integration that Prime Minister Hatoyama apparently sees as the model for the East Asian Community initiative has been based on Christianity as the common foundation and on democracy as the common philosophy. In contrast, East Asia has no such common foundation and lacks any common philosophy. The region also includes China,a one-party Communist dictatorship.
　　　　　The economic integration process may include the conclusion of economic partnership agreements (EPA) containing free trade agreements (FTA) to liberalize regional trade, a shift to a customs union to establish common tariffs against other regions, and the development of the region into an economic community with a single currency. Such process would be difficult to implement unless some philosophy is shared within the region. A political-security community as the next phase would be even more difficult to achieve unless some philosophy is shared within the region.
　　　　　Prime Minister Hatoyama apparently intends to accept China under the one-party Communist dictatorship as a member of the planned East Asian Community. At home and abroad, however, he must explain how such a community could be formed without any shared philosophy.
　　　　　Moreover the planned economic community could allow people, goods and money to freely move within the region. China’s population is 10 times as large as Japan’s. Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan has vowed to positively work to give foreigners voting rights in Japan. If people put under the totalitarian political party flow massively into Japan and obtain Japanese voting rights, China may further enhance interference with Japan’s domestic affairs. Democracy should be the minimum requirement for any participant in the regional community.

3. Be alert to China-led Sinocentrism.
　　　　　As China’s long-term national strategy is to achieve the “Great Restoration of the Chinese Nation” to mark its centennial around 2050, the proposed East Asian Community could turn into a China-led East Asian order known as Sinocentrism.
　　　　　The year 2050 reminds us of Richard Fisher’s warning that China’s ultimate goal is to become a world-dominating military power by the middle of the 21st century. (The warning given to the delegation of Japan Institute of National Fundamentals by Fisher, a U.S. specialist on Chinese military forces, during JINF’s visit to Washington, D.C. in April, 2009, is included in the book titled “Japan Should Enhance Strategic Power” (p. 161), which has been edited by Yoshiko Sakurai and published by Bungeishunju Ltd.)
　　　　　Prime Minister Hatoyama should be alert to the possibility that China could take advantage of his East Asian Community initiative promotion to achieve its own national strategy.

4. Do not exclude the United States from the East Asian Community initiative.
　　　　　In his speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on October 7, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada indicated the United States would be excluded from the East Asian Community initiative. “I would like to consider the community as consisting of Japan, China, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, Australia and New Zealand,” he said.
　　　　　The U.S. Obama Administration has grown concerned about the remark. On October 14, Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told a news conference in Beijing that critical dialogues that touched on security, economic and commercial issues should involve the United States. He thus made a check against any East Asian Community initiative excluding the United States.
　　　　　China once demonstrated its ambition to create an East Asian Community involving ASEAN plus 3 – China, Japan and South Korea – as a core group (excluding the United States). Japan, alert to China’s growing influences, took leadership in 2005 in launching an East Asian Summit including the three major democratic countries of India, Australia and New Zealand in addition to the ASEAN plus 3 group. Since then, China has seemingly lost its enthusiasm to pursue an East Asian Community.
　　　　　At the same time, China Reform Forum Chair Zheng Bijian, known as a foreign policy brain for Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a contribution to the U.S. authoritative Foreign Affairs magazine (September/October 2005 issue), said “it would not be in China’s interest to exclude the United States from the process (to form an East Asian Community).”
　　　　　Whether he knew such subtle changes in China’s attitude over the past few years, Prime Minister Hatoyama called on China and South Korea to cooperate in promoting the East Asian Community initiative at a Japan-China-South Korea summit in Beijing on October 10. He described the three countries as the core of the initiative. In response, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao retained a cautious attitude, pointing out that efforts should be accumulated since cooperation under an existing mechanism in East Asia is already underway.
　　　　　The Hatoyama government should explain why a subregional multilateral organization should be created in addition to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum which includes the United States.
　　　　　The Hatoyama government should also specify the positions of Taiwan in the East Asian Community initiative. Any community excluding democratic Taiwan as East Asia’s fifth largest economy after Japan, China, South Korea and Indonesia is inconceivable. Taiwan is an APEC member.

September 25, 2009

　　　　　　Just before and after the inauguration of the Hatoyama government, new moves emerged within the Democratic Party of Japan in regard to the issue of voting rights for foreigners. Toward the August 30 general election, the Korean Residents Union in Japan, an organization of South Korean residents known as Mindan, proactively supported candidates who were in favor of giving foreign residents voting rights. The South Korean government has enhanced its diplomatic approach to the new government regarding the matter. Last year, we announced policy proposals under the title of “Toward the Adoption of a Special Naturalization System for Special Permanent Residents.” Based on our considerations and developments since then, we would like to renew the proposals from the viewpoint that foreign residents should not be given the right to vote in Japan.^a

[Policy Proposals]
1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.

1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.
　　　　　　In Japan’s local elections, the points of contention are often made over matters that are related to the core of national policy, including the problems relating to U.S. military bases and nuclear power plant construction. Japanese citizens alone should be responsible for making choices regarding such matters that may have far-reaching effects on Japan’s future.
　　　　　　If North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were allowed to directly or indirectly interfere in choices regarding territorial disputes, U.S. military bases or any other problem linked directly to Japan’s sovereignty and national security, it could damage peace and stability in East Asia, the Japan-U.S. alliance or the Japan-South Korea friendship.^b

　　　　　　In 1995, the Supreme Court of Japan clearly rejected foreigners’ requests for voting rights in local elections, concluding: “Given that local governments are an integral part of Japan’s national governing structure, ‘residents’ (with voting rights in local elections) in Section 2 of Article 93 in Japan’s Constitution should be interpreted as Japanese citizens residing in regions under the jurisdiction of relevant local governments.”
　　　　　　Of more than 190 countries in the world, those that allow foreigners to vote in elections are limited to less than a quarter. These countries have had special reasons for accepting foreigners’ voting rights, including a long-held policy of attracting foreign workers.
　　　　　　The number of Japanese nationals with permanent resident status in South Korea is limited to several dozens, against hundreds of thousands of South Korean special permanent residents in Japan. Given the disparity in numbers, it is difficult to justify reciprocity between Japan andSouth Korea. ^c　　
　　　　　　Some view Korean residents in Japan as persons who were transported to Japan through coercion, and their offspring. However, only 320,000 persons or 16% of two million Koreans who were residing in Japan in 1945 were mobilized to work in Japan during the war. Most of them returned to Korea after the war. At one time, there was systematic discrimination against special permanent residents regarding social security and the like. Since around 1982 when Japan signed the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and implemented social security programs that treated Japanese and foreign residents as equals, however, such discrimination has vastly decreased.
　　　　　　One of motivating factors behind Korean residents’ demand for the right to vote in local elections is the fact that increasingly fewer Korean residents perceive themselves as foreigners. Tokyo Metropolitan University Professor Chung Dae-kyun says, “Allowing special permanent residents to vote in Japanese elections while holding Korean citizenship will perpetuate the gap between citizenship and identity.” It makes a great deal more sense to give Korean special permanent residents the right to vote by enabling them to become Japanese citizens. Doing so is certainly in keeping with global conventional wisdom.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.
　　　　　　Currently, special permanent residents wishing to become Japanese citizens are forced to complete the same laborious formalities as foreigners without special status. They must also select Chinese characters for their surnames from a list that excludes many of the characters used to write the most common Korean surnames such as “Choi,” “Kang,” ”Yun” and “Cho.”

　　　　　　For foreigners who have been awarded special permanent resident status and are willing to acquire Japanese citizenship and fulfill the concomitant duties and responsibilities, the current formalities are too laborious and should be simplified as follows:
(1) Identification: A census record from the applicant’s home country (or similar document) and an alien registration certificate
(2) Confirmation of intention to naturalize in Japan: A naturalization permission application, a written motivation to naturalize in Japan, and a written oath in which the applicant promises to be a law-abiding, upstanding citizen.
　　　　　　Even the simplified mechanism, like the ordinary naturalization system, should be based on approval. It is desirable to enact a temporary law to limit an effective period of time for the mechanism.
　　　　　　The special permanent resident system for those who have resided in Japan since before the war and their offspring should be reviewed after the special naturalization mechanism is implemented. One choice would be to integrate the system into the ordinary permanent resident system.
　　　　　　Naturalization means that a foreigner becomes an official member of Japan to share the same political destiny with original Japanese citizens. For all naturalization cases including special ones, the written motivation to naturalize in Japan and the written oath should be treated strictly. Some sober ceremony should be implemented when the oath is presented. But any ceremony has never been carried out.. Since July 2003, Japan has discontinued to require even the written motivation to be submitted.
　　　　　　In 1998, a stay in Japan as a condition for the ordinary permanent resident status was reduced to 10 years from 20 years. Since then, foreigners with this status have quickly increased. When granting the status, the government should strictly check whether an applicant’s permanent stay in Japan would meet the country’s national interests. From the viewpoint of Japan’s national interest, however, the government should positively address the permanent resident status for political refugees who escape from oppression under dictatorship.

————————————————————————————————–
^a The policy proposals are based on discussions after the March 2008 proposals were given. Nihon University Professor Akira Momochi was among participants in the discussions.

^b Registered foreign residents in Japan numbered 2,217,426 at the end of 2008. Of the total, Chinese (including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong) accounted for the largest share at 655,377 or 30%, followed by 589,239 South and North Koreans or 27%.
　　　　　　The number of foreigners with the special or ordinary permanent resident status stood at 912,361 including 420,305 special permanent residents. Koreans accounted for 99% of the special permanent residents. Since the early 1970s when South Koreans exceeded 50% of special permanent residents, the Japanese government has discontinued to specify the number of South or North Koreans. We estimate the number of North Koreans at 50,000 or less. We call for the government to disclose specifics. Special permanent residents include members of the General Association of Korean Residents, which is known as Chongryon and claims that all its activities are based around the concept of Juche (Chonryong Website).
　　　　　　Ordinary permanent residents numbered 492,056 including not a small number of Chinese under the CCP influence.
　　　　　　Any nationality-wise breakdown of ordinary permanent residents at the end of 2008 is not available. Of 439,757 foreigners with the ordinary permanent resident status at the end of 2007, Chinese accounted for the largest share at 128,501 persons. South and North Koreans captured the fourth largest share at 49,914 persons.

^c According to the 2003 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics on overseas Japanese residents, the number of Japanese nationals staying in South Korea stood at 55.

September 18, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

　　　　　　The United States has been growingly concerned that Japan could drift away from the United States under the Hatoyama government. In his article that has been reported in the United States and interpreted as anti-American, Hatoyama said, “The Japan-U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy.” But he has failed to gain any confidence in the United States.
　　　　　　Furthermore, Katsuya Okada, who has become foreign minister in the new government, indicated his plan to limit the scope of the Japan-U.S. alliance to the Asia-Pacific region in a foreign policy vision report, which he published in 2005 when he was the president of the DPJ. Okada thus denied the concept of “the Japan-U.S. alliance in the world” as agreed between the two countries under the past Liberal Democratic Party government. His assumption of the foreign minister portfolio may be another matter of concern to the United States.
　　　　　　If Hatoyama is confident that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy, the prime minister at his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama should declare, “The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” Hatoyama should try to eliminate U.S. concerns about Japan. A declaration using the late U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield’s famous remark should help the Hatoyama government gain U.S. confidence since Mansfield was respected on a bipartisan basis in the U.S. political arena.

2. Continue the SDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.

　　　　　　On the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ refueling mission in the Indian Ocean under the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law set to expire in January 2010, the Pentagon press secretary said on September 9, “We would very much encourage them to continue those efforts.” On August 31, the State Department spokesman said: “A stable, prosperous Afghanistan is in the interests of the entire international community, including Japan. But of course, it’s up to each country to determine how they can best contribute to that effort.” These remarks indicate nuanced differences within the U.S. government. But the refueling mission is a symbol of Japan’s contributions to the war against terrorism and should be continued. The DPJ’s campaign manifesto and its coalition agreement with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party call for Japan to play a proactive role in the “eradication of poverty” and “national reconstruction” in Afghanistan to eliminate a breeding ground of terrorism. However, a return to check-book diplomacy cannot become a symbolic contribution replacing the refueling mission.

3. Be aware that any revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or the bilateral agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will never become a priority for the Obama administration.

　　　　　　The U.S. State Department spokesman has declared that the U.S. government has no intent to renegotiate an agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, while the Pentagon press secretary has urged the Hatoyama government to implement the agreement. Michael Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said, “The Obama administration is beset with foreign and security challenges globally and will have little appetite to renegotiate the Okinawa base agreements (again!) or SOFA even in a year .” Hatoyama should keep in mind that if he urges the United States to review these agreements promptly, his ability as an international politician may be doubted. At a press conference just after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama indicated a right decision to refrain from taking up the SOFA issue at his planned meeting with President Obama in late September.

4. Urge the United States to issue a new Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security to redefine the bilateral alliance in 2010, based on military changes in East Asia and in the world.

　　　　　　Since the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration was issued in 1996 to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral alliance after the Cold War, the East Asian security situation has changed dramatically on North Korea’s nuclear armament and China’s military rise. The world security situation also has changed greatly as the war against the terrorism of Islamic extremists has become an important common challenge for the civilized world.
　　　　　　In 2010 marking the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan, based on these changes, should propose a new joint declaration to redefine the Japan-U.S. alliance and get prepared for the uncertain Asian and world situations.

5. Revise the three non-nuclear principles in a bid to admit the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

　　　　　　If U.S. nuclear deterrence were to work as designed to ultimately secure Japan’s safety, not only Japan but its potential enemies would have to be led to believe that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons for Japan’s defense. If Japan changes its three non-nuclear principles — not to possess, produce or introduce into the country nuclear weapons – in a bid to admit the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, potential enemies should clearly understand the U.S. willingness to defend Japan and the U.S. nuclear deterrence against possible attacks on Japan will be enhanced.
　　　　　　 The DPJ has suspected a secret Japan-U.S. deal to allow U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan and indicated it might demand the United States to comply with the non-nuclear principles. If the DPJ pursues an “equal” Japan-U.S. relationship as urged in its campaign manifesto, however, wouldn’t it be reasonable for Japan to possess nuclear weapons before refusing the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan?

September 18, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.

1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

　　　　　　Excessive environmental conservation measures are feared to impose a huge burden on the industrial circle and the people. These measures could force Japan to impose a far greater burden on itself than under the Kyoto Protocol.

(1) The medium-term GHG emission reduction target has failed to specify reasonable reduction measures and costs to secure the attainment of the target. It also has failed to make clear the burden that the industrial circle and the people would shoulder.

(2) How would the government, which has unilaterally offered such a lofty goal, take the responsibility for spending massive taxpayer money for purchasing emission credits or rights when the target turns out difficult to attain? The administration should specify the target’s net GHG emission reduction portion excluding emission credit or right purchases.

(3) Standard years for reducing GHG emissions have yet to be unified. The European Union has offered a 13% reduction from the standard year of 2005. The United States has come up with a 14% cut from the same year. Earlier, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government of former prime minister Taro Aso had proposed a 15% cut from 2005. In contrast, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has offered a 25% reduction from 1990. Such a target could become a major stumbling block discouraging the United States from taking part in a post-Kyoto Protocol framework.

How does the new government view Japan’s GHG emission reduction obligation (to reduce emissions by 6% from 1990 level) in the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period? The obligation is viewed as difficult for Japan to fulfill. Japan could be forced to spend massive amounts of taxpayer money on emission credit purchases and other measures to attain the goal. How will the new government raise funds for such purchases?

2. Do not make any easy international commitment that has not gained the endorsement of the people.

(1) It is a misuse of power for the administration to make an international commitment based on an incomplete, unspecific campaign manifesto without giving sufficient explanations to the people or having sufficient discussions in the absence of social consent. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should not have made any easy international commitment at the United Nations and the like.

(2) In his speech at the September 7 Asahi World Environment Forum 2009, Hatoyama described the medium-term target as based on emission reductions that are scientifically required to stop global warming. The prime minister should explain the relevant scientific data.

　　　　　　Hatoyama also said: “We will also pursue all major countries’ building of a fair, effective international framework. An agreement on an ambitious target among all major countries will be a precondition for Japan’s commitment to the international community.” But this approach could result in a repetition of the Kyoto Protocol experience. Domestic social consensus on any international commitment is a prerequisite for making such a commitment.
　　　　　　Hatoyama also said, “We believe that industrial countries should provide financial and technical support to developing countries that ambitiously try to reduce GHG emissions.” But we should require major GHG-emitting countries to make due payments for such support. Technical and financial grants to developing countries may delay their technological innovation to the disadvantage of global warming prevention and amount to unreasonable national wealth losses that the people cannot ignore.

3. Offer a medium-term target featuring a better balance between policies.

(1) Among DPJ initiatives, the elimination of expressway tolls and the abolition of provisional auto-related tax portions are expected to contribute to expanding automobile use and carbon dioxide emissions, contradicting the GHG emission reduction plan. These initiatives may also affect operators and users of public transportation services and hurt regional economies by leading to a decline in regional transportation networks. How will the administration address these adverse effects?

(2) If expressway tolls were to be eliminated, the government would have to specify how it would deal with 40 trillion yen in debt left by now-defunct public road corporations and their privatization.

(3) The increase of national burden accompanying the government’s environment policy would inevitably lead to a decline in Japan’s international competitiveness and to its industrial hollowing-out. Given that new financial resources will be required for the introduction of a fixed-price purchase system for renewable energy with mandatory purchase of all electricity generated and that the early introduction of an environmental tax will be difficult, further deterioration of fiscal condition would be inevitable. How will the government achieve both economic recovery and sustainable growth under such circumstances?

(4) Citing oil crises in the 1970s, the DPJ has argued that tougher environmental regulations would promote technological innovation and improve the economy. This argument is too idealistic to be persuasive. Compared with the shift from massive production and consumption before the oil crises to energy conservation, any further technological innovation over a short term of some 10 years would be far more difficult in Japan that already features the most widespread energy conservation technologies in the world.

(5) The DPJ depends on data from a certain research institute to argue that the medium-term GHG emission reduction target would be compatible with economic growth. But the DPJ has never specified objective data prepared in a manner for which the party is responsible. Any international commitment without responsible verification amounts to ignoring the people.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.
　　　　　　 In its campaign manifesto the DJP has vowed to “take steady steps toward the use of nuclear power,” while forming a coalition with the Social Democratic Party that has described itself as the only political party that has made clear a shift away from nuclear energy. It would be unrealistic to attain the medium-term CO2 emission reduction target on the condition of a shift away from nuclear energy. As a responsible ruling party, the DPJ is required to specify its attitude on the future nuclear energy policy.

Policy Proposals from JINF

September 11, 2009

Japan Should Be Prepared to Respond to Emergency Situation in North Korea
— Promote Freedom Unification by ROK
to Prevent China’s Control of the Korean Peninsula —

Policy Proposals
1. Japan should adopt the promotion of freedom unification by the Republic of Korea (ROK) as its strategic goal and be prepared to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea.
2. Japan should endorse the vision of freedom unification offered by U.S. President Barack Obama and ROK President Lee Myung-bak on June 16, 2009, which seeks “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.”
3. Japan, the United States and the ROK should expand their strategic talks at government, military and private expert levels to prepare for an emergency situation in North Korea.
4. At their strategic talks, the three countries should consider how Japan should cooperate with the United States and the ROK upon their military advancement into the North and how the United States and the ROK should cooperate with Japan in securing safety of and rescuing Japanese abductees in the North.
5. While the ROK is the primary party to the freedom unification, Japan and the United States should proactively support ROK proponents of the freedom unification to propel the trilateral friendship to new horizons.

　A medical life limit of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il has come into sight. Within several years, he could die or become incapable of working due to serious illnesses. Since early 2009, indications of Kim’s sense of urgency have emerged, including the start of the process of nominating his successor and the enhancement of the National Defense Commission.
　A dictatorship changes after the death of the dictator, as indicated by the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin and China after Mao Zedong. In North Korea, no major change came after the death of Kim Il Sung because by that time his son, Kim Jong Il, had already taken effective control of power.
　After Kim Jong Il’s death, North Korea could plunge into an emergency situation, a chaos in which the government may lose control of the country. In preparation for such a development, U.S. and ROK military advancement into the North and Chinese military intervention have been contemplated. The Korean Peninsula is entering the era of drastic changes rather than continuing the status quo.
　Desirable for Japan will be the expansion of free democracy on the Korean Peninsula and the eradication of extraordinarily anti-Japanese policies. It is ideal for people on the Peninsula to implement these measures voluntarily, peacefully and promptly.
　The problem is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a bid to maintain its totalitarian control system, the CCP has made aggressive efforts to block the expansion of freedom domestically and externally.
　In North Korea after Kim Jong Il, the CCP may attempt to secure its influence in a manner counter to Japan’s national interests through such measures as the creation of a CCP-controlled regime. Japan should contemplate its policies based on such strategic environment.
　On June 16, the U.S. and ROK presidents specified a joint vision to pursue “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” U.S. and ROK forces are preparing for their advancement into the North upon a chaos. A unified Korea under the ROK’s auspice should meet Japan’s national interests as long as the ROK maintains the U.S.-ROK alliance, the Japan-ROK Basic Relations Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
　Regrettably, it is unlikely that North Korean people who seek freedom after the current extreme suppressive regime collapses can prevent the CCP’s intervention, maintain domestic security and build a free democracy by themselves.
　Only the ROK government may (1) maintain the philosophy of free democracy, (2) maintain security to contain subversive elements and (3) be recognized internationally as a legitimate body to govern the northern part of the Korean Peninsula.
　Therefore, the promotion of the freedom unification by ROK will be a strategic goal to meet Japan’s national interests.
　Under a China-controlled North Korean regime, the Chinese army would use military facilities and other key infrastructure such as ports, airports, and expressways during a war on or around the Korea Peninsula. Japan’s support responding to an emergency situation in North Korea must be specified as being linked to the freedom unification of the peninsula by the ROK. Japan cannot support a two-stage reunification plan that might tolerate a China-controlled government in North Korea.
　With this point in mind, Japan should accumulate efforts to realize the best scenario. If Japan takes irresponsible actions to avoid its sacrifices and burdens, the Japan-U.S. alliance may weaken. This could allow the United States to consult with China and tolerate a China-controlled North Korean regime in disregard of Japan. If Japan, the United States and the ROK adopt the expansion of free democracy on the Korean Peninsula a common strategy and get prepared to respond to an emergency situation in North Korea, they may be able to prevent CCP’s hegemony in East Asia. The future of the Japan-U.S. alliance depends on responses to an emergency situation in North Korea.

2nd Urgent Recommendation from JINF on N. Korea’s Nuke Test

Japan Should Provide for Domestic Legislation for Effective Cargo Inspections

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 June 15, 2009

　The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a new resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test on May 25. Originally Japan and the United States called for a stronger resolution featuring mandatory cargo inspections. Even if such resolution had been adopted, Japan could not have taken part in mandatory inspections, as explained below, in its surrounding waters such as the Sea of Japan while leaving other U.N. members including the United States to take risks accompanying the inspections. In that case, Japan should have come under harsh criticism from the international community.
　 For this reason, JINF urgently recommends Japan to take the following actions:

1. Overhaul defense laws to provide for the necessary domestic legislation for effective cargo inspections.
2. Straighten out the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the collective self-defense right.
3. Switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws.

1. Overhaul defense laws to provide for the necessary domestic legislation for effective cargo inspections
　　Japan has created a law named the “Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” as its legal base for cargo inspections by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But such inspections are linked to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” as indicated by the name of the law. Unless the “situations in areas surrounding Japan” are declared, the SDF cannot conduct ship inspections under the law.
　The ruling and opposition camps are considering amending the law to enable the SDF to conduct ship inspections in other situations as well. But it may be impossible to take effective actions under such limited amendment.
　This is because the “ship inspection operations” under Article 5 of the act begin with “monitoring of a ship’s passage” and cover “approaching, chasing and accompanying the ship concerned and waiting for it in its way as far as necessary.” As for “boarding to inspect and verify” as the core of ship inspection operations, the act requires the SDF “to request the captain or the person who controls the ship concerned (hereinafter referred to as ‘the captain or the like’) for stopping the ship and to get on board for inspection and verification of documents and cargoes on approval by the captain or the like.”
　The provision means that the SDF can inspect only ships whose captains or the like approve their ships’ stoppage and inspection as requested by the SDF. What can the SDF do against ships whose captains or the like reject such SDF requests? The law only provides that the SDF should “persuade the captain or the like to accept such requests.” In other words, the SDF would be able to do nothing more than persuasion.
　The law also provides that SDF inspectors may use weapons only “when they have due reasons to identify the need for using weapons to defend themselves or their colleagues engaged in inspection operations.” In addition, the act provides that SDF inspectors “shall not harm any people” for other reasons than their legitimate self-defense or averting present danger under the Penal Code.
　 Under the law, SDF inspectors are barred from issuing stoppage orders or fire warning shots at the ship concerned. No effective measures can be taken under such limitation.
　The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) now exists as an international effort for cargo inspection operations. More than 80 countries have endorsed the principles and objectives of the PSI and virtually participated and cooperated in the operations. The Japanese government has claimed that it has “proactively participated in the PSI operations” by hosting such programs as the second PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise.
　 In fact, however, Japan’s participation in PSI operations is far from proactive. This is because Japan has participated primarily in “tabletop and command post exercises” rather than actual drills hosted by other countries. Japanese participants in actual drills in the past have been limited to Japan Coast Guard patrol boats and special teams from the National Police Agency, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and customs service. Regarding the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, the Ministry’s white paper “Defense of Japan 2008” says, “in addition to dispatching Ministry of Defense personnel including SDF personnel to a variety of meetings, Japan dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas, and gathered related information.” Other PSI exercises for Japan’s participation as cited by the annual defense white paper are limited to a panel exhibition called “exhibition training.” Have such realities meet the white paper’s conclusion that the SDF has “played a proactive role on its own initiative in a number of joint exercises?”
　The white paper also says: “Through these proactive efforts, for example in the case of PSI maritime interdiction activities, the relevant information obtained through information gathering activities (such as surveillance by ships of the MSDF and by aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF) is provided to relevant organizations and countries. Furthermore, it is thought that the MSDF will be able to carry out effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships, with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard in the event that maritime security operations are ordered.”
　This indicates that what the SDF can do is limited to the provision of the “relevant information” to “relevant organizations and countries.” Unless “maritime security operations are ordered,” the SDF may be barred from carrying out “effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships.”
　“Effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships” could be based on maritime security operations that have already been ordered for the SDF to address pirates. But maritime security operations are interpreted as excluding the use of weapons for protecting foreign ships. Effective measures would be difficult to take within the scope of the maritime security operations.
　Japan should fundamentally overhaul its defense laws to resolve the above problems in the following way:

2. Straighten out the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the collective self-defense right
　The above problems have emerged as the government has interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as banning the exercise of the collective self-defense right. The government has banned stoppage orders and warning shots in ship inspection operations because these measures are expected to lead to the exercise of the collective self-defense right. Under the constraint, the SDF’s PSI operations are limited to the provision of information and participation in exhibition training.
　The Unites States and other relevant foreign countries interpret PSI including its exercises as military operations. Unless the above interpretation of the Constitution is modified, the Maritime SDF cannot participate effectively in PSI operations. Some people are exploring cooperation using Japan Coast Guard patrol boats, but this measure also will fail to secure Japan’s effective participation in PSI operations. In fact, the Japan Coast Guard Law provides that “any provision in this law shall not be interpreted as allowing the Japan Coast Guard and its officials to be organized, trained or function as military forces (Article 25).” The Japan Coast Guard, like the SDF, is barred from participating in military exercises, let alone military operations.

3. Switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws
　　Under international customary law, warships have been given the right of “boarding.” The right is also provided for by Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas and Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, Japan has failed to provide for the necessary legislation for implementing rights and obligations under international law. This is the reason Japan has had no choice but to order maritime security operations in addressing pirates.
　Legal systems of many countries allow military forces to base their operations directly on international law. Those countries use so-called “negative list” to restrict actions of military forces. This means that military forces are allowed in principle to freely conduct operations other than those banned by international law including the International Humanitarian Law. As a matter of course, military forces are bound by orders and regulations of their respective governments. But they can engage in necessary operations even if there are no domestic laws which specifically allow such operations. This is because military forces may extend their operations into enemy territories or, even if they are in their own countries, they may operate in the absence of government functions because of enemy invasion.
　 In Japan, however, the SDF that should be defined as military forces under international law is governed by laws originating from the Police Act. This is partly because the SDF was inaugurated first as the National Police Reserve. Therefore the SDF cannot engage in operations other than those specified in the “positive list” (governing laws). The SDF may be able to engage in various operations purporting to be as “education and training” or “surveys and research required for implementation of duties” (Article 4, Ministry of Defense Establishment Law) if they are not accompanied by the use of force or the use of weapons. But the SDF cannot use weapons or take other effective measures without laws which specifically allow it to. Japan is the only country where such legal constraints are put on military forces.
　This is the reason Japan had no choice but to create special measures laws for the SDF’s refueling operations in the Indian Ocean and its dispatch to Iraq. Unless new special measures laws are developed or existing laws are amended, the SDF cannot conduct new operations. Every time a new situation emerges, Japan must consume much time on developing law for actions to address the situation. This can prevent Japan from making prompt, effective contributions.
　This is the problem facing Japan now. Accumulation of stopgap measures can hurt Japan’s national interests.
　Japan should learn lessons from the present situation and switch from the “positive list” to the “negative list” for defense laws.

JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Yoshiko Sakurai
Tadae Takubo
Masato Ushio
Koichi Endo
Yujiro Oiwa
Yoichi Shimada
Katsuhiko Takaike
Yasushi Tomiyama
Tsutomu Nishioka