Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

May 2008

Urgent Recommendations from JINF (Japan Institute for National Fundamentals)

An appeal to the Japanese government: (1) Caution the U.S. Department of State against accepting deceptive declarations from North Korea concerning its nuclear programs; (2) Urge the U.S. not to betray the Japan-U.S. alliance by removing North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in the absence of a complete declaration

Urgent recommendations

# It has come to our attention that the locations of plutonium bomb manufacturing facilities were not included in a report purporting to be a declaration of nuclear programs submitted by North Korea to the U.S. This omission notwithstanding, the U.S. State Department seems headed toward accepting the report as complete and removing North Korea from the SST (State Sponsors of Terrorism) list. We urge the Japanese government to object to this deceptive report, and to warn the U.S. that indulgent compromise will be construed as tolerance of both the nuclear armament of and abductions by North Korea, positions that will undermine the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Summary

# The U.S. Department of State has deemed North Korean statements concerning enriched uranium and nuclear proliferation (to Syria and other nations) acceptable, even though they are obviously prevarications.

# Furthermore, the U.S. has trivialized the plutonium problem, focusing solely on the amount extracted. This became apparent on May 2, 2008, when Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill acknowledged that he has yet to obtain information from North Korea regarding the locations of nuclear bomb manufacturing facilities.

# Conciliatory forces in Japan and abroad have declared that there has been steady progress in the denuclearization of North Korea, and are accusing those Japanese who insist on the resolution of the abduction problem of impeding the process.

# However, our strongest objection is to the U.S. government’s shifting its position and moving toward rewarding North Korea with removal from the SST list, despite the fact that the North Koreans have not produced a complete declaration of their nuclear programs.

# On May 7, Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura stated that a complete declaration of North Korean nuclear programs must include the locations of nuclear manufacturing facilities.

# We urge the Japanese government to stick to the principle by (1) discouraging the U.S. government from making hasty, unreasonable compromises; and (2) refusing to sign any six-party-nation agreement in the absence of a complete and correct declaration, even if said agreement is signed by both the U.S. and North Korea, and even if Japan is the only nation that refuses to sign.

On May 2, 2008, members of the Parliamentarian League for Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea, NARKN (National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea) and AVKN (Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea), including Rep. Jin Matsubara (who is also a JINF director) and Yoichi Shimada (a member of the JINF Planning Committee), met with Christopher Hill during their visit to Washington.

At the meeting, Rep. Matsubara asked Christopher Hill the following question: “If you talk about a complete declaration of North Korean nuclear programs, have you obtained critical information about the locations of nuclear bomb manufacturing facilities?” Hill’s reply? “No. That’s a problem.” This is an extremely crucial point.

On October 3, 2007 at the Six‑Party talks, the Joint Statement on Second‑Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement was issued. That statement requires North Korea to “provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs.” Such a declaration would necessarily cover plutonium, enriched uranium, and nuclear proliferation.

The U.S. State Department has accepted North Korea’s virtual disclaimer concerning two out of three categories — enriched uranium and proliferation (to Syria and other nations) — even though they are patently untrue. The U.S. officials have trivialized the plutonium issue to the point where their sole focus is on the amount extracted, and are even moving toward removing North Korea from the SST list.

A complete and correct declaration absolutely must include the locations of plutonium bomb manufacturing facilities, the number of nuclear devices, their configurations, and the locations of their repositories. On-site inspections and sample collection, to determine whether the declaration is correct, are also imperative.

Appeasement lobby in Japan and abroad are attempting to portray those Japanese who insist on the resolution of the abduction problem of impeding the process, when there has been steady progress on the nuclear front, reminding us that such progress is in Japan’s national interest.

However, the U.S. government is on the verge of rewarding North Korea, even though a complete declaration has not been forthcoming, by removing that nation from the SST list. The Fact Sheet issued by the U.S. Department of State on October 3, 2007, in conjunction with a six-party agreement concluded on the same day, states explicitly that the declaration must include all North Korean nuclear facilities.

This problem must be addressed before any discussion about whether the resolution of the abductions should be a condition for the removal of North Korea from the SST list even begins.

After Rep. Matsubara returned to Japan, he posed the following question at a meeting of the Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs held on May 7, 2008: “Mr. Hill concedes that the Americans have not yet been notified from the North about the locations of North Korean nuclear bomb manufacturing facilities. Has our government been informed to that effect?”

Foreign Minister Koumura responded to his question: “I don’t think I have been informed about that. However, I would not consider a declaration that does not include that kind of information complete.” A reasonable perception, indeed.

We urge the Japanese government to stick to the principle by (1) discouraging the U.S. government from making hasty, unreasonable compromises; and (2) refusing to sign any six-party-nation agreement, in the absence of a full and clear declaration, even if said agreement is signed by both the U.S. and North Korea, and Japan is the only nation that refuses to sign.

The North Korean declaration will remain incomplete until it includes critical information like exact locations of nuclear bomb manufacturing facilities. This is an obvious conclusion; neither inspections nor additional time is required to decide that the declaration is incomplete.

Japan is the nation most vulnerable to North Korean intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We appeal to Japan’s politicians for keener discernment of nuclear issues.

JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS

Sakurai Yoshiko