Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

　　　　　On February 7, North Korea test-launched a ballistic missile. The test represented the Kim Jong-un regime’s demonstrative provocation that came before Japan and the United Nations Security Council invoke their respective sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear explosion test on January 6. The Chinese government that had urged Pyongyang to suspend the missile launch lost face.
　　　　　Many experts in Japan have interpreted the motive of the nuclear and missile tests might be North Korea’s willingness to directly negotiate with the United States and protect the Kim Jong-un regime. Such interpretation is wrong, based on the lack of fundamental knowledge of North Korea’s military strategy.
　　　　　The lack of such knowledge could gravely affect Japan’s national security.

Motive of nuclear missile development
　　　　　North Korea test-launched the Taepodong missile in 1998 for the first time ever. Then, I was in South Korea to meet with a former North Korean Air Force captain who defected to the South just before the test. I asked the former captain about the significanse of ballistic missiles in North Korea’s military strategy. Then, the former captain gazed me and said: “Aren’t you an expert on North Korea? Why don’t you know such basic thing?”
　　　　　The former captain said: “It’s clear for North Korean military officers. The reason why North Korea failed to win the Korean War that began with a North Korean surprise attack in 1950 was that U.S. forces came to Korea from their bases in Japan. In the next Korean war, the North could win by implementing a surprise attack on the South and making U.S. military bases in Japan unavailable for use until reinforcements come from the U.S. mainland. North Korea could win by having missiles that can directly attack U.S. bases in Japan and nuclear missiles that can hit Washington, New York, Los Angeles and other major cities in the U.S. mainland and by stimulating U.S. public antiwar sentiment to block U.S. forces in Japan from participating in war. I have been persistently told of the strategy since my war college days.”
　　　　　A similar explanation came from Hwang Jang-yop, a former secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party who defected to South Korea in 1997.

Japan’s nuclear option
　　　　　North Korea’s nuclear missile development started in the 1950s and gained momentum in the 1960s. Then North Korean leader Kim Il-sung keenly felt the strategic implication of U.S. forces in Japan through the Korean War and launched nuclear missile development under a belief that the North could win by making U.S. forces in Japan unavailable. His son Kim Jong-il continued nuclear missile development while leaving more than 3 million people, or 15% of North Korean population, to starve to death. Kim Jong-un is continuing nuclear weapon and missile tests even at cost of China-North Korea relations that are the most important diplomatic relationship for the North.
　　　　　Don’t be deceived. North Korea is developing nuclear missiles reaching the U.S. mainland in order to start a second Korean war and absorb South Korea. Although these missiles have not been completed, North Korea has conducted a missile-launching test every three years to solve technical problems one by one. However the United Nations sanctions North Korea and however China is angered, the North will never give up on nuclear missile development.
　　　　　We have no choice but to enhance nuclear deterrence to counter North Korea. Specifically, we must have capabilities to surely kill the dictator if North Korea launches a nuclear missile. Some South Korean conservatives have called on Japan and South Korea to arm with nuclear weapons. In the Speaking Out column on January 12, I proposed Japan’s arming with nuclear weapons. I would like to emphasize anew that discussions on Japan’s arming with nuclear weapons should be stimulated, with any taboo eliminated.

Tsutomu Nishioka is Planning Committee Member, Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, and Professor at Tokyo Christian University.