The U.S. national security strategy is undergoing a tectonic shift under the Trump administration. Washington has made conspicuous moves to withdraw from Europe, including beginning to consider relinquishing the post of Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a post the United States has held for about 75 years. The reason behind such move may be to concentrate on China, the only real competitor for the U.S. Indeed, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in his inaugural oath ceremony said, “We will work with allies and partners to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific by Communist China, as well as supporting the President’s priority to end wars (including the Ukraine war) responsibly and reorient to key threats.”
Doubts about U.S. military intervention
However, the Trump administration has not explicitly mentioned its stance on the defense of Taiwan. Only Elbridge Colby, undersecretary-nominee of defense, stated at a Senate confirmation hearing on March 5 that “there is a real threat of a conflict in the coming years,” expressing recognition of threat, and that it is appropriate to continue the policy of strategic ambiguity which does not specify whether the U.S. will intervene militarily in a Taiwan contingency.
While warning that “Taiwan’s fall would be a disaster for American interests,” Colby emphasized that Taiwan should make more defense efforts in order to enable U.S. intervention in the defense of Taiwan. Significantly, he urged Taiwan to raise its defense spending to 10% or more of gross domestic product from the current level of less than 3%. Even for Russia and Israel, which are currently at war, the percentages are 5.9% and 5.3%, respectively. Statements that could be taken to imply that the U.S. has no intention to defend Taiwan unless its defense spending as a percentage of GDP is nearly twice as high as in the two warring countries greatly undermine the credibility of the U.S. to intervene militarily in a Taiwan contingency.
Prepare for the worst
As far as national crisis management is concerned, it is essential to build a strategy that can assure national defense even in the worst-case scenario. Considering the Trump administration’s “America First” attitude, it is now a common wisdom to consider the possibility that the U.S. may not enter a war in a Taiwan contingency, depending on circumstances.
If Taiwan is abandoned by the U.S., China is likely to unify Taiwan by force. If that happens, China will be ready to take control not only of Japan’s Senkaku Islands, Sakishima Islands, and Okinawa but also the entire Western Pacific area. This would greatly damage Japan’s national interests and force Japan to make a major historic shift in its national security posture.
In preparation for such a worst-case scenario, Japan needs to develop a Taiwan strategy that defines what it should do in the future in the political, economic, technological, intelligence, and military fields. On March 18, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a document to the Legislative Yuan (National Assembly) specifying for the first time the expected date of an attack by Chinese forces as 2027. Japan should develop the Taiwan strategy in a hurry. It would be too late to do so after something has happened.
Kiyofumi Iwata is a member of the Planning Committee at the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals. Formerly, he served as Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.