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70 Years after World War II

How Should We Cope with the Tectonic Shift in the Global Geopolitics?

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ジャーナリスト。ハワイ大学卒業（アジア史専攻）。クリスチャン・サイエンス・モニター紙東京支局員、アジア新聞財団デプス・ニューズ東京支局長などを経て、1980年から96年まで日本テレビ「NNNきょうの出来事」のニュースキャスター。以降、フリージャーナリストとして活躍。2007年にシンクタンク国家基本問題研究所を設立し、理事長に就任した。「21世紀の日本と憲法」有識者懇談会（通称、民間憲法臨調）の代表も務めている。
薬害エイズ事件を論じた『エイズ犯罪 血友病患者の悲劇』で95年に大宅壮一ノンフィクション賞、98年に菊池寛賞、2007年にフジサンケイグループの正論大賞をそれぞれ受賞。
主な著書は『日本の勝機 ―米中韓の変化に果敢に向き合え―』、『日本国の復権』、『議論の作法』など。
Yoshiko Sakurai is the nation's leading freelance journalist. Ms. Sakurai studied at and graduated from the University of Hawaii, majoring in Asian history.
She worked as a staff writer of the Christian Science Monitor's Tokyo Bureau, a reporter for the DEPTH NEWS of the Press Foundation of Asia, and as Tokyo Bureau Chief of the DEPTH NEWS. Beginning in 1980, she worked for 16 years as a news anchor at channel 4, Nippon TV, on the program "NNN Today's Events" until the end of March, 1996. Ms. Sakurai has since been working as a writer-journalist.
In 2007, she established the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) and was elected President of the Institute. In 2012, she was elected a representative of the so-called "Private Research Commission on Constitution."
She received the Ohya Soichi Non-Fiction Award, regarded the highest non-fiction writing award in the country, for her work entitled "AIDS Crime, Tragedy of Hemophiliac Patients." She also received the Kikuchi Kan Award in 1998 and the Fuji-Sankei Group's "Seiron Taisho" in 2007.
Her recent works include: "Face up Squarely to the Problem of Changing US, China and South Korea" "Rules of Arguments."

田久保忠衛　国家基本問題研究所副理事長

Dr. Tadae Takubo　Vice President, Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF)

杏林大学名誉教授。法学博士。1956年早稲田大学法学部卒。時事通信社でハンブルク特派員、那覇支局長、ワシントン支局長、編集総務兼外信部長、米国ウッドローウィルソン国際学術研究所客員研究員、海外事業室長兼解説委員、編集局次長兼解説委員などを歴任。
84年杏林大学社会科学部教授（国際関係論、国際政治学）、92年より社会科学部長、93年より大学院国際協力研究科長を兼任、2002年から総合政策学部および大学院国際協力研究科客員教授、10年杏林大学名誉教授。07年国家基本問題研究所設立に伴い副理事長に就任。産経新聞新憲法起草委員会委員長を務めた。
97年フジサンケイグループの第12回正論大賞を受賞。2006年第67回文藝春秋読者賞受賞。
主な著書は『戦略家ニクソン』、『米中、二超大国時代の日本の生き筋』、『国民の憲法』（共著）、『憲法改正、最後のチャンスを逃すな!』など。
Tadae Takubo is Professor Emeritus at Kyorin University. He received a ph. D. in law from Keio University.
After graduating from Waseda University, he joined Jiji Press and held prominent positions such as Hamburg correspondent, Naha (Okinawa) Bureau Chief, Washington, D.C., Bureau Chief, Foreign News Editor and Deputy Managing Editor. Between 1979 and 1980 he was a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
In 1984 Dr. Takubo joined the faculty of social sciences at Kyorin University as a professor of international politics and international relations. He served important positions at the university including Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences (1992-2002) and Dean of the Graduate School for International Cooperation study (1993-2002). He was Guest Professor at the Faculty of General Policies and Guest Professor at the Graduate School for International Cooperation Study (2002-2010).
In 2007, he established the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) with Ms Yoshiko Sakurai and was elected Vice President of the Institute. In 2013, he assumed chairman of the Sankei Shimbun-organized five-men committee to draft a new "National Constitution of Japan."
In 1997 he received the "Seiron Taisho" (an award established by Fuji-Sankei Group) for excellent activities in journalism.
His most important publications include: "A New World Order and Japan" "Strategist Nixon" "A New Japan-US Alliance" "America's Wars" "Living in a Turbulent World" "How Should We Live in the Era of Two Super Powers, the US and China?" "Don't Miss the Last Chance for Constitutional Revision."

アーサー・ウォルドロン　米ペンシルベニア大学教授

Dr. Arthur Waldron　Professor, University of Pennsylvania

ボストン生まれ。アジア、特に中国史、戦略研究が専門。数多くの学術論文を発表、20冊余の本を執筆、編集、寄稿しており、そのうち２冊は中国語で書かれている。1997年からペンシルベニア大学歴史学部国際関係の教授を務めている。
全寮制の私立タフト校（米コネチカット州）、ウインチェスター・カレッジ（英国）を経て、71年、ハーバード大学を首席で卒業。81年には歴史学博士号を取得した。
首都ワシントンにある国際評価戦略センターを創立、副理事長に就任。アメリカン・エンタプライズ公共政策研究所（AEI）の前アジア担当責任者、アメリカ中国研究協会理事、ジェームズタウン財団理事、外交問題評議会（CFR）評議員などを務めている。米海軍大学やプリンストン大学で教壇に立ち、ブラウン大学で非常勤教授、2003年から一年間、ベルギーのルーバン大学の客員教授を歴任した。
中国、日本、台湾、フランス、英国、旧ソ連で研究活動に従事したことがあり、中国語、仏語のほかロシア語にも堪能。連邦議会の米中経済安全保障調査委員会の創設メンバーでもある。米中央情報局（CIA）の中国での活動を評価する特別委員会の外部専門家12人の一人である。88年に結婚、二人の子息がいる。
Professor Waldron (born on December 13, 1948 in Boston) is an American historian. He works chiefly on Asia, China in particular, often with a focus on the origins and development of nationalism, and the study of war and violence in general. He has published numerous scholarly papers and reviews, and written, edited, or contributed to more than twenty books, including two in Chinese only. Since 1997 he has been the Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania
He attended Harvard College from which he graduated summa cum laude in 1971, receiving the Sophia Freund Prize. In 1981 he received a

Ph.D. in history, also from Harvard.
Waldron is a founder and vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington DC. He is a former director of Asian studies with the American Enterprise Institute, a director of the American Association of Chinese Studies, a member of the Board of theJamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to arriving at the University of Pennsylvania, Waldron taught at, the U.S. Naval War College, and Princeton University, and as adjunct professor of East Asian Studies at Brown University. In 2003-2004 he was Visiting Professor of History,at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
Waldron has lived and studied in China, Japan, Taiwan, France, England, and the former Soviet Union. He occasionally consults for the U.S. government, and was a founding member of the Congressional US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2000-) as well as one of twelve outside experts on the top-secret Tilelli Commission (2000-2001) which evaluated the CIA's China operations. He has represented the United States in "track two" meetings with Korea, Taiwan, China, Japan and Russia.
In 1988, Waldron married; he and his wife have two sons.

ブラーマ・チェラニー インド政策研究センター教授

Dr. Brahma Chellaney Professor of Strategic Studies, Center for Policy Research, India

所属する政策研究センターはニューデリーに本部を置くインドの民間シンクタンク。専門は国際安全保障、軍備管理問題。軍備管理問題で博士号取得。2000年1月までインド政府の国家安全保障会議（NSC）顧問として、外部専門家から成る国家安全保障諮問委員会の対外安全保障グループ座長を務めた。その後、最近までインド外相の政策諮問グループの一員だった。
米国のハーバード大学、ブルッキングズ研究所、ジョンズ・ホプキンズ大学高等国際問題研究大学院（SAIS）や、オーストラリア国立大学で役職を歴任した。
著書に『アジアのすさまじい力―中国、インド、日本の興隆』、『気候変動の最前線にて―国際安全保障への影響』（共著）などがある。
インターナショナル・セキュリティー、オービス、サバイバル、ワシントン・クオータリー、セキュリティー・スタディーズ、テロリズムの各誌に研究論文を執筆。インターナショナル・ヘラルド・トリビューン、ウォール・ストリート・ジャーナル、ジャパン・タイムズ、アジア・エイジ、ヒンドゥスタン・タイムズ、タイムズ・オブ・インディアの各紙にコラムを定期的に寄稿している。
Brahma Chellaney is a strategic thinker and a geostrategist tracking large-scale international trends. He is a professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, a fellow of the Robert Bosch Foundation in Berlin, and an affiliate with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King's College London. He has served as a member of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the foreign minister of India and an advisor to India's National Security Council.
As a specialist on international strategic issues, he has held appointments at Harvard University, the Brookings Institution, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and the Australian National University. He has also been a Fellow at the Nobel Institute in Oslo and at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D.C.
Prof. Chellaney is the author of nine books, including Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan and Water: Asia's New Battleground, winner of the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award. His latest book is Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis.
Prof. Chellaney has published numerous research papers in various international journals, including International Security, Orbis, Survival, Asian Survey, Washington Quarterly, Security Studies and Terrorism.
He is also a columnist, including for Project Syndicate, and a television commentator. He regularly contributes opinion articles to the International New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Japan Times, and the Times of India. In 1985, he won a Citation for Excellence from the Overseas Press Club, New York.

時殷弘 中国人民大学教授

Dr. Shi Yinhong Professor, Renmin University Of China

国際関係が専門で、人民大学の米国研究センター主任を務めている。2011年2月からは国務院参事として中国政府に政策提言を行っている。
南京大学で国際関係史教授（93-98年）、南京の国際関係学院教授（98-2001年）、中国米国史研究会理事長（96-2002年）などを歴任した。
88年に南京大学で博士号（歴史学）を取得後、ハーバード燕京研究所客員研究員（83-84年）、ドイツ・ケルンの東欧・国際問題研究所客員研究員（92年）、米ノースカロライナ大学フルブライト派遣研究（95-96年）を経て、ミシガン大学で公共政策、名古屋の愛知大学では近代中国問題についてそれぞれ客員教授を務めた。
時教授は、中米両国で歴史学、国際政治論、戦略研究、東アジア安全保障、両国の外交政策についての研究、教育に従事してきた。著書には「中国の政治経験：司馬遷史記の政治戦略的読み方」（2012年）（仮訳）、「戦略に関する30の研究：中国の対外戦略省察」（2008年）（仮訳）などがある。その他、学会誌や新聞、雑誌に550編以上の論文や寄稿文を書いている。
Dr. Shi Yinhong is a professor of International Relations, Chairman of Academic Committee of the School of International Studies, and Director of the Center on American Studies at Renmin University of China in Beijing. He has served as a counselor of the State Council of China since February 2011. He previously was a professor of International History at Nanjing University from 1993 to 1998, and a professor of International Relations at International Relations Academy, Nanjing from 1998 to 2001. He also served as the President of American Historical Research Association of China from 1996 to 2002.
Shi obtained a Ph.D. degree in International History at Nanjing University in 1988. He was a visiting fellow at Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University from 1983 to 1984, a visiting fellow at Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies in Cologne in 1992, a Fulbright research visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina from 1995 to 1996. He taught graduate courses as a visiting professor of Public Policy three times at University of Michigan, and a visiting professor of Modern China Studies at Aichi University in Nagoya.
He has engaged in research and teaching on the history and theory of international politics, strategic studies, East Asia security, and foreign policies of both China and the United States. His 16 books have been published, most of them in China, including The Pathology, Resurgence, Decline, and Demise of An Empire: A Systematic Analysis of Ba Gu's Book of Han Dynasty (1st century A.D.) (2014); China's Political Experience: A Politico-Strategic Reading of Sima Qian's Historical Record (2 century B.C.) (2012); Global Challenges and China (2010); Thirty Studies on Strategy: Reflections of China's External Strategy (2008). He has over 550 professional articles and essays published in academic journals, magazines and newspapers.

Ⅱ・session 1

Opening address Yoshiko Sakurai President, JINF: Yesterday, December 24, the third Abe administration was inaugurated and Prime Minister Abe pledged that he would totally dedicate himself to addressing the challenge that has been imposed upon this nation ever since the end of World War II. He also said he would endeavor to give rise to the discussion among the people on the revision of the Constitution and thus deepen the understanding of the people about the matter. Revising the Constitution is the founding goal of our institution. We want Japan to become an independent-minded nation so that we will be able to contribute ourselves to the peace and stability as well as the order not only of Japan but also of Asia at large—which is our hope and aspiration. It is our conviction that this is the responsibility Japan is called upon to perform in Asia as well as the world.

Behind that conviction is the fact that the post-World War II international order has been dramatically transformed. The United States still retains power as the global superpower. However, they have become more and more introverted—spiritually speaking—whereas China, for its part, has gained momentum in terms of military, economic and financial capabilities—they are pursuing an expansionist policy under the banner of the so-called Chinese Dream. Such asymmetrical changes regarding the two powers have been causing a really dramatic turnaround in the international order. This shift is the greatest post-WWII crisis not only for Japan but also for India and other countries in Asia. Against this background, we decided to organize this symposium with the participation of intellectuals from the United States, India, China and Japan.

To that end, we have asked four professors to gather for today's symposium.

Dr. Shi Yinhong, professor of Renmin University of China, had originally been scheduled to be here and appear as a panelist. However, on the night before his departure for Japan, we received an e-mail, in which he said he was not able to attend. Unfortunately, he cannot make it himself, but we do have a copy of his keynote speech he had submitted to us beforehand. With the permission of Dr. Shi Yinhong, we will share the text of his speech later.

Now, I would like to invite Prof. Waldron to deliver his keynote speech.

War and Peace

Prof. Arthur Waldron: Today is the Christmas day among the Christians. That's good to focus on peace. A good way to think about peace is to visit either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Two days ago, my wife and I and our two boys visited Hiroshima. We stayed the night before in the complete tranquility of Miyajima Island where the only sound was the tide lashing against the stone walls of the harbor and the seabirds calling. As the sun rose, the great torii in the water before the temple became bright.

The scene was that of the nature and tranquility that had been seen there for thousand years before August 6, 1945. On that day, there occurred a shock, a flash and a roar. Then again, after years since then, came a return to tranquility and calm.

I can think no place in the world that embodies better than Hiroshima the great lesson that we must bear in mind today in our discussion, which is war must be eliminated and peace secured. To contemplate at the Atom Bomb Dome—to imagine the flash, the shock wave, the fire, the intense temperature, the hellish reality of a nuclear war, the people, the birds, the mice, the trees, the grass, everything that was dead most immediately and some by radiation over years and decades—is, I think, an essential assignment and education for anyone who considers the problem of a nuclear war.

It is one thing to believe that war must be prevented and abolished. This is natural—it is deeply moral and, I should also say, intellectually easy. I have a neighbor whose house is covered with a sign saying: "War Is Not the Answer." True enough! But I would like to ring the bell and ask him: "Suppose someone invades you militarily, what do you do then? How do you avoid the war?"

This question is not easy to answer. What road truly leads to war? Which truly leads to peace? These are profound, intellectual, moral questions. We must be aware that sometime in history—many times—what seemed to be a road to peace has in fact led to war and vice versa.

I am going to talk about how to avoid such a war. In my talk, I will speak about weapons, including nuclear weapons. Please remember, though, that my purpose is to state as clearly as I can what I believe as the way to avoid the war and its hazards. Avoiding a war is not an easy or straightforward task either in thought or in action. I want you all to understand what you are hearing as the words of a man who has visited Hiroshima more than once to listen to her and learn, I believe, the most important lesson she teaches. So, if that is clearly understood, let us begin.

Let me recall the year 1971 when President Richard Nixon astonished the world by announcing that he would visit the People's Republic of China. China had been an American friend and ally in World War II, but the communist regime that came to power in 1949 moved her to the Soviet side in the Cold War. In the end, the two countries were hostile and had little contact.

That announcement, therefore, filled people with hope. I was beginning the Chinese language at the time. I remember our elation—and the excitement of the American people. Perhaps the Cold War was ending. Perhaps our two great countries could be friends again and live in peace. But it was not to be.

Today, as we meet, the international atmosphere is quite different. No question exists that China now has a huge and powerful military along with a succession of territorial claims—always dormant but pushed to the front in 2010—have frightened her neighbors.

I think the possibility is quite real that a small military incident could, without anyone so intending, escalate into a serious, possibly disastrous, war in Asia.

How in a half century did we come from hope for peace to fear of war?

In her China diplomacy, the United States was ambitious. Deeply influenced by an overly positive view of the People's Republic of China—which then overwhelmingly dominated scholarship, although it is dead today—we privately envisioned, I believe, a truly intimate alliance with China as China we believed shared the American interests.

It was widely agreed that at least one territory would not survive American-Chinese reconciliation—this was the island of Taiwan. Henry Kissinger spoke repeatedly of the need to sacrifice—his word—our alliance and the people of Taiwan in order to seal friendship with China. Less well known but ever more importantly, Washington was also considering discarding her alliance with Japan.

When Mr. Nixon met Mao Zedong in person on February 21, 1972, he had prepared a long list of questions to discuss. One was this and I quote the declassified transcript:

"We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? Is it better—here I know we have disagreements—is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless or is it better for a time to have some relations with the United States?"

Those were the words President Nixon gave to Chairman Mao Zedong to propose that Japan might "have some relations with the United States," as opposed to none at all. This was a stunning initiative.

This was far more than opening an embassy. This was an attempt to fundamentally change the security architecture of Asia. I do not think that China wanted to be any part of it, which was why it never got off the ground. Mao quelled for a few minutes after President Nixon brought it up. Said the Chinese chairman to the American president: "All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much. I think your topic is better—philosophic questions." And, so it ended. No Chinese pursued it.

Today, China and America are deeply interdependent. Last year (2013), bilateral foreign trade totaled $562 billion. Much of the U.S. government is financed by purchases of American Treasury debt, of which China owned $1.3 trillion as of April this year (2014). A quarter of the 886,000 foreign students in the U.S. in 2013/2014 were from China.

Yet the two governments have nothing like a meeting of minds. When it comes, for instance, to the United Nations, China usually opposes us. Her military build-up quite expressly targets us. The Chinese press owned and operated by the Chinese government is daily filled with scores of false and libelous attacks on the United States.

The basic goals are incompatible—we are like two trains on a single track headed toward each other and for a collision.

Never and Must

Now let me change tack and talk quite bluntly about war, to which we gave no thought in 1972, but which today, I think, threatens the world more than at any previous time in my own life.

China today presses claims to territories all the way from Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India, which she calls South Tibet, through those shoals that are close to Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan—and at least as far as the Ieodo island of South Korea. She also claims sovereignty over the entire Nanyang or South Sea, a 3.68 million square kilometer area which is substantially larger than the Mediterranean Sea's 2.51 million square kilometers. These claims are all subsumed under a definition impossible to be defined, yet regularly used as a legal formula for more than a century.— "Chunghua guyou zhi jiangyu" or roughly "territories held by China since time immemorial." The claim lacks any historical basis but it is widely believed and gives directions to policy.

In 1994, I had a long and relaxed discussion with Huang Hua, China's well-educated and cosmopolitan foreign minister from 1976 to 1982. Speaking of the various reefs, rocks and other features in the Nanyang, Huang made it clear that China intended to "pick them up by one by one." Particularly since 2010, China has demonstrated and attempted its intent of gaining territories even by military means. Thus, she has fought the Vietnamese and the Indians and the Filipinos and regularly threatens Japan, while at the same interfering with routine and legal U.S. military operations.

China is, moreover, a strategic nuclear power, with something between 300 and 3,000 nuclear warheads and with the delivery capability to strike her neighbors and the United States. Asia is alarmed.

Why does the Chinese government promote this dangerous policy based on its historical myth? I think because it is a dictatorship facing domestic dissents and therefore wishes to turn anger away from the government toward Japan, the United States and others, while building a great territorial project.

Now, China is not even on a road to freedom, let alone about what it has achieved as some foreigners believe. Freedom House, a nonpartisan organization, ranks all the countries of the world for freedom. Number 1 is the highest—free. Number 7 is the very lowest—unfree. In Asia, only

China and North Korea receive the lowest possible rate of unfree 7. Among other Asian countries, the highest score is 1 and the countries receiving this score include Mongolia, Japan and Taiwan. India and South Korea are rated free but with the qualification—at 2.

It is worth noting that Russia—which is no paradise of rights and liberty—is at 6, unfree but with the qualifications. The only other countries in the world that share the dismal rating of 7 with China and North Korea are in Africa or in the Middle East.

Here is my conclusion. Given the military and nuclear threats from China and other regional countries, the pacifism and renunciation of war—the long Japanese policy—is no longer realistic. It is dangerous—dangerous to the point of threatening national sovereignty. Military weakness invites abuse and attack and it thus is a road to war rather than to peace. Washington publicly claims that she would defend Japan when she was attacked. As an American, I believe this is not true. Would the United States really use her nuclear weapons to defend not herself but her ally? Would she launch a nuclear strike if Tokyo were hit? Would she do so, having certain knowledge that such action would elicit a counterstrike that would completely destroy the United States? The answer is "no." Regardless of what she may have promised, I am absolutely certain that my country, the United States, would never launch nuclear weapons against anyone unless our own homeland had already been hit.

Without what is called American-extended deterrence—or our nuclear umbrella, a myth—countries not themselves possessing the nuclear capability would be alone facing an aggressor, without an ally, subject to threat and blackmail, isolated and in mortal danger.

The two countries that have been known in the United States the longest, fought side by side with us in many wars and might be considered our closest allies are England and France. It tells me a lot that neither England nor France has ever trusted the United States as an automatic guarantor as Japan now does. The two European states know that in the end they must be capable of their own complete self-defense without any ally.

That is why both countries have spent a vast sum of money to maintain what strategists call a minimum deterrent, that is to say, a nuclear capability that is too small to start a war, but, nonetheless, strong enough to prevent one. Each country maintains three nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles carrying some of their nuclear weapons. One of these submarines is kept always underway invisible, deep in distant waters, capable, if called upon, to inflict an utterly devastating blow against any aggressor even thousands miles away.

If I were a Japanese, I am certain in mind that I want my country to possess a minimum deterrent like what England and France have. Such a deterrent will make Japan as secure as possible from aggression, while itself providing no capability for aggression.

Choosing the policy I suggested is a challenge for Japan. Many may oppose it, including, perhaps, the United States. If adopted, it will, however, strengthen peace in Asia and the world. Let met conclude. As I consider the predicament of today's Japan, a democratic, free and clearly

peaceful country in an area filled with danger, I draw two conclusions.

The first is a "never" and the second is a "must." First, Japan must never acquire aggressive strategic nuclear capabilities of any time, certainly not comparable to those of Russia, China or the United States. Second, Japan must acquire the minimum nuclear deterrent necessary to seal her from aggression. prevent any attack and thus ensure peace. Otherwise, Japan will be isolated, without allies, and powerless against nuclear aggression.

Sakurai: Thank you, Prof. Waldron. That was really impressive. I highly appreciate it. I have the pleasure to invite you, Prof. Brahma Chellaney, to deliver your keynote speech.

"Offering My Five Points"

Prof. Brahma Chellaney: What I intend to do is to offer five points in answer to the theme of this symposium. Let me begin with the very obvious point. We live in a world of rapid change. The pace of technological change since the 1980s, since the advent of the Internet age, has been truly revolutionary. As a result, technological forces are playing a greater role in shaping in international geopolitics than in any other time in history. Economically, the rapid pace of technological change, coupled with reduced transportation costs and lowered trade barriers, has accelerated global GDP growth and contributed to the rise of the East.

The pace of geopolitical change has been no less extraordinary especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In fact, we have seen the most profound geopolitical change in the most complex timeframe in history.

This brings me to my second point: the international order is clearly in transition, given the tectonic power shift that is underway. The age of the Atlantic dominance is in retreat. With just 12 percent of the world population living in the West, the post-World War II transatlantic order must give way to a more truly international order. Even economically, the dominance of the West is on the decline. Just in the last 10 years, the share of the West in the world's total GDP has declined from 60 percent to 42 percent, while the share of the developing economies has risen to 40 percent.

Today's manifold challenges and unfolding power shift symbolize the new world order. Although we know that the present order is in its transition, the contours of the new order are still not visible. Yet, fundamental reforms of the existing international institution are becoming inevitable. The international institutional structure has remained static since the mid-20th century. A 21st-century world cannot remain saddled with the 20th-century institutions and rules.

One challenge is to accommodate the new powers that have been rising. The new powers include not only those that have been rising since the end of the Cold War but also others—like Japan and Germany—that were rising before the Cold War ended.

Let's take the case of Japan. Japan has had a distinction of always leading Asia in modern

world history—Japan was the first society modernized, which happened in the Meiji era. Japan was the first Asian country to become a world power. That had happened by the beginning of the 20th century. Even after Japan's crushing defeat in World War II, Japan was the first Asian country to emerge as a global economic powerhouse.

Japan today ranks among the world's richest countries and boasts Asia's lowest income inequality. To be sure, Japan's geopolitical clout has taken a beating because of the economic stagnation for almost two decades, during which China has risen dramatically. Yet, given Japan's role in modern history, Japan's political rise we are witnessing now carries far-reaching and long-term implications. With its world-class navy, Japan will be the center of the new Asian order.

Now let's consider the case of Germany, which is the only booming economy in the eurozone. Should Germany indefinitely remain a rule-taker rather than being accommodated as a rule-maker? Geoeconomics is not dictating the geopolitics—contrary to the predication some analysts made when the Cold War ended. Yet, not to accommodate countries like Japan and Germany would be to signal that a country that is counted as an important power only when it flexes its muscle.

My third point relates to the future of the international system. Will the international system be rule-based or based on the classical balance of power? The interest of Japan, like the interest of other democracies, will be best served by the rule-based order. After all, the alternative to the rule-based system is an order in which international law is just a tool of the powerful against the weak.

The only mechanism to enforce international law is the U.N. Security Council. Unfortunately, the five existing permanent members do not have a flattering track record in respecting international law. It has become fashionable to talk about a rule-based 21st century, but let us not forget that we entered the 21st century amid major violations of international law. To give you some examples—the bombing of Serbia, the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq without U.N. Security Council mandates, more recently, China's forcible grabbing of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines and, in the most recent case, Russia's annexation of Crimea. All of these examples are of open violation of international law.

The Ukraine crisis, in fact, has become a case study of what I call the international law of convenience. President Putin cynically justified his annexation of Crimea in the name of responsibility to protect—responsibility to protect is a model not based on a legal principle. The U.S. president, Barack Obama, invoked to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in regime change that has turned Libya into a failed state.

Dispute settlement is the heart of building harmonious relations between countries, but we have a case that has China which has become party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea. But China refuses to accept this treaty's dispute settlement mechanism in a case brought against it by the Philippines. China also refuses to accept any international fact-finding arbitration or

mediation in any of its disputes with its neighboring countries. Great powers must not selectively accept some international treaties, while rejecting other treaties that are critical to the ruled-based international order. And, if they join in a treaty, they must accept all of its provisions including any dispute settlement mechanism.

My fourth point is about an increasingly interdependent world. British writer Rudyard Kipling famously said, "Oh, East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet." But now East and West increasingly meet in an interdependent world. Western economies are now dependent on capital flows from the economies of the East. The economies of the East, as you know, are ridden with cash. Global interdependencies actually extend beyond trade and capital flows—they even extend to the environmental public health, climatic and technological spheres.

The important point is that the interdependencies have not brought the world closer together. Rather, the interdependencies only sharpen competition among major powers for their advantage. Meanwhile, the struggle for natural resources is sharpening geopolitical competition among some important powers. Historically, access to natural resources has been a critical factor in war and peace. When a country's resource supplies are blocked, it can go to war.

Let me give you an example of the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941. That attack took the United States by surprise, but that attack was triggered in part by the U.S.-imposed oil embargo against Japan, which at that time was largely dependent on oil imports from the United States. The oil embargo was parceled in the U.S.-led economic squeeze of Japan.

Today, the sharpening geopolitical competition over resources has aggravated interstate disputes over resources-rich territories. For example, the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas together occupy an area—a land area—of less than 11 square kilometers. But the surrounding seas around them are supposedly rich in hydrocarbon reserves. Now Africa has become the theater of a new great game on resources,

My fifth and final point is about sanctity of the existing borders. Sanctity of the borders has become a powerful international norm—a norm that has prompted the strong Western reaction to Russia's annexation of Crimea. In Asia, unfortunately, sanctity of borders as a norm is under an open challenge. Make no mistake. Respect for the existing borders is the prerequisite to peace and stability on any continent. Europe has built its peace on the basis of this principle.

In Asia, efforts to redraw territorial and maritime borders are an invitation to an endemic conflict. Only one important country in Asia—China—is engaged in such efforts to redraw territorial and maritime borders. These efforts of China—which, as you know, is one of the largest countries in terms of land area—extend even against some of the world's smallest countries, Bhutan, which has faced repeated Chinese military incursions.

As Prof. Waldron pointed out, one of the most pressing concerns for Asian countries is China's relentless efforts to redraw territorial and maritime boundaries. These efforts are reflected in China's moves in the East and South China Seas as well as China's efforts to reengineer the

trans-boundary water flows of the major rivers that originate in the Tibetan plateau, which is known as Asia's Water Tower. China's creep reflects its strategy to change the existing territorial status quo little by little in salami style. In salami style, you only take a small slice each time. So, little by little, the Chinese strategy involves changing the status quo as part of a high-stake effort to gain control over strategic areas and resources. Refusal to accept the status quo only highlights the futility of political negotiations.

Why? Because, in modern world history, a major redrawing of frontiers involving the surrender of big chunks of real estate by one disputant to another disputant has never happened at the negotiating table. Such redrawing has been only accomplished on the battlefield as happened in Asia repeatedly in the second half of the 20th century. After six decades of such redrawing of the frontiers in Asia, these efforts must stop, or Asia's economic success story will stall.

This danger has been highlighted by the increasing military capabilities in Asia at the time when territorial and maritime disputes have resurfaced. Let me be clear: harmonious relations between any two countries cannot be built if one country refuses to accept the territorial status quo and aggressively ascertains its claims against other countries. This situation will mean tense relations, not harmonious relations.

So, let me now conclude very quickly. The larger implications of the ongoing power shift in the world remain unclear. For example, an assertive pursuit of national interests for relative gains in an increasingly interdependent world is hardly conducive to a more harmonious world. The architecture of the global governance that emerges will determine how the world should cope with this pressing challenge. The way the great powers play international politics may explain why the present international order is based on both the balance of power and rules. This blend of the balance of power and rules will likely characterize the international order but with a more balance of power than rules. Chairman Mao once famously asserted that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." In the 21st century, will power still grow out of the barrel of a gun? If major powers assert one set of rules for themselves and another set for others the answer is yes.

Sakurai: Thank you, Prof. Chellaney. If Pro. Shi Yinhong of Renmin University of China were here, he would probably wish to make his remarks in response to Dr. Chellaney, but, all of a sudden, Dr. Shi became unable to attend. So, on behalf of Dr. Shi, I would like to recite the text of his keynote speech. I have already received consent from Dr. Shi.

Major Power Shift

Prof. Shi Yinhong's keynote speech (read by Sakurai):

1. Major power shift: Is a "new normal" emerging?

Today's China looks like:

—A huge nation-state—with dramatically increased economic, financial and military strengths—is touching the second most powerful status in the world in some key areas;

—A more centralized domestic power structure of political leadership;

—A country, though, still has huge multiple complex challenges at home but (is) concerned much more about its external affairs and clout upon the outside world because of the internal economic imperatives, a more intensive desire for geopolitical strategic rights and national glory as a major power, vigorously increased popular nationalism and triumphalism and much more militant and ambitious armed forces;

—A reawaking lion under a top leader who has a much more centralized power in his hand believes in the resurgence of China's national greatness, being proud of her hard-liner posture toward China's rivals, large and small, and keenly aware of the domestic popular applause because of that, and has a remarkable preference for a strategic and operational approach of pushing toward the bottom-line without breaking it even at several fronts;

—A greater power with its rather dramatic process of substantial transformation of foreign policy making many things different from the previous discourse and practice in a rather short time span, therefore, rendering itself and others underprepared, somewhat confused and increasing chances of miscalculation;

—Self-contradictory messages delivering China's external relationships especially with the U.S. and Asia-Pacific partners. There have been two opposite sets of messages by words and deeds delivered by China under Xi Jinping's leadership. The first set is a more impressive one to the two other major powers and probably the more fundamental one is Xi's repeatedly used theme of the great resurgence of the Chinese nation referred to more officially as the China Dream.

2. A shift in the driving aim of the People's Liberation Army from an effort to just build up more modernized forces to a simpler but more comprehensive and forceful aim of being capable of fighting—and fighting victoriously.

3. Extraordinarily frequent official reports of breakthroughs in China's military build-up, including advanced weaponry, military technology and the increasing capability of the PLA's combat readiness.

4. The further hardening of China's posture toward territorial and maritime disputes with some neighboring countries, especially Japan and the Philippines. Though, since the time around Shinzo Abe ran the most recently formal process of reinterpreting the Constitution to make Japan having the military right of collective self-defense, China's posture toward Japan has quietly begun to emerge as an indication of change toward moderation.

5. The sudden declaration of the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), a major strategic action taken in the context of intense confrontation with Japan. In the longer term, this represents the first formal expansion of China's maritime

strategic space since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 beyond China's immediate offshore waters. Of course, this has a fully self-conscious implication for the strategic dominance of the United States in the Western Pacific.

6. The remarkable decline especially in the months before President Xi's Boao (Resort) speech in early April 2013 on Hainan Island in the number of references to the principle of peaceful development. This principle was used to guide Chinese foreign policy and to declare free country by the Chinese government in the previous years. Deng Xiaoping's taking low posture, another traditional principle in contemporary Chinese foreign policy, is no longer referred to as well. However, on the other hand, one can also and must refer to another set of developments since the 18th Party Congress (held in November 2012)—especially since the early summer of 2013. These remarkably reflect the complexity and inner dilemma of China's foreign policy under the new leadership headed by Xi Jinping:

1) the repeated confirmation of peaceful development orientation in the leader's statements since April 2013;

2) The much emphasized objective of creating a China-U.S. new-type-of-great-power relationship (has been) repeated again and again, as China's favored central concept for the future of China-U.S. relations. In fact, this concept has received Xi Jinping's personal insistence and is reflected by his repeated effort to gain President Obama's acceptance of this characterization of the China-U.S. relationships. Though, the record of Obama's acceptance has been bleak up to now, especially since the declaration of China's East China Sea ADIZ;

3) Much cooperation and accommodation with the United States on prominent international security issues, including North Korea, Syria and Iran, together with prominent progress in the field of broadening market access for U.S. services and capital in China. Both of these were difficult to obtain by Washington in the past to such a degree;

4) the extraordinary "Peripheral Diplomatic Work Conference" held in October 2013 and attended by all the members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. This conference emphasized forcefully that the general line of the good neighbor policy must be the guiding style of China's behavior toward neighboring countries. However, the strong impression it made at the time has been somewhat diluted since the intensifying confrontation with Japan after Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine until weeks near to the beginning of Beijing's APEC summit held in November 2014, accompanied with an almost suddenly emerged China-Japan four-principle consensus declared on November 7, 2014. This is, indeed, a major and hopeful development aimed at mitigating the China-Japan confrontation and making a Xi-Abe summit possible;

5) remarkable modernization of China's act in general in the recent past over the South China Sea dispute. In numerous months until the sudden outbreak of the China-Vietnam confrontation about the establishment of a Chinese oil rig in the offshore waters off the Paracel

Islands, together with increased efforts to improve China's relations with ASEAN and its member states, including Vietnam, a primary rival of China in the dispute. This is despite rumors that China might soon declare the establishment of a South China Sea ADIZ.

Concluding general notes for the future of Chinese foreign policy:

The prospects of China's foreign policy are still uncertain, conditioned by various domestic and international elements that will continue to be dynamic and often mutually contradictory. So, as all the above indicate, the current Chinese foreign policy could be regarded as self-contradictory, reflecting mutually conflicting factors, domestic and international, behind it.

However, among the uncertainties and self-contradiction, one major thing seems to be increasingly certain—Xi Jinping's increasingly clear aspiration for China's increasing power influence, that of the soft and hard ones or even a preponderant role in Asia and the Western Pacific in longer terms at the cost of American dominant advantage.

His statement—an Asian affair should be led by Asians ourselves—issued at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) held in Shanghai in May 2014, China's advocacy and leading role in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, established in October of the same year with its headquarters in Beijing, or China's suggestion of creating an enormous Asia-Pacific free-trade zone, a suggestion issued shortly before the opening of the Beijing APEC summit and obviously somewhat competitive with the U.S.-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which has already been in an intensive negotiation process since 2011, are all indications in this direction. About this major aspiration, self-contradiction has only been mainly in the hard-liner aspect of China's peripheral diplomacy referred once and again above, which has feared a large part of China's Asian neighbors, and inconvenient for American efforts to shape and consolidate some strategic united front to check China in the region.

Generally speaking, the critical issues for China's foreign policy are still: how can China strike the difficult balance between its different strategic requirements and how can those strategic requirements overcome domestic and international pressures and constrains? These will be a primary challenge for China's new leadership as it grapples with shaping a policy toward the United States and its neighboring countries. While the challenge is already acute, China's response remains underprepared and far from sufficiently integrated. China is struggling with various new domestic and international complexities, which in great part have been brought about by China's own dramatic growth in the past few decades.

A new stage of strategic partnership with Russia in its expansionist cause: Before Russia's annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine crisis, China appealed again and again to the principles of nonintervention, peaceful settlement of international disputes through diplomatic dialogue and negotiations and respect to state sovereignty and territorial integration in spite of the strategic importance of the relationship with Russia as a major strategic partner of China as well as an almost intimate personal relationship with President Putin developed by Xi Jinping himself.

However, just because of that strategic importance, China's public appeals to the above principles has been reduced remarkably in frequency and loudness in recent weeks in the context of Russia's continued and intermittently accelerating efforts to separate Ukraine's eastern part from that country.

Moreover, Beijing would give a huge amount of assistance to Russia in the disguise of commercial payments and export required goods to help it pass over economic difficulties largely brought about by the impact of the U.S.-EU sanctions. This change happens in a situation of almost extraordinary strategic tension between China and the United States, a tension having its structural longer-term profound cause just like that between Russia and the United States and the European Union. Russia has to move much nearer to China, somewhat like China has to move nearer to Russia.

Anyway, among the Chinese public and official media, pro-Russian and anti-American opinion has developed into a high wave almost never seen before. Is a "new normal" emerging? Yes, with little reservation.

For China, a new normal of the strategic and national psychological confrontation with Japan has already emerged with double possibilities for the future. On one hand, the almost suddenly emerged China-Japan four-principle consensus declared on November 7, 2014, is the hope stimulating developments for substantial mitigation of the China-Japan confrontation and even for a gradual improvement to a degree, which we have never seen since September 2010. On the other hand, longer-term further deterioration may have been on the horizon, accompanying with the lifting of the ban on Japan's right of collective self-defense, which might lead to the Japanese military involvement in the South China Sea and even in the maritime sphere around Taiwan if the situation in these areas would go to the worst or near worst in the future.

A new form of strategic rivalry with the United States, more comprehensive, more profound and more prominent, seems to be quickly emerging. And almost nothing in the predictable future could make one have a confidence that it would be otherwise, especially in consideration of stronger domestic dynamics in both countries driving the rivalry, together with external dynamics for pushing the rivalry, coming from U.S. allies and strategic partners in East Asia.

Would the new China-Russia strategic partnership become a new normal for the future? It would be possible or even probable, though Russia's jealousy, together with its geostrategically and economically motivated warmer relations with China's rival neighbors in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as its concerns about Russian power and influence in Central Asia, could and will make Beijing feel more complicated. In short, geopolitical and geostrategic competition and rivalry among the major powers has been coming back with all their risks and ominous uncertainties, while globalization and interdependence provide only a partial mitigation. More human efforts to reverse this trend are absolutely required now and in the future.

Sakurai: This is the keynote speech by Dr. Shi Yinhong. Having listened to the three guest speakers, I now would like to ask Prof. Emeritus Takubo to say a few words as well.

"Speaking Softly while Carrying a Big Stick"

Prof. Emeritus Tadae Takubo: While listening to the three professors, I thought that most people in Japan are not accustomed to presentations like those given by the three professors—presentations about the global geopolitics. That is because in postwar Japan, there has been a trend to refuse to regard "geopolitics" as a science. As a result, academic societies in Japan tend to be meticulously divided. In the case of the study of international politics, for instance, scholars choose to specialize in narrowly-classified areas, focusing just on one region or even one country, instead of fostering deeper insights into broader geopolitical aspects. What is more, they subdivide such areas further into specialty genres such as economics, politics, language and culture with emphasis on specific segments of the history. As such, scholars who are savvy about unique disciplinary areas receive higher acclaim as excellent researchers.

In contrast, what the three speakers have unanimously meant is that the political landscape of the world is shaped not by a single factor, but by multiple complex factors. Indeed, they have commonly talked about the geopolitics. While I listened to—and I was deeply impressed by—the three professors, I also wondered why our country has had no far-sighted scholars like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, etc.

In my keynote speech, I will talk about Japan's standing of today in global geopolitical terms by looking at the international environment both vertically and horizontally.

After the Cold War was over, the United States emerged as a unipolar superpower. Just prior to the end of the Cold War, Huntington predicted the emergence of a "One plus Six" world order. The "one" meant the United States, the sole preeminent superpower in the world, and the "six" players would include Japan, China and Russia—which still was the Soviet Union at the time—as well as Germany, France and Britain. This global framework eventually lasted for some time thereafter, and we then saw the rise of China, India and Brazil particularly in economic terms.

In the current world order, the United States still remains a great preeminent nation in the world in terms of absolute national strength. Though it is true that the United States is by far superior to other countries, I think that it is on the decline in relative terms. On that premise, I will speak of the challenges Japan is now faced with.

Japan now has to cope with two major challenges. One of them is the extraordinary rise of China associated with a sort of expansionist ambition in total disregard of international law. What should Japan do in the face of this situation? The second challenge or phenomenon is an inward-looking United States, a trend that has become apparent especially since the start of the second administration of President Obama. "Inward-looking" is defined very ambiguously. Yet, we need to

try to disambiguate such a situation and really understand what the U.S. posture of late means to us and think of what it should do vis-à-vis such a situation.

To begin with, let me focus on China. In 2013, Prof. Chellaney analyzed what he describes as China's "salami-slicing strategy" in his contribution to The Washington Times. He wrote: "The strategy involves a steady progression of small actions…yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China's favor," It is a very interesting description. In other words, while we Japanese are paying attention primarily to the issue of the Senkaku Islands, China is steadily pursing its expansionist ambition by slicing territory in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and areas along the terrestrial border with India "piece by piece" in its favor.

Frankly speaking, I don't know the exact reason that China is pursuing an expansionist policy. Maybe, there is a fundamental idea among the Chinese—Sino-centrism that puts China at the center of the world with no boundaries binding it. Perhaps, there is an ambition within the Chinese leadership of today to replicate the glory—the map of hegemony—of the Qing dynasty, during which China had huge interests around the world. Then, there should be a more practical, economic reason for pursuing the expansionist policy—access to natural resources elsewhere.

Dr. Shi mentioned the existence of domestic dilemmas and contradictions with foreign countries China has to cope with. China is undoubtedly faced with internal problems. We have a phrase "internal troubles and external threats" to describe a situation in which a country is at an impasse due to domestic and external woes. So, there seems to be a political strategy within the Chinese leadership to try to divert people's wrath with the internal problems away from it and direct their ire to foreign countries. In this respect, it was "big news" to me when a Chinese scholar like Prof. Shi made a mention to that effect in his keynote speech.

Another matter that makes me uneasy is the fact, as I mentioned earlier, that the United States is taking a more inward-looking approach. In 2011, I began feeling that there was something really wrong with U.S. foreign policy. At the time, Britain and France took leadership in launching NATO intervention in Libya to help rebels topple Muammar Gaddafi, but President Obama wanted to limit the role of the U.S. military to the provision of rear support. In fact, he told Britain and France to refrain from using the word "war" and limit both the duration of the operation and the areas NATO troops would attack.

A year earlier—in 2010—a South Korean naval ship was sunk. Shortly afterward, a multilateral investigation team held North Korea responsible for the sinking of the South Korean vessel. Nonetheless, the United States stopped short of accepting the international team's findings and, instead, agreed to let the U.N. Security Council's chairman issue a resolution denouncing the attack without naming North Korea. Later in the year, North Korea fired more than 100 artillery shells at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. The South Korean armed forces, of course, got really furious, but the United States controlled their outrage. I could not but help thinking something must have gone wrong with the U.S. administration.

On December 26, 2013—exactly a year ago—when Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine, the U.S. government issued a statement, saying it was "disappointed" with his visit. It was the first time in the postwar history of Japan-U.S. relations that Washington had made such a public comment on such a visit. In the brief statement, the U.S. government described Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni as "an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan's neighbors." In other words, it was meant to say that the United States does not want to get dragged into a war that may primarily involve Japan. In Okinawa, it is often said that if the United States gets involved in a war, Japan may be drawn into that war. But the reality is utterly opposite. The United States is afraid of a situation in which Japan is involved in a war, forcing it to get drawn into that war.

The U.S. attitude reminds me of a foreign policy taken by Theodore Roosevelt who was U.S. president from 1901 to 1909. When the United States was trying to prevent German or Spanish forces from intruding into the Caribbean Sea around Cuba, he employed a famous approach of "speaking softly while carrying a big stick." I often teach my university students about the implication of carrying a huge stick while speaking in a little cat voice—meow meow.

It is obvious that the United States has the biggest stick in the world, but the Obama administration seems to be extremely afraid of using the stick. At such a time, the ISIL has emerged and the United States has to respond the ISIL's threat. The United States has opted to carry out air raids, using drones as well, while it has repeatedly emphasized a "no boots on the ground" policy in the fight against the extremist Muslim group. Instead, it has deployed to Iraq some 2,900 U.S. ground troops as "military advisors" who, though, would not actually fight with the ISIL. So, it have become more inconceivable how long the United States will refrain from using its big stick.

Meantime, in late November 2014, Chuck Hagel was dismissed as U.S. secretary of defense. According to U.S. newspapers, he had sent letters to National Security Advisor Susan Rice on some occasions, complaining of the difference between the strategy and tactics of the United States vis-à-vis Syria and the ineffectuality of Obama's "pivot to Asia."

Ashton Carter will now succeed Hagel as U.S. secretary of defense. We may count on him to some extent because he is the person who in 2006 called for a preemptive attack on North Korea. But the State Department and the Pentagon have so far failed to break the wall erected by an inner group of advisors to President Obama at the White House. As such, the United States has been slow in making policy decisions and, what is worse, made mistakes in certain cases. Will such a situation be rectified? I do not think the new secretary of defense alone will be able to do much to let the Obama administration change its posture.

My biggest concern is the possibility of the United States and China eventually joining hands. I, for one, do not expect such a situation to happen anytime soon. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to a memorandum written around 1933 by John V.A. MacMurray,

who was then the U.S. minister to China. In the document, he expressed his anxiety about U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's inclination toward Chiang Kai-shek. MacMurray wrote to the effect: "China has reneged one treaty after another—it has ignored almost all of the agreements signed during the Washington Conference of 1922. It is very dangerous for the United States to lean toward China too much." The so-called MacMurray memorandum was introduced to Japan by Prof. Waldron with its translation into Japanese supervised by Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka, a professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo.

The MacMurray memorandum shows that the United States had inclined to China before World War II, extending a helping hand to it. Thus, we need to remember that something strange of this kind might be repeated from time to time.

Now I would like to touch on one of the postwar events, which I mentioned in my lecture in April (in 2014). When Richard Nixon visited Tokyo in November 1964—five years before he became U.S. president—he was invited by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to a dinner at the latter's home in Oiso. In his book "Leaders: Profiles and Reminiscences of Men Who Have Shaped the Modern World," Nixon recounted that Yoshida was "worried" about Charles de Gaulle's opening of diplomatic relations between France and China in January 1964 without informing the Japanese. Nixon also wrote: "Yoshida asked me whether I thought the United States might do the same thing." Nixon visited Beijing in 1972. This means that when he met Yoshida in 1964, Nixon had already made up his mind to normalize diplomatic relations with China. During his meeting with Yoshida, according to Nixon, "I replied I could not speak for the Johnson administration." But, in July 1971, or just two years after assuming the presidency, Nixon made a surprise announcement—which the Japanese have since referred to as the Nixon shock—that he would make a visit to China in 1972. Personally, I was a Washington correspondent for a Japanese wire service at the time. Of course, I had hectic days to cover the news. It was the biggest event in my life as a journalist.

Whether the United States and China will be at odds, I think, depends on the state of relations among Japan, the United States and China. In his memoirs, "Shanghai Jidai" (My Days in Shanghai), Shigeharu Matsumoto, who was a former Shanghai bureau chief of Rengo News Service before the war, had a seemingly enigmatic sentence. He wrote: "The Japan-China relationship is actually the Japan-U.S. relationship itself." I think he meant to question which country the United States would treat as the most important country in Asia—Japan or China. At the time, everything depended on what the United States would decide to do with regard to the future of Asia. I believe Mr. Matsumoto implied that that kind of relationship among the three countries would remain intact.

In this connection, we had Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson in the second Bush administration. Such great U.S. secretaries of state or presidential advisors as Kissinger and Brzezinski were no longer within the administration. Paulson, talking from the economic point of

view, openly advocated a "Group of Two" (G-2) relationship between the United States and China as a way of jointly governing the world. I thought it was a really dangerous move for Japan.

In his presentation, Dr. Shi said he does not expect the United States to accept China's proposal for establishing a "new-type-of-great-power" relationship between China and the United States. But I don't think so because Susan Rice, the current national security advisor to President Obama, indicated in a speech she delivered in Washington in November 2013 that the United States might be receptive to this concept. For his part, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden also made a positive comment on this matter during his visit to Beijing in December 2013. Though President Obama himself has not directly commented on this matter, the concept is so ambiguous that this is also a dangerous move.

I don't want to promote my own book, but I have recently written a book, whose title can be translated into English as "Don't Miss the Last Chance to Revise the Constitution." In the book, I refer in detailed length to an in-depth essay about the concept for the "new type of great-power relations" co-authored in 2012 by Cui Tiankai, then vice foreign minister of China and now Chinese ambassador to Washington.

In the essay, China called for "mutual respect of core interests of concerned countries." This is a highly delicate issue. What will happen if the United States accepts the Chinese initiative? China's areas of core interests include Taiwan, Tibet, Uyghur and the South China Sea, In addition, in April 2013, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman confirmed—apparently through a slip of the tongue—that the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture is also an area of core interests of China. If the United States agrees to forge a new type of great-power relations with China, I think it will not be in conformity with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. So, we should be more sensitive to and watchful of this issue.

Finally, I have to talk about the Constitution of Japan. We have had it for nearly 70 years without amending it. It is riddled with many contradictions. Indeed, it has provisions that are hardly compatible with our nation. Even though we have the right of collective self-defense, because of the interpretation of the Constitution by the earlier governments, we have not been able to exercise the right in reality. Therefore, we have had no choice but to change the interpretation to enable us to exercise the right of collective self-defense, though, still, to a limited extent. Nonetheless, Dr. Shi saw even such a limited change as a problem. It is all too apparent in the eye of everyone that the issue of Yasukuni Shrine is nothing but an internal matter of Japan. But Dr. Shi saw Prime Minister Abe's visit to the shrine as a dangerous sign on diplomatic terms. So, in the same token, I think China will take up as a diplomatic issue once Japan makes a serious move to revise the Constitution. Overcoming such pressure, I believe, is the new and right direction our country should go in.

I recall what happened to Japan during and after the 1991 Gulf War. When Iraq led by Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, President George W.H. Bush put together a "coalition of

the willing" and many countries decided to join forces with the United States to help rescue Kuwait fairly quickly. After the Gulf War ended, the Kuwaiti government took a full-page ad in The Washington Post to thank the coalition of the willing by naming 30 countries for saving the kingdom. Japan spent a huge amount of money— $13 billion to $13.5 billion to support the international effort to rescue Kuwait, but its contribution was not thanked by Kuwait.

In 1993, Mr. Ichiro Ozawa, a famous Japanese politician, wrote a book, titled "The Blueprint for a New Japan," arguing that Japan should become a "normal" nation. He is right. By the way, someone criticized Ozawa for having bureaucrats compile a collection of remarks made by various people and converting it into a book of his own.

About a year later, a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official began calling his own country a "handicapped nation." What the official meant is that Japan was deprived of its "big stick" —in the words of Theodore Roosevelt—due to the defeat in World War II, it has no choice but to "speak softly" —also in Roosevelt's words—like a cat, while providing foreign countries with a lot of economic assistance. Therefore, the official argued that Japan ought to contribute two or three times more to an international coalition than other countries—if a foreign country extended $10 billion, for instance, Japan would need to furnish $20 billion or $30 billion.

As such, though the time appeared to be ripe at that time for the country to revise the Constitution, but there was no unanimous agreement yet in Japanese society to do so.

More recently, we have been faced with China's expansionist policy, crises on the Korean Peninsula and Russia's intimidating action against Japan over the Northern Territories. Moscow has sent a senior official to the Russian-held territory in broad daylight. What is more, Russia has staged military exercises there. Given all those developments, it seems to be difficult for Japan to survive under the current Constitution.

Yesterday (December 24, 2014), Prime Minister Abe renewed his resolution to revise the Constitution. Following the inauguration of his second administration in late 2012, the prime minister boosted voters' confidence in his Cabinet very quickly, thus stabilizing the government. Meantime, though U.S.-China relations happen to be cool right now, the situation surrounding Japan remains unchanged—Japan is something like a little house sandwiched by two huge buildings, which, of course, are the United States and China. Given such a situation, it is obvious what we should pursue.

I earlier referred to the need for Japan to become a "normal" state. How should we define a normal nation? There can be a truly realistic answer to the question. That is a state capable of demonstrating deterrence by clarifying its determination to launch an instantaneous counterattack in the case of a recurrence of Hiroshima. In other words, it should be a state that would no longer keep just passively praying for peace and speak like a little cat. I sincerely wish that our politicians would have a broad vision and foresee what would happen to our country 10 years later, 20 years later, 50 years later and even 100 years later in geopolitical terms.

Ⅱ・session 2

Sakurai: Now, we will come back to the earlier keynote addresses. You may have further comments. For instance, what kind of the future will the United States be able to achieve? What direction is China going to eventually go in? What can the United States, Japan and India do vis-à-vis China? Domestically, we have the issue of revising the Constitution as well as the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which is something we cannot give up for the sake of our culture and civilization. What do you expect to happen if Prime Minister Abe persists on those points? So, these are the points I would like you to talk about in Session II.

Chinese Inveteracy

Prof. Waldron: First, about Mr. Nixon's remarks to Mao Zedong, I believe this is the tip of iceberg in the sense there was a lot of secret thinking about where the relationship (between the United States and China) was going to go. This was not, in fact, put down on paper—certainly nothing I have seen.

I think they (Nixon, Kissinger and people around them) were rather more optimistic about the capacity of China to be an ally than turned out to be the case. I believe they envisioned as the best possible outcome a close and intimate long-term relationship between Beijing and Washington as the sort of pivot of Asia, and Japan and other countries would be dropped. I would consider this was a perfectly natural way for them to think. I think the years that followed have been very educational for the United States—members of Congress have intervened repeatedly about Washington's China policy.

The special kind or new kind of strategic relationship between China and the United States is undefined. I think that moment has passed.

Let me just say something about Obama, which is very complicated. Obama is the man who knows very little about the world history. I talked to a Washington official who briefed Mr. Obama about the Pacific and he discovered Mr. Obama knew nothing about the origin of the Pacific War—he knew very little at all about the war between China and Japan and the reason that the United States and others had got involved in it. This is quite astonishing, but if you know something about Obama's childhood and how he grew up, it is not surprising.

I think Mr. Obama was expected to be a domestic policy president, who was going to install a kind of redistributionist and mildly more collectivist sort of socialism into America. But, instead, he was confronted with a whole host of foreign policy problems, starting with his pledge to close Guantanamo. As soon as people told him what people who were in Guantanamo had in fact done, he was horrified because he was not updated and because he was no regularly briefed and so forth. In a sense, Mr. Obama's tragedy is that he did not spend 20 years in other political jobs before running for president.

As for the future of America, here is what I would like to say: the key to international success is the strength of your alliances—whether you are a good ally or not. A good alliance is based on more than immediate common interests—a good alliance is based on shared values, shared views and mutual understanding of culture and so forth. Therefore, the United States has natural allies in the countries that are essentially free—there are free countries in Asia, there are free countries in Africa and there are free countries all over the world. There is no shortage of potential allies.

As Prof. Chellaney pointed out very clearly, the great trend we are now facing is the transfer of wealth from Europe and North America to the rest of the world. This is a natural process and, it is also, I should say, a fair and just process—international wealth should be more widely distributed.

What it means is the United States will never again have the kind of position we had after World War II. But remember the United States had traditionally been an isolationist country. The reason we became a world power after World War II was the two powers—Japan and Germany—had been completed destroyed and there were two power vacuums in the East and West. Either the Soviet Union was going to move into them or the United States was going to move into them. Today, I think, the world is much stronger and the other countries are much more robust and they have much more stable political systems. The real question is: first, will the United States attempt to build strong and equal alliances? Well, of course, we would like to be in charge, but being an ally, you cannot always be in charge.

Second, will we understand it is our interest to form strong alliances with countries with whom we share basic values—not to allow our foreign policy to be kept this way?

I just conclude by saying there has been dissatisfaction with George W. Bush and Obama. One reason is that we effectively have been involved in war for 20 years without any declaration of war. In the past 10 years, over 5,000 American have been killed. It is now possible for the president to send troops without even getting the authorization from Congress. I feel this is a deep constitutional issue we face.

Never write off the United States. I fear China is so inveterate with the idea that this 21st century is going to be China's century while somehow the United States is in its terminal decline—a slide out of Asia. This is quite wrong. Do not underestimate the United States. We are

quite capable of surprising people who push us around. We are also, I would say, a reliable ally.

The problem right now is we are unable to articulate clearly what our realistic goals are for the world order. And we get sunk into conflicts without considering seriously where they are going to go—we are simply not good at a long-term decision. However, I expect within the next few years this is going to change—it is going to have to change. We know it is changing when personnel begins to change.

Recently the chief of intelligence of the Pacific Fleet, James Fanell, was removed. He was fired for not being wrong at all. He was fired for being right—(in the words of Prof. Chellaney, for having said in public that China was preparing for "a short, sharp war" against Japan). People didn't like what he was saying about what might happen. Well, this is a terrible mistake. Someone like him has to get back because, no matter what we tell ourselves, we have to deal with the reality. That said, I have a great confidence in the future of democracy, freedom and so forth—the values we all share.

If I may conclude, I still believe almost completely—I'm 66 now—I may yet live to see a China that will be, if not completely free, substantially more free than she is today because China at present is an extraordinary outlier in the international community. I think China has been changing dramatically since 1976. She is going to keep on changing.

Sakurai: Thank you, Prof. Waldron. Prof. Chellaney, do you have any comments after hearing this—the future of China and that of the United States? In two years' time, there will be a change in personnel in the United States.

Revision of Constitution

Prof. Chellaney: Listening to Prof. Waldron's explanation on the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China, we must bear in mind the historical context that the opening was not only a profound geopolitical movement but the direction it set remains in place in the American policy today. China would not have been an economic powerhouse today without the Nixon-Kissinger opening. In fact, after the Nixon era was over under President Jimmy Carter, the president himself issued a memorandum and an instruction to all American departments in the year 1978, instructing them to aid in China's rise through investment and technology transfers. That American policy to aid China's rise persisted for a generation thereafter. Even when the Tiananmen Square massacre happened, the Americans looked the other way. The trade sanctions that were slapped unwillingly on China were soon lifted.

In 1988—just nine months before the Tiananmen Square massacre—some pro-democracy movement was crushed in Myanmar. But, against the small, weak Myanmar, the Americans came down with tons of bricks, imposed sanctions on Myanmar and kept them escalating, derailing

Myanmar's efforts for development for generations. Only two years ago, that sanction regime began to ease.

But (as for) the relations with China, the opposite policy was followed by the United States, which was to encourage China's economic rise. Even when China in 1996 fired missiles across the Taiwan Strait, the United States did not change its policy of aiding China's economic rise. So, behind China's economic success story lies a factor that is often forgotten—the United States of America.

Looking ahead, it is apparent that the future of America's alliances in Asia as well as its alliances elsewhere hinges on one word—credibility. The credibility of the American alliances will determine the future of these alliances. Credibility has to be seen and accepted also by the allies. If the allies don't have credibility—if they don't believe that the security insurance with the United States is credible—that alliance arrangement will not last. This holds true for America's pivot to Asia, which has been defining Obama's policy initiative on Asia.

Unfortunately, years after Obama unveiled the pivot, the pivot remains more rhetorical than real. I call it a content-free concept. The concept looks attractive on paper but has no strategic content. In fact, the pivot could have been rededicated to rein in China's increasing assertiveness. But, time and again, not just in relations with Japan, but even in relations with other countries like India, Americans always been telling us not to do anything that would raise China's hackles.

To give you one specific example, during the Bush administration, it was decided that the United States and India would hold joint military exercises in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is the state which China has claimed since 2006. India and the United States hold more exercises together than the United States has with any other country. But, when Obama took office, that sort of exercises was cancelled. Why? The new administration in Washington did not wish to raise Beijing's hackles. Then, how far can India depend on friendly security cooperation with the United States?

Similarly, we know that on the Senkaku Islands, the Americans have taken, in effect, a neutral position, which is that they say on the one hand that Senkaku is covered by the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and, in the same breath, the U.S. position is that it would like Japan and China to resolve this dispute peacefully between the two countries. With the U.S. security guarantee being central to the defense of the Senkakus, I think in this context that countries like Japan in particular will have to think far ahead.

Because, yes, I think the U.S.-Japan security alliance will remain pivotal to Japan as well as to the U.S. interests in Asia because U.S. bases in Japan provide the United States with means to forward-deploy troops to the Asian theater. So, for both Japan and the United States, the U.S. military presence in Japan is central. (But) if, let's say hypothetically, there were to be a Chinese attack on Senkaku and the attack is limited to the Senkaku Islands, it seems to me inconceivable

that the United States would militarily intervene on behalf of Japan.

In fact, the entire effort of U.S. diplomacy is to prevent that scenario from happening because if this scenario is to happen, it will force the United States to make a choice—that choice the United States does not wish to make.

To come to the point, if I was a Japanese policymaker, I would be certainly worried about Japan's future because, when I look around the world, is there any other country where a foreign occupying power wrote and imposed a constitution? It is a constitution that remains in place in that country and up till today has not been amended even once. And the only country in the world that is in this unique situation is Japan.

India and Japan both established their Constitutions at the same. The Indian Constitution was drafted and accepted by the Indians—there was no foreign involvement. Between that time and today, India has amended its Constitution more than 120 times—every year, on average, India amends its Constitution twice, because the Indian attitude of India is that nothing is perfect—the Constitution is a working progress.

But in Japan where you have a foreign-imposed constitution but you have not amended it even once to improve it. It cannot be that the Constitution is totally perfect. There must be room for improvement. But even that effort has not been made because this has been caught in vicious domestic politics as the amendment of the Constitution would amount to the remilitarization of Japan. But if you are a Japanese policymaker and looking ahead, you ought to be looking at credible security options.

I think Shinzo Abe's re-election marks a watershed in Japan's determination to reinvent itself as a more competitive and secure nation. If I were going to check Japan's coming years, I would say that you would see in the next 10 years a Japan that would reflate and that would become more competitive and that would rearm. When I say Japan will rearm, I don't mean the militarization of Japan that happened before World War II. Today's rearming that will happen in the coming years in Japan will be for self-defense. It could be very very different. It will be to make Japan less insecure.

I think that the rearming of Japan won't be bad for the American economy and also for the Japanese economy. Why? Because Japan's rearming, like India's military modernization program now, will enable the Japanese GDP to grow and also open major business opportunities for American defense manufacturers.

Sakurai: Since Mao Zedong and Mr. Nixon met in the early 1970s, it has become very clear that although we have always thought of the United States as Japan's only ally that will never separate from us, Japan is simply one possible option from the U.S. point of view. Basically, we Japanese must learn from the talks between Nixon and Mao Zedong that what the real world of politics in the world is like.

In regard to what Dr. Shi mentioned earlier in his speech is that the United States did not seem to be very receptive to the idea of having a new-type-of-great-power relationship with China. However, when we look at the results of the APEC meeting that was held in China in November 2014, although it is apparent that President Obama did not use the same term as the Chinese used—the new type of big-power relations—it is very clear from the comments he made at the time that he was effectively receptive to the idea.

Prof. Waldron said we don't have to underestimate the United States. I think any country that does so will face a critical consequence. For our part, we Japanese regard the United States as a very important ally. However, with regard to a nation's desire and duty to maintain its sovereignty, I believe we have entered a new age in the world politics in which we need to ask whether we can place absolute trust in the alliance with the United States. Under such new circumstances, what measures should those countries that have very close relationships with the United States take, while keeping a close eye on the rise of China and the change in U.S. policy? So, I would like to ask for Prof. Takubo's comments.

Diplomatic Option

Prof. Emeritus Takubo: Let me begin with my earlier life. My first job was to work as a resident correspondent in Okinawa for a Japanese wire service—I lived in Naha. I then worked in Tokyo and later in Washington. Looking at the world from Naha, looking at the world from Tokyo and looking at the world from Washington, the world looked very differently. This was just about the time Okinawa was to be returned to Japan. At that time, Mr. Chobyo Yara, who then was the chief executive or governor of the Ryukyu government, was closely watching what the Prime Minister's Office in Tokyo was doing in the negotiations with the United States on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. His main concern was to avert a situation in which Okinawa would be given an unfavorable status compared with the mainland of Japan.

For his part, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was making every effort in his negotiations with President Richard Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger to peacefully regain the territory Japan lost in the war. Prime Minister Sato was also determined to put his political life at stake to make Okinawa free of nuclear arsenal upon its return to Japan. Incidentally, what both President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had in mind was the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa prior to its reversion to Japanese rule.

President Nixon had been thinking of denuclearizing Okinawa. Indeed, seven years prior to his presidency, Mr. Nixon devised a new global strategy of his own. At that time, there were three-way confrontations—confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, those between the Soviet Union and China and those between China and the United States. To challenge the Soviet Union, he thought, the United States should approach China—which then was still

weaker than the Soviet Union—and create an environment that might give the impression that Washington and Beijing had a rapprochement between them. Mr. Nixon thought this would be a major deterrent against the Soviet Union.

Washington consequently offered some positive signals to Beijing, tacitly showing its readiness to normalize relations with China. The first measure to that end was the relaxation of the restriction on travel to China, which superficially looked rather insignificant. Then, in a related development, Washington resumed low-level U.S.-China contacts in Warsaw, Poland. The United States kept strengthening its pro-China posture. Eventually, it announced that the 7th Fleet of the U.S. Navy would reduce its activities in the Taiwan Strait by half.

At the time, the U.S. forces in Okinawa had intermediate-range Mace-B ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads—they could target Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing. Therefore, the denuclearization of Okinawa would be the greatest U.S. appeasement policy vis-á-vis China. Given those developments prior to President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, what Prof. Waldron cited in connection with the Nixon-Mao dialogue was something we should not feel surprised at.

Now, considering the cold geopolitical reality of the international situation, I remain convinced that Japan has no other diplomatic option but to ally with the United States.

What conditions are necessary for an alliance? There are three conditions. The first condition is that the countries that form the alliance share values, such as rule of law and human rights. The second condition is that there is little economic friction—in relative terms—between those countries. Those two conditions are perfectly met as far as Japan and the United States are concerned. The third condition is the presence of a common enemy for them. I think the third one is the most important. In my view, since President Obama took office, something had gone somewhat wrong with the United States in relation to the third condition.

Ever since the Nixon administration, Washington's China policy has remained constant—it has maintained an engagement policy with tolerance toward China. We need to wait for a while to know whether the engagement policy will be really successful. It is true that the U.S, policy has let China, which used to be isolated, engage in international economic activities, international organizations and sports—on all fronts. Washington has thus let China make itself accustomed to the values shared in the international community. Otherwise, there is no way of establishing a normal relationship between the United States and China. However, it should be noted that the preceding U.S. administrations had never forgot to hedge militarily against their engagement policy toward China. But, ever since the Obama administration was inaugurated, this insurance—military power—has been diluted. This is the main reason why President Obama's foreign policy is described as introverted or inward-looking.

Earlier in today's session, there was a reference to the team of presidential advisors at the White House. The team includes Mr. Denis McDonough—the current White House's chief of staff

who was deputy national security advisor until early 2013—and National Security Advisor Susan Rice. I have to say people around them have little knowledge about the Asian affairs but they still have created a wall around them. The wall is too thick for the Pentagon and the State Department to penetrate. Amid such a situation in Washington, the relationship between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department has been perfect and that between the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense has been very good. Likewise, there have been no problems at all between the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force of Japan and their U.S. counterparts—the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. However, there has been something odd as to the relationship between the White House and the Prime Minister's Office of Japan. This makes me the most dissatisfied.

Let me conclude. What Japan should do is to keep strengthening the bonds with our allies—the United States in particular.

Sakurai: The power of China of today is not restricted to military might. While the rest of the world has seen China as an economic power with a huge domestic market, Beijing has recently taken the initiative of reaching out to the rest of the world by launching the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the so-called New Development Bank—also known as the BRICS Development Bank—and developing a Silk Road Economic Belt. China's aim is apparent—it wants to create a new international economic and financial regime on its own. In other words, China has embarked on pursing a new global strategy by flexing its financial muscle—its huge external reserves that amount to about $4 trillion. Its goal is to hold sway over a number of foreign countries not only in military terms but also in economic terms.

Realistically speaking, every country has no choice but to be on good terms with China. However, the opposite is also true. China needs us as we need it. Nonetheless, it is true that China's military power and economic and financial capabilities have become so strong. In addition, the Chinese are assiduously on the expansionist tact under the banner of the "Chinese Dream." Of course, the United States still remains as the superpower in terms of not only military and economic capabilities, but also education, demographic and technological strengths. However, the United States fails to catch up with China in terms of the awareness of being a superpower in spiritual aspects.

We may be able to keep China in check and let it behave in line with international law and avoid conflicts with its neighbors—only if we really have the courage to do so. Do you think we are capable of doing so in a realistic sense? So, I would like to ask each one of you.

The Largest Expansionist

Prof. Waldron: Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Obama visited China and the day before he visited, one of the Chinese newspapers published an utterly scurrilous, libelous, insulting article about our

president. I have no power in Washington but my advice would have been: "You shold not go to China, Mr. President."

Obama should have said: "Look. That editorial crosses the boundary. I am not coming. You have to fire everybody at the newspaper, which you own at all. It is a government-owned newspaper with its content dictated by the government. You've got to fire everybody and you've got to give me a written apology. Until you do that, I am going to go to South Korea, Japan and Burma—which has been democratized remarkable—and I may even go to Taiwan. Who knows what I'm going to do? But I will certainly not come and sit down with you after this gross insult." If we had done that, I think that our prestige would have risen with the Chinese.

My late mentor, Ambassador (to China) James Lilley, used to say that the Chinese prefer to receive bad news from a high-ranking American and good news from a low-ranking American. So, in other words, if the president of the United States says "no," it would have a tremendous impact on their self-esteem. We didn't do so because of a policy that begun under Nixon and Kissinger, which really continues the continuity of the story—if we just wait long enough, and nice enough, China is going to be our best friend in the world and at that moment we will link arms and we will walk off together into the sunset as music swells and the credits roll on the screen.

My approach is that if you were trying to marry a girl and you have sent letters every week and if after 30 years she has not agreed to marry you, the chances are that she is not going to and, therefore, we should be realistic and banish from our imagination. China is a great civilization and there are many great things about China. But at the moment China is one of the worst dictatorships in the world—by far the largest. She is an expansionist—there is no question about it.

I would like to say just one other thing. Prof. Chellaney said he envisions Japan rearming. I do, too. I don't think Japan has any choice. India is rearming. Vietnam has ordered six submarines from Russia and is producing anti-ship missiles. Australia is rearming. Russia is rearming. Putin has greatly improved the Russian military.

What does it look like to China? That looks terrible because that means her actions are creating a group of very powerful countries, each acting independently. China has borders with something like 16 countries. The number of places China now claims she is willing to fight because of their "core interests" far exceeds its capabilities. But, simply from a military point of view, it is inconceivable that you can concentrate your forces all those places. So, she is going to have to rethink her policy.

Now I use the word "enabler." That is the United States willing to serve as an enabler for China and we have picked China out from among other countries as being the one that we're going to confer a sort of enabler's mantle on human rights. On human rights, we have a serious problem—Belarus. We have no ambassador there, we have no deputy chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission there as we have sanctions. Why? Belarus has political prisoners. How many political

prisoners does Belarus have? They have 19 political prisoners. That's enough—and, as you , Prof. Chellaney, were saying of the case of Burma—that's enough to bring tons of bricks from the United States. Now, how many political prisoners in China do you think we could find? 19? That could be a 15-minute work if we had a right person.

Finally let me conclude with this, which I think is very important to understand the Chinese state of mind. Chinese are instinctively hierarchal. But the fort mode of social organization of human beings is hierarchical—a dominant hierarchy. A civilization and culture are really the way we people have built ways of overcoming the dominant hierarchy. In international relations, that means a fail-safe, basically since the 17th-century, of equal sovereign states. It is not clear to me that China has ever brought into the idea that she is simply one among 100 and some sovereign states.

If you go back to the Shujing classical documents in Chinese, you will find pictures of circles. What they show is basically the whole world. China is at the center, and then, as you go out, there is a zone of influence.

We are going to have a very profound difficulty incorporating China into the world order. This may be particularly difficult because, in order to get them to join organizations, we have made concessions—the idea being through engagement. For instance, the renminbi is not a convertible currency. Do such concessions make their currency convertible? No. The lesson they may have learned is that they will always make an exception.

"Thank you, China"

Prof. Chellaney: In a democracy like Japan, we can debate issues and disagree with each other, but democracy allows for options to be considered carefully—pros and cons, upside and downside, to be considered. If you are in a large autocracy like China and when you make policy choices, you don't have this option. When President Xi calls a meeting of the Politburo, its members will have to hear only what the leadership wants them to hear. So, often, if you look at China's actions in recent years, they have been counterproductive to China's own interests. Many of the actions China is taking vis-à-vis its neighbors are only triggering reactions. An example is the build-up of capabilities in the neighboring countries to counter any Chinese interventionist impulse. All this is happening, thanks to China—China's counterproductive actions.

All of us in India say, "Thank you, China" for creating public awareness in India about the threat China poses to India. You don't have to work in India to raise the public's awareness of China's threat. Every second day, there is a new Chinese incursion across the Himalayas. So, the Chinese are educating the India public about the threat China poses to India.

When I was in Japan about 20 years ago and I was among an audience like this, I spoke up about Japan being the principle and largest aid provider to China. When I pointed out how

counterproductive this could be to the Japanese interests, there was almost embarrassment—I could sense embarrassment—because, at that time, in Japan, China was seen to be a friendly country that would not turn against Japan. But today the mood has changed in Japan.

This is largely because of the Chinese actions, not because of anything happening in Japan. So, we should thank China for being stupid in its actions and creating this kind of awareness in Asia about the long-term danger China poses to the entire continent and the world.

But, as I mentioned earlier, Japan is likely to rearm but remain a U.S. ally. After all, as Prof. Waldron referred to the case of Britain and France, the closest allies of the United Sates are independent military powers yet remain very close allies of the United States. When Japan rearms and when India rearms, they will remain friends of the United States. We are not talking about any fundamental shift geopolitically.

This leads me to my most disturbing point. It is about what is happening internally in China. I think we need to be aware of this. When President Xi Jinping came to India in September (2014), the day he arrived in India, there was a major Chinese military incursion into the northern India area of Ladakh. So, the prime minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi consulted Mr. Xi and asked him point-blank, "Why is it every time a Chinese leader comes to India or an Indian leader goes to Beijing, there is a Chinese incursion?" Xi Jinping felt very embarrassed. He said, "What are you talking about?" Prime Minister Modi said, "When you arrived, you brought a major incursion." Mr. Xi said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I am not aware of this. Give me 24 hours, and I will get back to you." Twenty-four hours later, he did get back to the Indian prime minister and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, your information is right. When I return home, I will fix this issue." When he returned home, this incursion also ended—the Chinese troops withdrew.

Now, there are two schools of thought in India. One school of thought believes that the Chinese incursion that happened as in the past whenever a high-level visit took place is part of China's tactic to play hard ball as well as to send the mantle of peace—that is the blending of a hard tactic and a soft tactic. The other school of thought believes that President Xi actually was not aware as he claimed about this incursion.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said three or four years ago that Chinese admirals and generals were increasingly blindsiding the civilian leadership and doing things that undercut China's diplomatic strategy. If that is going to happen, it will actually be in parallel with what happened in Japan before World War II, by the way. The military in Japan became so powerful that it began to dictate the civilian leadership. That is the way Japan went wrong. So, if you are going to see the same trend unfold in China, it will have a major implication for Asia's peace and security.

Prof. Waldron: Could I add something quickly to what Prof. Chellaney said that supports his worries? I am fond of saying that in China bureaucrats drive limousines—expensive foreign cars—but the army drives tanks. This is important to remember.

I remember that in the year 2001 there was an American reconnaissance plane—an EP3—that was flying in international airspace along the Chinese coast was brought down by a highly irresponsible Chinese pilot, who smashed into it and then fell into the ocean to his death. The United States government then approached the Chinese government—the central government and the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs—about how to resolve the issue. And we got nowhere. It was only when we approached the Foreign Affairs Department of the People's Liberation Army. Then we began to develop arrangements for the release of the American captives.

The only way I can interpret is that only people who had the power to tell the PLA what to do about this war were the PLA's own Foreign Affairs Department. It is completely conceivable to me that as for incidents, actions and policies that could have extremely grave consequences, decisions about these are being made at a very low level. After all, there was no decision made to bring down the EP-3. In effect, the pilot was the person who made the decision to bring down the American plane. His commander on the ground hadn't told him to bring it down.

Sakurai: Thank you, Prof. Waldron. To what extent does the Chinese Communist Party control the military? This is one of the big questions on my mind. The two experts suggestively implied the current situation in China. Now, Prof. Takubo, would you like to give your last comment?

Claws and Fangs

Prof. Emeritus Takubo: Let me touch on general points. The first thing is, as three of us mentioned, that the Chinese military is currently going against the principle of civilian control under the one-party dictatorship. This is very dangerous. China, which now has the world's second-ranking military might, labels Prime Minister Abe a nationalist. It has accused him of trying to resurrect militarism by visiting Yasukuni Shrine. When our government recently reinterpreted a constitutional provision to enable Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, China branded the decision as a dangerous move. Those Chinese reactions are laughable to me. I would like to ask Dr. Shi if he was here: Why is it dangerous?

I think China has sort of both claws and fangs—its military might. On top of the military might, China is now seeking to gain influence in the financial area as well. We have the International Monetary Fund that has been led by Europe, the World Bank led by the United States and the Asian Development Bank led by Japan. China is aware that those multilateral financial institutions cannot afford to take care of completely financing infrastructure development in developing countries. So, as if challenging the so-called Bretton Woods financial regime of the world, China is spending a massive amount of money to finance infrastructure development in the developing world.

Meantime, China experts say China maybe have four ailments—first, the widening income gap among people in China and, second, corruption that has been a major issue there of late. The third ailment is the ethnic minority issues—an increasingly grave issue—involving Tibet and Uyghur. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, a swing-back tendency is apparent after years of inclination toward mainland China. The fourth issue is environmental disruption. Intelligent people in China now have a considerable misgiving that people's discontent with the fourth issue may transform into the denunciation of the current political system of China.

We ought to keep a close eye on both the series of internal ailments China is suffering and the claws and fangs—the expansionist ambition. We should keep from focusing just on one of them. Of course, we must make it clear that we always stand firm against infringement upon the sovereignty or interference in the internal affairs of Japan. To date, Prime Minister Abe has shown no signs of giving in to the pressure of China. I think the Chinese have finally begun realizing that this is a distinctive difference between Prime Minister Abe and the preceding prime ministers of Japan. In addition, Prime Minister Abe's diplomacy is considerably strategic. He places an importance on strengthening bilateral relations with India in particular and Australia as well. Also he is not making an enemy of Russia. So far, he has visited over 50 nations. Though his commitments to those countries naturally vary, depending on host countries, all in all, Prime Minister Abe has been carrying out diligent and strategic diplomatic initiatives.

In Asia, there are five "fingers" that are in alliance with the United States to form a countervailing force against China. They are South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. In addition, Prime Minister Abe has made every effort to join hands with India with a view to keeping China from doing something extraordinary. I am sure that his diplomatic efforts are yielding what amounts to a tacit deterrent vis-à-vis China. Considering such serious efforts on the part of our prime minister, I want to say to President Obama: "Pull yourself together."

Now let me come back to the issue of the revision of the Constitution. What implications does this cause have on the rest of the world?

First and foremost, as it is needless to say the Japanese people have their own identity, we will modify the preamble of the Constitution in a way of correctly reflecting the identity. We have a 2,000-year history of revering the dignity of the Imperial Family. Thus, Japan has the most stable constitutional monarch—in which the Emperor serves as the head of state—in the world. What is more, our Imperial Family is unique in that it is the only monarch family in the world that has an unbroken line of succession with emperors. So, this ought to be included in the preamble. It is also important for us to show to the rest of the world in general and our neighboring countries in particular our firm posture by revising the Constitution. Therefore, that is where we will have to go. There is no other path for us to follow.

I hope President Obama's successor will be the person who is capable of exerting the traditional leadership becoming to the United States. I am convinced that a strong United States, a

strong Japan and a strong India should shake hands to provide a "safety valve" for the security of Asia, thus making a major contribution to the security and stability of the world as well.

Sakurai: So, we have been looking at what is happening in the world from a realistic point of view. It has been discussed that Japan should think of opting to have a minimum nuclear deterrent to defend itself while maintaining the alliance with the United States as in the case of Britain and France. I don't know immediately whether is it feasible or not for Japan to do so. Still, this topic is worthy for us to give serious consideration. Surrounded by the superpowers, countries like Japan have to have the capability and spirit to defend themselves. Otherwise, we will go nowhere. As Prof. Takubo said, Japan should exert to retain its national identity, an approach that will be the best way for our country to contribute to Asia and to the world as a whole.

We have received many questions from the floor. I would like to address them one by one. The first question is: "Why is the Chinese professor absent?" I also have many related questions: "Has he been barred by the Chinese government?" "Do you know the details about his sudden cancellation?"

As I mentioned at the outset of the symposium, there was communication back and forth with Dr. Shi via e-mail. I was informed by Dr. Shi two nights before his scheduled arrival that he was not coming. We were surprised and shocked that he was not coming. So, I asked him how we could explain to the audience why he was not coming. He told me that his wife fell ill. He did not elaborate. But there are many things we could imagine. You may consider this as a real case of what is taking place in China.

While I earlier read out Dr. Shi's paper on behalf of him, I thought he defended the position of China as the Chinese representative in this symposium. Nevertheless, at the same time, he honestly cited those problems that China is faced with. You can now use this case as a hint to think about the real state of affairs in China.

Now, this is a question to Prof. Waldron about Japan having nuclear deterrence. "What is the minimum level of nuclear deterrence Japan can have? If Japan actually has a nuclear capability, there presumably will be strong opposition from the United States and other countries. So, how can Japan overcome such opposition from abroad? I also would like to know whether a majority of Americans are supportive of or opposed to Japan's move to revise the Constitution?"

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

Prof. Waldron: The first thing I would stress is that minimum nuclear deterrence prevents people from starting wars. If they are afraid that you can strike back, they cannot start a war. Therefore, it is a force for peace. No country that has one nuclear submarine is going to say, "Look how mighty we are. We have one nuclear submarine. We are going to take on a war." They cannot do.

So, I would argue that what Japan should do is follow what France and Britain have done. No one in Europe is sort of quaking in their boots saying, "Suppose British attack us and suppose French nuke us." I don't think even the Russians are worried about that. They just know these two countries have the ability not to start a war. They do not have the ability on their own to start a war, whether conventional or nuclear. But they do have the power to prevent somebody else from attacking them. That is when a war will begin—when somebody else attacks. When you want to keep someone else from attacking you, how do you keep someone else from attacking you? By being sure that that person is afraid of you. What you can do with them is you are strong enough—you know you can punch and knock them out. And they know you can do that. So, they cannot attack you.

My recommendation for Japan is undoubtedly highly controversial in Japan, but it is rather almost normal thinking, I would say, in Europe—particularly in France and England—which is, "Look! We have three submarines." Three submarines are not very many. Only one of them is underway at any given time. They do not have the power to create a new British empire or a new French empire or anything like that. They simply keep other people form starting aggressive wars.

So, I think Japan would first have to be more secure. No one would dare to attack her if she has that capability. And if no one dares to attack her, the likelihood of a whole series of wars will diminish. For instance, the likelihood that there will be a war between China and Japan would suddenly go down to zero because the Chinese do not want even five or six or even one Japanese bomb to hit it. It is very interesting to me that the Chinese theory of victory seems to assume they are going to emerge unharmed. But President Xi did say, "War would be a disaster." He is right. I would wish he would do more to prevent it.

I believe a number of countries should adopt this policy because this is a policy that balances and therefore to prevent wars. It in no way involves an increase in the likelihood of war—it actually decreases the likelihood of war.

Prof. Chellaney: Nuclear weapons have been the premier mass destruction technology even though they have now been around for nearly seven decades. Nonnuclear military technology tends to become obsolete within a matter of 10 to 20 years, but nuclear weapons are unique in the sense that ever since they were first discovered and developed in the early 1940s, they have remained the world's top-of-the-line technology of mass destruction.

Prof. Waldron is also right to say that Japan with a minimum nuclear deterrent of its own will feel more secure. And such a deterrent will actually preclude a potential Chinese attack on Japan.

The problem with this is a legal problem—a formidable legal problem. Japan is a member of the NPT (nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and if it wants to break away from it to go nuclear,

it will actually require a tremendously bold policy posture. The country that cannot even get rid of its foreign-imposed Constitution—let alone even to make more changes to it—in my view, to be blunt and to be frank, is not going to take such a tremendously bold action of breaking all of its legal obligations. If I were a Japanese policymaker, I would follow the path which will not entail such major risks. First, my suggestion—or my prediction—is that Japan will rearm in the next 10 years. That rearming on the conventional front involves no breach of any international legal obligation and, in fact, it is consonance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which says the right of self-defense is the "inherent right" of every nation-state.

Second, as I said earlier, this nuclear weapon technology is more than 60 years old. Given the fast pace of technological change, I believe, in the next 10 to 20 years, we will see a new technology of mass destruction emerge. If I were a Japanese policymaker, I would be looking ahead making sure that when the next WMD technology was to be developed and unfold, Japan would be one of the early developers and push forward that technology. What today stops Japan, which already is the world's leader in robotics, from being a cyber superpower? If Japan is going to be a cyber superpower, cyber dominance will be the next realm. That will play a decisive role in the outcome of any military conflict. There may be more specific mass destruction technology emerging, but certainly the cyber realm is one area where Japan ought to invest heavily.

And then there are other options Japan has, in addition, to have an independent nuclear deterrent capability. One is to strengthen further its alliance with the United States and have a clear understanding of how far American nuclear deterrence can play a role in the security of Japan. In addition, Japan also has the right to enter into a mutual defense treaty with another nuclear weapons state. For example, there can be—not now but maybe years on the road—a Japan-India mutual defense treaty.

So, years ahead, go along with everything Prof. Waldron said, except for this: I would be a bit cautious because I think that, given the fact that Japan thus far has been so fabled by the debate on the constitutional revision. Even the issue of the right of collective self-defense became such a political issue in this country. Japan is the only exception.

Even the revision done by the Abe government is not a blanket collective self-defense arrangement—it will be only applied to specific occasions, for example, if a U.S. ship defending Japan was going to be attacked by a third country, Japan, under the revision made by the Abe government, would have the right to defend the U.S. ship. But if something was going to happen in the South China Sea or against Taiwan, this revision is not bold enough to take care of those other scenarios. So, at the moment, Japan has a fairly long way to go to become what I call a normal state.

Prof. Waldron: I have always felt the (nuclear) nonproliferation regime is one of the noble ideas. Several years ago, my wife and I were watching a speech by President Bill Clinton. He said, "The

United States will not tolerate a North Korean nuclear bomb." My wife said, "Arthur, what is he saying?" I said, "That idea is what in America we refer to as an empty threat."

In other words, our attempt to enforce nonproliferation against Pakistan and North Korea has not amounted to anything. But we are creating a situation in which people who violate the (NPT) regime are awarded because we don't actually stop them.

Let me touch on another point in relation to what Prof. Chellaney referred to. What is going to supersede nuclear weapons? One possibility is so-called precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The danger is that if you have too well developed the capacity with PGMs, you will start approaching the so-called first-strike capability—that is, you could paralyze the whole place.

There are also a few other explosives which are the options for a number of nonnuclear countries. In my paper published a while ago, I said this strategic issue will arise in Japan in 10 years and that in the intervening period, what we call anti-access area denial—the so-called A2/AD tactic—will be sufficient to ensure that no attack can be successful. This question of deterrence is the key to keeping the peace. Because deterrence means nobody dares to attack you. If the attack is unsuccessful, the aggressor goes home and they will have a fight over whose fault it is, but that is much better than having a war.

Change of the International Environment

Prof. Emeritus Takubo: We listened to two of you about holding nuclear weapons. Should we or shouldn't we have nuclear weapons? If we actually have them, a tremendous political power and a national consensus will be required.

Having said that, we need to think of how we should practically deal with the issue of possessing nuclear weapons if and when we have no choice but to do so. The international environment tends to change in 10 years, 20 years or 50 years. We don't have to make any decision today, but we should keep ourselves prepared to openly debate this matter.

In the 1960s when French President Charles de Gaulle had nuclear weapons for France for the first time, I remember that the Mainichi newspaper interviewed Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois, known as the father of the French nuclear force and de Gaulle's right-hand man. He was quoted as saying to the effect: "A mid-size country needs to have a separate kind of philosophy regarding nuclear arsenal. It needs to have a minimum nuclear deterrent so that it will be able to have the ability to stop people from attacking it—but not enough nuclear capability to start a war." He meant to say even when an aggressor had 100 nuclear bombs and France had only 10 nuclear bombs, it would be still possible to counterbalance the disparity and maintain the peace if France had a capability of striking the heart of the enemy's soil with a nuclear bomb. De Gaulle was the person who first came up with this concept.

Behind de Gaulle's decision to go nuclear in the name of counterbalancing the nuclear

threat posed by the Soviet Union was its intension to extricate France, a nation rich in tradition and glory, from the postwar control of the country by the United States and Britain as well.

Gen. Gallois said, "If Japan eventually treads in France's footsteps and develops nuclear weapons in response to China's nuclear armament, you will be able to free yourself from the shackles of the United States as France has been able to suddenly find itself free from the control by the United States and the United Kingdom—from the postwar Yalta (Conference) system." At that time, of course, no one else ever imagined that China would become a threat. Now, looking back in history, I think that Gen. Gallois had an ability to look very far into the future.

I think what really matters with Japan is not whether our country may go nuclear but how we should cope ultimately with a major change in the international environment surrounding our country. I mean a situation in which we may be faced with a nuclear state on the Korean Peninsula if and when North Korea and South Korea are reunited and Taiwan may become independent and equip itself with nuclear weapons. Then, Japan will fall in a valley of nuclear states. I wonder if Japan can survive in such a situation only with the strengths of manga animations and washoku or traditional Japanese cuisine. There may be a certain nation—China, for instance— that may brandish a nuclear threat and intimidate Japan into terminating the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty or abolishing the Imperial Family. What should we do in such a case? So, we need to be prepared for such contingency.

Sakurai: I would like to come back to the comment made by Prof. Chellaney: what can Japan, which has not been able to amend the Constitution even once, do? Let me provide some supplementary comments of my own. The JINF was founded as an institute to genuinely and earnestly pursue the revision of the Constitution. Among Japan's think tanks, we are the only one doing so. We also have the most solid foundation tanks to membership dues from approximately 10,000 members who contribute $100 each every year to our institute. Our membership is steadily growing. A growing number of people are all looking to the revision of the Constitution and they are supporting the JINF's goal of revising the Constitution. I concurrently head a private-sector forum exclusively dedicated to revising the Constitution. We would like to see the Constitution revised within a year or two. To that end, I have been involved in enlightenment activities at various places.

Seven decades have already passed since the end of World War II. I am determined to make it possible to revise the Constitution by all means. The trend of public opinion and awareness may change drastically. Two decades ago, I asserted with regard to the issue of so-called comfort women that they had not forcibly taken away to serve as comfort women. At that time, many of my scheduled lecturers at various parts of the country were cancelled and I was bashed because of my assertion—those women had not been coerced to serve as comfort women. This assertion is well understood today. With the only exception of the Asahi Shimbun, Japanese people now have a

common understanding that so-called comfort women had not been forced to do so.

In the event of a national crisis, what can or should we do to cope with it? I believe we are firmly determined to defend our country on our own—we should be able to cope with it. I hope all of you will make full use of the JINF as a forum to refine your thinking.

The next question comes to you, Prof. Chellaney. "India participates in the Chinese-initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer and the Chinese-led BRICS Development Bank. Which relationship is more important for India—that with Japan and the United States or that with China? The Indian position looks too ambiguous. So, I appreciate your clarification. Thank you."

Prof. Chellaney: That's a good question. The answer is not simple, but let me give you my frank response to your question. First, there is a BRICS bank, called the New Development Bank, in which all the BRICS member states—five of them—are equal partners. But this bank is being headquartered in Shanghai and its first president will be an Indian. When the Indian prime minister went to the BRICS summit in Brazil (in July 2014), Indian media reported that India actually demanded that this bank be headquartered in New Delhi. But ultimately, India lost out and, as a consolation prize, India got to nominate the first president of the bank. For me, that was a defeat for India's diplomacy. India actually had to settle for the consolation prize. But, as for the BRICS bank, all the five countries are equal members of that bank.

And there is a new bank which China has floated more recently. It is called the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This bank is dominated by China. The purpose behind this bank is also very interesting. China is a status quo power on international political reforms. Why? Because it has already been accommodated in the international political insitutions, especially the hard-core of the international geopolitics—the United Nations Security Council. It is a permanent member of the Security Council. This accommodation happened not because of China's rising power, but the accommodation happened when China was still poor and in a civil war.

The point is that China is a status quo power on international reforms, but, it is a revisionist power on the financial architecture as represented by the Bretton Woods system. So, the AIIB has been launched as a rival to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which are dominated by the United States and Japan, respectively. For example, the total capital of the ADB is about $70 billion, but for this new bank China has launched, China has provided an upfront sum of $50 billion as capital for this bank and plans to collect another $50 billion from other members and private lenders.

India, Singapore and some other countries that are actually friends and allies of the United States have joined as the founding members of this new China-dominated AIIB. The reason for them to be part of this bank is that they can influence its direction. I my view, this is a mistake on the part of these countries, including my country, because this bank, because of its structure, will

be dominated by China. Its largest strategic motive is very clear. India, Singapore and countries like them will not be able to influence either its decision-making or its direction. In my view, by being part of this bank, India is only aiding China's largest strategic ambition.

As far as the question as to "who is more important for India—China or the United States? The answer is clear. Nobody in India in its right sense, or at least no right-minded Indian, thinks of China as a friend.

Prof. Waldron: One of the things puzzles me very much. It is that in China today, there are hundreds of millions of farmers in the country side who are living on $1 a day or even less. A Chinese friend of mine who recently visited remote areas of China told me that there are people in those areas who don't even have cloths to wear. Of course, if you visit Shanghai, Beijing or coastal or urban areas, the standard of living has risen dramatically since my first visit there around 1980. But I do not understand why, given the wealth the Chinese government has, it does not spend more money on improving the livelihood of Chinese people—hundreds of millions of them are living in relatively remote areas. Why not build hospitals and schools? Why not clear up pollution? Why not improve transportation? I have never heard a convincing answer to that. But I find it the most ironic that China provides multi-billion dollars to foreign countries, while leaving hundreds of millions of its own people living in extreme poverty.

Sakurai: Prof. Waldron, I entirely agree with you, indeed. China's annual income per person is $5,400, which is equivalent to about ¥540,000. In that country, former Premier Wen Jiab ao, who had been thought to be one of the country's cleanest and corruption-free politicians, was found to have actually saved $2.7 billion, equivalent to ¥270 billion. A number of people, including Bo Xilai and Zhou Y ongkang, have been arrested for corruption. In the case of Zhou, he is accused of saving nearly ¥2 trillion. As such, the internal issue China is faced with is very serious.

I have a question for Prof. Takubo about the emergence of China. What is the key point of Japan's survival policy?

Prof. Emeritus Takubo: We need to rectify the distorted structure in Japan. It has been said that Japan's economy is first-rated. But its politics is said to be third-rated—unfortunately, we may have no choice but to tolerate this reality. How about the circumstances that surround the Self-Defense Forces? They are in a terrible situation. It is totally wrong to imagine that they are in the situation similar to that for the prewar military of Japan. The reality is opposite. I feel sorry for SDF members because, in the first place, the SDF is not recognized by the Constitution and Japanese people take it for granted to see SDF members mobilized for disaster rescue, relief and reconstruction. This can hardly be the case in a normal state where the military exists to protect the nation. We have done nothing to rectify the situation. This is a crime of the state. It is more

important than anything else to redress this situation. Therefore, I have advocated the revision of the Constitution for many years—decades—now.

Earlier, I referred to Gen. Gallois, but I should admit that I am opposed to the concept of the French general. What Japan should do is to become a normal and strong state, strengthen the alliance with a strong United States and join hands with India and Australia among other friendly countries. Then, naturally we will be able to force China to reflect upon itself. Since Prime Minister Abe took office, there have been counterblows from Japan to the relevant speeches and remarks made by China. Such an approach is also helpful for clearly understanding what the Japanese government has been doing vis-à-vis China.

About Inward - Looking Policy of USA

Sakurai: This is the last question. I would like Prof. Waldron and Prof. Takubo to comment on this question, which reads: "Do you expect Washington's passive stance toward foreign countries to really change when a post-Obama administration is inaugurated? Or do you expect the inward-looking posture of the United States to stay unchanged as a long-term trend?"

Prof. Waldron: I don't think clearly very much that the United States is turning inward. If you look at our young people, they have more experience of traveling and seeing the world than their parents of any previous American generation. If you look at the competency of things, like foreign languages or foreign cultures, of students I teach at the University of Pennsylvania, who are quite representative of students across the country, they are very aware that they live in a world that is a single community.

I think the problem we have is our institutions for articulating our foreign policy have become somewhat dysfunctional. We have too many different, separate foreign policy centers. I just give you examples. You remember that Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon made their whole plan for China in secret, without telling the secretary of state. I can see that we may need the National Security Council and so forth. But these are extra-constitutional organizations. One of the things I have noticed about President Obama is that, when he has meetings about the state of the world, he often has this with the secretary of defense, when, basically, the secretary of state is discussing it with him, which is what the Constitution says we should do.

I think we are distinctively cosmopolitan. Then, our problem is that not so much we withhold involvement in the world. As Prof. Chellaney mentioned, there have been a number of possibly very ill-judged American security actions. In none of those cases have constitutional procedures been observed—there have been no binding votes.

But I think the idea that the United States somehow looks down on other countries is quite wrong. I think we are no different from any other country and we are the most comfortable

with our own food and our own people. Finally, look at immigration—I am not talking about illegal immigration. I believe everybody should have a chance. My own wife went through the legal naturalization process. At this moment the United States has a population of 300 million. Of those Americans, 30 million are born abroad and are naturalized. We are a country that is constantly welcoming new citizens from other countries.

In China, there are 1.3 billion people. The number of those who are born abroad and acquire Chinese citizenship is 914. That gives you some insight. I think that America has difficulty in coordinating and acting consistently and running the administration smoothly. But it is ever more an international country and this is irreversible.

At my school, we have students of every conceivable ethnicity. I tell them, "This is the future." No one ever bothers to say, "Go back to your original home" or "Why are all people over there are all Asians?" That never can happen. The future is going to be a continual mix and emphasis on specific values and the ideals hold us together.

So, I simply don't think this is a problem. I can imagine that the new administration might be more bureaucratically competent than the Obama administration.

Prof. Chellaney: This portion, of course, was about America. But I am supplementing whatever Prof. Waldron said. In fact, Prof. Takubo bemoaned third-rate politics in Japan. Third-rate politics is a phenomenon that is not restricted to Japan. It is actually prevalent in a number of other democracies, including my country and also the United States. Look at the gridlock in Washington that hobbles policy-making so long.

But if you look at Obama particularly, what actually strikes me is that he has been in the White House for more than six years now. He got the Nobel Peace Prize a bit too early for peace. He has ended up being a serial interventionist. Right now, the United States is involved in three wars when the main requirement for the United States today is to embark on a comprehensive domestic renewal so as to arrest the relative decline in its power and international standing. But if it goes to one war after another, it will even lose a larger picture in terms of its own long-term interests. The reason why U.S. policy is not able to grasp the long-term reality in relation to the rise of a muscular China is because the United States is bogged down in these various wars.

Prof. Waldron: I believe these wars are unconstitutional. I believe what the U.S. Constitution is intended is that in case of an invasion, the president should be able to do what necessary for a while but he should then convene a solemn meeting of both houses of Congress and there should be discussion and there should be a truly binding vote.

Let me say also there is a psychological factor. I think back long ago when I was a little boy in the 1950s, I would ask my parents, "Daddy, mammy, have we Americans ever lost a war?" They said, "No. We've never lost a war." Of course, I didn't know much about the Korean War

then and the (Anglo-American War of) 1812 was highly problematical. But basically that was right.

My students at the University of Pennsylvania, or anyone else in the country do not remember a war in which the United States has prevailed. They don't remember ever winning, whether it was one of the small—as the British say—penny-pack wars dragged on and on in the Middle East or whether it was something more major.

Prof. Emeritus Takubo: If the pullout of U.S. troops from abroad can be defined as a case of inward-looking policy, the United States has been definitely looking inward. The United States completely withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2011 and plans to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 2016. I think this inward-looking trend will hardly change in the years ahead. There are two reasons. One is the U.S. public opinion. It is highly inconceivable that young Americans would be prepared to shed their precious blood for a country that is not willing to defend it on its own. When we just think about it in their shoes, can we do the same thing for the Americans? Indeed, this kind of sentiment is increasingly prevalent in the United States now. The second reason is the issue of fiscal restraint, which entails cuts in military spending. Considering these two reasons, the inward-looking trend is going to go on in the United States.

However, the United States is still an overwhelmingly enormous country. Its military spending is five times larger than that of China. Moreover, its military has an unparalleled level of warfare experience and expertise because of U.S. troop deployments to various parts of the world since the end of World War II—and its armed forces retain a considerably high degree of combativeness.

The U.S. economy remains so huge, despite being faced with certain difficulties, that its GDP still accounts for about one-third of the entire world GDP whereas the country represents about 4 percent of the world's population. As everyone knows, the U.S. dollar continues to be the world's key currency. Of course, the United States is in a superior position in terms of innovation and technology, including high-tech, nanotechnology and biotechnology. There is no doubt that the United States is the No. 1 country particularly with regard to military technology advancements. In the area of education, eight of the world's 10 topmost universities are in the United States. Furthermore, the United States is on the brink of switching from a net importer of energy to a net exporter, thanks to the shale gas revolution. It has no demographic problems, such as a declining birthrate as seen in Japan and other countries.

For those reasons, the United States is most likely to continue to be the No. 1 country in the foreseeable future. I think the United States still has every condition for stopping looking inward. When does such a phenomenon occur? For instance, when President Jimmy Carter came to power in 1977 after calling himself a "born-again" presidential candidate, he announced an inward-looking plan—in line with his campaign pledge—to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. However, in 1979, he was actually "born again" to make a major about-face, dropping his own

plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and chose to firmly confront the Soviet Union in response to Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan with about 100,000 troops in December of the year.

President Ronald Reagan basically followed Carter's foreign policy and then pursued a more aggressive policy toward Moscow, eventually bringing the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to an end. President George W. Bush did an overnight about-face in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States—he then became an outward-looking president, sending U.S. troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. Those events imply that U.S. presidents in the future may change—from an inward-looking posture—depending on external conditions.

Prof. Waldron: It's the last word, which I don't believe anybody has been used in this entire meeting. That word was Europe. Europe is bigger than the United States—it has 5 million square miles. It has more people than the United States. It has a larger GNP than the United States. It also has more soldiers than the United States. In this connection, a friend of mine said, "No, we don't call them soldiers." They refer to them as "people in uniform," which I thought is an interesting point.

One of the great imponderables in the future is whether Europe is going to continue its rather self-indulgent and unsustainable attempt to maintain a high standard of living without producing value.

I think the fact that there is now an emerging threat on Europe's eastern border may cause Europe to revive. We must remember that there is always Europe which is bigger, no matter how you measure it, than the United States. The immediate post-World War II period was very unusual because there were power vacuums.

Prof. Chellaney: Prof. Waldron, you referred to the developments on Europe's eastern front—the Ukraine crisis and Russia. I think for us in Asia this development is so central to our larger security picture. I think without thinking through about the long-term implications of what is being done, the U.S.-led sanction campaign against Moscow has made China the main beneficiary of this new development just as China was the main beneficiary of the developments in the second half of the Cold War.

Sakurai: We talked about democracy and the rule of law. The question here is whether we have leaders with a far-sighted global strategy who are capable of thinking through the implications of what would be done to implement democratic rule of law. At least for the next generation, I think, all of us will have to watch this growing threat from China very closely.

As it was mentioned at the beginning of this symposium, the international order has, for the first time since the end of World War II, faced almost a crisis situation. I think Japan should

understand that it is now in a crisis situation. Amid such a situation, we should stop going this way and that in confusion on the issue of exercising the right of collective self-defense. As we discussed today, what we have to do is to think thoroughly of how we can become a state that on the one hand maintains the alliance with the United States and on the other hand, like Britain and France, has an enough ability, not to start a war, but to prevent it and protect itself. Although we have not yet been able to revise any part of the Constitution, we should look far beyond that to seriously consider viable ways to make out country capable of defending itself.

After inaugurating the third Abe administration, Prime Minister Abe told the nation that he would throw all of his body and soul into his challenge to change the postwar system of Japan. I think he meant that he would risk his life to attaining his political goal. The Japanese people, for their part, ought to be equally determined to challenge the problems facing the country. In other words, 70 years after the end of World War II, the country remains in such a bad situation. It is the responsibility of us—the older generation.

Therefore, the JINF will continue resolutely and undauntedly spearheading the national campaign to change the postwar order in this country by offering new ideas to inspire the public to proceed with our common cause.