September 25, 2009

　　　　　　Just before and after the inauguration of the Hatoyama government, new moves emerged within the Democratic Party of Japan in regard to the issue of voting rights for foreigners. Toward the August 30 general election, the Korean Residents Union in Japan, an organization of South Korean residents known as Mindan, proactively supported candidates who were in favor of giving foreign residents voting rights. The South Korean government has enhanced its diplomatic approach to the new government regarding the matter. Last year, we announced policy proposals under the title of “Toward the Adoption of a Special Naturalization System for Special Permanent Residents.” Based on our considerations and developments since then, we would like to renew the proposals from the viewpoint that foreign residents should not be given the right to vote in Japan.^a

[Policy Proposals]
1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.

1. Limit the right to vote in national and local elections to Japanese citizens.
　　　　　　In Japan’s local elections, the points of contention are often made over matters that are related to the core of national policy, including the problems relating to U.S. military bases and nuclear power plant construction. Japanese citizens alone should be responsible for making choices regarding such matters that may have far-reaching effects on Japan’s future.
　　　　　　If North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were allowed to directly or indirectly interfere in choices regarding territorial disputes, U.S. military bases or any other problem linked directly to Japan’s sovereignty and national security, it could damage peace and stability in East Asia, the Japan-U.S. alliance or the Japan-South Korea friendship.^b

　　　　　　In 1995, the Supreme Court of Japan clearly rejected foreigners’ requests for voting rights in local elections, concluding: “Given that local governments are an integral part of Japan’s national governing structure, ‘residents’ (with voting rights in local elections) in Section 2 of Article 93 in Japan’s Constitution should be interpreted as Japanese citizens residing in regions under the jurisdiction of relevant local governments.”
　　　　　　Of more than 190 countries in the world, those that allow foreigners to vote in elections are limited to less than a quarter. These countries have had special reasons for accepting foreigners’ voting rights, including a long-held policy of attracting foreign workers.
　　　　　　The number of Japanese nationals with permanent resident status in South Korea is limited to several dozens, against hundreds of thousands of South Korean special permanent residents in Japan. Given the disparity in numbers, it is difficult to justify reciprocity between Japan andSouth Korea. ^c　　
　　　　　　Some view Korean residents in Japan as persons who were transported to Japan through coercion, and their offspring. However, only 320,000 persons or 16% of two million Koreans who were residing in Japan in 1945 were mobilized to work in Japan during the war. Most of them returned to Korea after the war. At one time, there was systematic discrimination against special permanent residents regarding social security and the like. Since around 1982 when Japan signed the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and implemented social security programs that treated Japanese and foreign residents as equals, however, such discrimination has vastly decreased.
　　　　　　One of motivating factors behind Korean residents’ demand for the right to vote in local elections is the fact that increasingly fewer Korean residents perceive themselves as foreigners. Tokyo Metropolitan University Professor Chung Dae-kyun says, “Allowing special permanent residents to vote in Japanese elections while holding Korean citizenship will perpetuate the gap between citizenship and identity.” It makes a great deal more sense to give Korean special permanent residents the right to vote by enabling them to become Japanese citizens. Doing so is certainly in keeping with global conventional wisdom.

2. Give special consideration to foreigners whose residence in Japan commenced prior to 1945 and their offspring (special permanent residents) by adopting a special naturalization mechanism for them, instead of granting them the right to vote in local elections.
　　　　　　Currently, special permanent residents wishing to become Japanese citizens are forced to complete the same laborious formalities as foreigners without special status. They must also select Chinese characters for their surnames from a list that excludes many of the characters used to write the most common Korean surnames such as “Choi,” “Kang,” ”Yun” and “Cho.”

　　　　　　For foreigners who have been awarded special permanent resident status and are willing to acquire Japanese citizenship and fulfill the concomitant duties and responsibilities, the current formalities are too laborious and should be simplified as follows:
(1) Identification: A census record from the applicant’s home country (or similar document) and an alien registration certificate
(2) Confirmation of intention to naturalize in Japan: A naturalization permission application, a written motivation to naturalize in Japan, and a written oath in which the applicant promises to be a law-abiding, upstanding citizen.
　　　　　　Even the simplified mechanism, like the ordinary naturalization system, should be based on approval. It is desirable to enact a temporary law to limit an effective period of time for the mechanism.
　　　　　　The special permanent resident system for those who have resided in Japan since before the war and their offspring should be reviewed after the special naturalization mechanism is implemented. One choice would be to integrate the system into the ordinary permanent resident system.
　　　　　　Naturalization means that a foreigner becomes an official member of Japan to share the same political destiny with original Japanese citizens. For all naturalization cases including special ones, the written motivation to naturalize in Japan and the written oath should be treated strictly. Some sober ceremony should be implemented when the oath is presented. But any ceremony has never been carried out.. Since July 2003, Japan has discontinued to require even the written motivation to be submitted.
　　　　　　In 1998, a stay in Japan as a condition for the ordinary permanent resident status was reduced to 10 years from 20 years. Since then, foreigners with this status have quickly increased. When granting the status, the government should strictly check whether an applicant’s permanent stay in Japan would meet the country’s national interests. From the viewpoint of Japan’s national interest, however, the government should positively address the permanent resident status for political refugees who escape from oppression under dictatorship.

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^a The policy proposals are based on discussions after the March 2008 proposals were given. Nihon University Professor Akira Momochi was among participants in the discussions.

^b Registered foreign residents in Japan numbered 2,217,426 at the end of 2008. Of the total, Chinese (including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong) accounted for the largest share at 655,377 or 30%, followed by 589,239 South and North Koreans or 27%.
　　　　　　The number of foreigners with the special or ordinary permanent resident status stood at 912,361 including 420,305 special permanent residents. Koreans accounted for 99% of the special permanent residents. Since the early 1970s when South Koreans exceeded 50% of special permanent residents, the Japanese government has discontinued to specify the number of South or North Koreans. We estimate the number of North Koreans at 50,000 or less. We call for the government to disclose specifics. Special permanent residents include members of the General Association of Korean Residents, which is known as Chongryon and claims that all its activities are based around the concept of Juche (Chonryong Website).
　　　　　　Ordinary permanent residents numbered 492,056 including not a small number of Chinese under the CCP influence.
　　　　　　Any nationality-wise breakdown of ordinary permanent residents at the end of 2008 is not available. Of 439,757 foreigners with the ordinary permanent resident status at the end of 2007, Chinese accounted for the largest share at 128,501 persons. South and North Koreans captured the fourth largest share at 49,914 persons.

^c According to the 2003 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics on overseas Japanese residents, the number of Japanese nationals staying in South Korea stood at 55.

September 18, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

1. When he meets with U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should declare that the Japan-U.S. relationship in which the two countries share value is the most important bilateral relationship for Japan.

　　　　　　The United States has been growingly concerned that Japan could drift away from the United States under the Hatoyama government. In his article that has been reported in the United States and interpreted as anti-American, Hatoyama said, “The Japan-U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy.” But he has failed to gain any confidence in the United States.
　　　　　　Furthermore, Katsuya Okada, who has become foreign minister in the new government, indicated his plan to limit the scope of the Japan-U.S. alliance to the Asia-Pacific region in a foreign policy vision report, which he published in 2005 when he was the president of the DPJ. Okada thus denied the concept of “the Japan-U.S. alliance in the world” as agreed between the two countries under the past Liberal Democratic Party government. His assumption of the foreign minister portfolio may be another matter of concern to the United States.
　　　　　　If Hatoyama is confident that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy, the prime minister at his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama should declare, “The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” Hatoyama should try to eliminate U.S. concerns about Japan. A declaration using the late U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield’s famous remark should help the Hatoyama government gain U.S. confidence since Mansfield was respected on a bipartisan basis in the U.S. political arena.

2. Continue the SDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.

　　　　　　On the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ refueling mission in the Indian Ocean under the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law set to expire in January 2010, the Pentagon press secretary said on September 9, “We would very much encourage them to continue those efforts.” On August 31, the State Department spokesman said: “A stable, prosperous Afghanistan is in the interests of the entire international community, including Japan. But of course, it’s up to each country to determine how they can best contribute to that effort.” These remarks indicate nuanced differences within the U.S. government. But the refueling mission is a symbol of Japan’s contributions to the war against terrorism and should be continued. The DPJ’s campaign manifesto and its coalition agreement with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party call for Japan to play a proactive role in the “eradication of poverty” and “national reconstruction” in Afghanistan to eliminate a breeding ground of terrorism. However, a return to check-book diplomacy cannot become a symbolic contribution replacing the refueling mission.

3. Be aware that any revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or the bilateral agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will never become a priority for the Obama administration.

　　　　　　The U.S. State Department spokesman has declared that the U.S. government has no intent to renegotiate an agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, while the Pentagon press secretary has urged the Hatoyama government to implement the agreement. Michael Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said, “The Obama administration is beset with foreign and security challenges globally and will have little appetite to renegotiate the Okinawa base agreements (again!) or SOFA even in a year .” Hatoyama should keep in mind that if he urges the United States to review these agreements promptly, his ability as an international politician may be doubted. At a press conference just after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama indicated a right decision to refrain from taking up the SOFA issue at his planned meeting with President Obama in late September.

4. Urge the United States to issue a new Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security to redefine the bilateral alliance in 2010, based on military changes in East Asia and in the world.

　　　　　　Since the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration was issued in 1996 to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral alliance after the Cold War, the East Asian security situation has changed dramatically on North Korea’s nuclear armament and China’s military rise. The world security situation also has changed greatly as the war against the terrorism of Islamic extremists has become an important common challenge for the civilized world.
　　　　　　In 2010 marking the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan, based on these changes, should propose a new joint declaration to redefine the Japan-U.S. alliance and get prepared for the uncertain Asian and world situations.

5. Revise the three non-nuclear principles in a bid to admit the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

　　　　　　If U.S. nuclear deterrence were to work as designed to ultimately secure Japan’s safety, not only Japan but its potential enemies would have to be led to believe that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons for Japan’s defense. If Japan changes its three non-nuclear principles — not to possess, produce or introduce into the country nuclear weapons – in a bid to admit the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, potential enemies should clearly understand the U.S. willingness to defend Japan and the U.S. nuclear deterrence against possible attacks on Japan will be enhanced.
　　　　　　 The DPJ has suspected a secret Japan-U.S. deal to allow U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan and indicated it might demand the United States to comply with the non-nuclear principles. If the DPJ pursues an “equal” Japan-U.S. relationship as urged in its campaign manifesto, however, wouldn’t it be reasonable for Japan to possess nuclear weapons before refusing the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan?

September 18, 2009

[Policy Proposals]
1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.

1. Withdraw the medium-term target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2020.

　　　　　　Excessive environmental conservation measures are feared to impose a huge burden on the industrial circle and the people. These measures could force Japan to impose a far greater burden on itself than under the Kyoto Protocol.

(1) The medium-term GHG emission reduction target has failed to specify reasonable reduction measures and costs to secure the attainment of the target. It also has failed to make clear the burden that the industrial circle and the people would shoulder.

(2) How would the government, which has unilaterally offered such a lofty goal, take the responsibility for spending massive taxpayer money for purchasing emission credits or rights when the target turns out difficult to attain? The administration should specify the target’s net GHG emission reduction portion excluding emission credit or right purchases.

(3) Standard years for reducing GHG emissions have yet to be unified. The European Union has offered a 13% reduction from the standard year of 2005. The United States has come up with a 14% cut from the same year. Earlier, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government of former prime minister Taro Aso had proposed a 15% cut from 2005. In contrast, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has offered a 25% reduction from 1990. Such a target could become a major stumbling block discouraging the United States from taking part in a post-Kyoto Protocol framework.

How does the new government view Japan’s GHG emission reduction obligation (to reduce emissions by 6% from 1990 level) in the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period? The obligation is viewed as difficult for Japan to fulfill. Japan could be forced to spend massive amounts of taxpayer money on emission credit purchases and other measures to attain the goal. How will the new government raise funds for such purchases?

2. Do not make any easy international commitment that has not gained the endorsement of the people.

(1) It is a misuse of power for the administration to make an international commitment based on an incomplete, unspecific campaign manifesto without giving sufficient explanations to the people or having sufficient discussions in the absence of social consent. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should not have made any easy international commitment at the United Nations and the like.

(2) In his speech at the September 7 Asahi World Environment Forum 2009, Hatoyama described the medium-term target as based on emission reductions that are scientifically required to stop global warming. The prime minister should explain the relevant scientific data.

　　　　　　Hatoyama also said: “We will also pursue all major countries’ building of a fair, effective international framework. An agreement on an ambitious target among all major countries will be a precondition for Japan’s commitment to the international community.” But this approach could result in a repetition of the Kyoto Protocol experience. Domestic social consensus on any international commitment is a prerequisite for making such a commitment.
　　　　　　Hatoyama also said, “We believe that industrial countries should provide financial and technical support to developing countries that ambitiously try to reduce GHG emissions.” But we should require major GHG-emitting countries to make due payments for such support. Technical and financial grants to developing countries may delay their technological innovation to the disadvantage of global warming prevention and amount to unreasonable national wealth losses that the people cannot ignore.

3. Offer a medium-term target featuring a better balance between policies.

(1) Among DPJ initiatives, the elimination of expressway tolls and the abolition of provisional auto-related tax portions are expected to contribute to expanding automobile use and carbon dioxide emissions, contradicting the GHG emission reduction plan. These initiatives may also affect operators and users of public transportation services and hurt regional economies by leading to a decline in regional transportation networks. How will the administration address these adverse effects?

(2) If expressway tolls were to be eliminated, the government would have to specify how it would deal with 40 trillion yen in debt left by now-defunct public road corporations and their privatization.

(3) The increase of national burden accompanying the government’s environment policy would inevitably lead to a decline in Japan’s international competitiveness and to its industrial hollowing-out. Given that new financial resources will be required for the introduction of a fixed-price purchase system for renewable energy with mandatory purchase of all electricity generated and that the early introduction of an environmental tax will be difficult, further deterioration of fiscal condition would be inevitable. How will the government achieve both economic recovery and sustainable growth under such circumstances?

(4) Citing oil crises in the 1970s, the DPJ has argued that tougher environmental regulations would promote technological innovation and improve the economy. This argument is too idealistic to be persuasive. Compared with the shift from massive production and consumption before the oil crises to energy conservation, any further technological innovation over a short term of some 10 years would be far more difficult in Japan that already features the most widespread energy conservation technologies in the world.

(5) The DPJ depends on data from a certain research institute to argue that the medium-term GHG emission reduction target would be compatible with economic growth. But the DPJ has never specified objective data prepared in a manner for which the party is responsible. Any international commitment without responsible verification amounts to ignoring the people.

4. Specify a resources/energy strategy including the use of nuclear power.
　　　　　　 In its campaign manifesto the DJP has vowed to “take steady steps toward the use of nuclear power,” while forming a coalition with the Social Democratic Party that has described itself as the only political party that has made clear a shift away from nuclear energy. It would be unrealistic to attain the medium-term CO2 emission reduction target on the condition of a shift away from nuclear energy. As a responsible ruling party, the DPJ is required to specify its attitude on the future nuclear energy policy.