Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

　　　　　The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has deployed the HQ-9 sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAM) on Woody Island of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. When I visited the United States last month, a U.S. expert on China told me that the PLA flew its J-11 fourth-generation fighters to the island last October.
　　　　　Chinese President Xi Jinping at his talks with U.S. President Barack Obama last September said, “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the South China Sea. What would the militarization be if the fighters’ flight or SAMs’ deployment does not represent the militarization? China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea after such action in the East China Sea could be a matter of time.
　　　　　When China established the ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013, it required foreign aircraft to submit flight plans to Chinese authorities before any passage through the ADIZ and threatened to take “defensive measures” against those failing to meet the requirement, indicating the Chinese ADIZ differed from such zone of any other country.

China’s progress in establishing effective control
　　　　　Article 2 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People's Republic of China in 1992 states that the land territory of the PRC includes the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, the Zhongsha Island, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and all other islands belonging to the PRC. Usually, a country establishes an ADIZ outside a territorial airspace above its territory to prevent foreign aircraft from intruding the territorial airspace. Without effective control capabilities to expel intruding aircraft, however, the ADIZ establishment would be meaningless.
　　　　　If fighters, SAMs and relevant radar facilities are deployed, however, they may be used to take actions forcing intruding aircraft to withdraw. The deployment of such equipment may expand China’s effective control on the South China Sea horizontally and vertically after its expansion from “points” to “lines.”
　　　　　By establishing the ADIZ in the South China Sea, China may make a steady step forward its effective control on waters within the so-called First Island Chain linking Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. If China implements the establishment during the term of office for President Obama who has failed to take any effective measures to counter China, it may pave the way for China to achieve the effective control on the South China Sea in the future.
　　　　　The PLA may be aggressive about the ADIZ establishment in the South China Sea, which would help the PLA expand its interests and enhance its status. We have seen some events that led us to doubt the Chinese Communist Party’s effective control on the PLA. The HQ-9 deployment could be taken as one of such events.

China could be further isolated internationally
　　　　　By reclaiming land on some of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, China has antagonized major members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as the United States. Disappointed at China’s failure to persuade North Korea to give up on a nuclear explosion test and a ballistic missile launch, South Korea has rebelled against China in a reversal of its approach of siding with China. In Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, which has kept a distance from China, won a landslide victory in its recent presidential election. If China, when being embattled in this way, dares to establish the ADIZ in the South China Sea, it may become further isolated internationally.
　　　　　China’s effective control on the South China Sea would have grave consequences for Japan that depends on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) that runs through the South China Sea for about 80% of its energy imports. Japan will have to further cooperate with countries with which it can share national interests to prevent China from expanding its hegemony.

Fumio Ota is a JINF Planning Committee Member and retired Vice Admiral of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force.