Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

　
On September 3, China held a military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s formal surrender in World War II. Attracting attention among more than 100 types of weapons displayed at the parade were new-domain weapons such as unmanned equipment, weapons related to “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)” operations in a potential Taiwan contingency, and new strategic nuclear weapons that can reach the U.S. mainland.

New domains: Unmanned, space, cyber, and electronic warfare equipment

A total of 12 types of unmanned equipment were displayed at the parade, including not only unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but also unmanned reconnaissance assault vehicles that travel on land, unmanned vessels operating at sea and underwater, and unmanned minelaying systems. Also on display was an armored support combat vehicle for operators of UAVs and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles. Five types of anti-UAV weapons were identified, including laser and high-power microwave weapons. Indications are that the operation of unmanned equipment is progressing both for offensive and defensive purposes.

Four types of equipment each for space, cyber, and electronic warfare domains were exhibited. The total of 12 types of equipment in the three domains included a battlefield network cloud vehicle, a space-ground network vehicle, and an intelligence fusion vehicle. They may be used for fusing and assessing all intelligence collected in ground, space, cyber, and other domains, allowing all military units to seamlessly share the same intelligence.

A2/AD: Longer-range missiles that are difficult to intercept

A2/AD equipment on display included three types of cruise missiles that fly autonomously at low altitudes, as well as three types of hypersonic missiles that fly at Mach 5 or higher. The DF-26D, a new version of the DF-26 ballistic missile nicknamed “Guam Killer” with a range that can reach the U.S. territory of Guam, came out as a hypersonic ballistic missile. Many other missiles on display were new, apparently featuring longer ranges and increased precision.

These missiles are difficult to detect and intercept, making them effective for anti-access operations against U.S. forces coming from the direction of the second island chain (linking Japan’s Ogasawara Islands and Guam) and area-denial operations aimed at disrupting the activities of Japan-based U.S. forces and other forces already inside the first island chain (linking Japan’s Nansei Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines) in a potential Taiwan contingency. They were demonstrated apparently as missiles to improve A2/AD capabilities.

Strategic nuclear forces: Completion of the triad

China also displayed the JL-1 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with an extended range, and the new DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), demonstrating the completion of the nuclear triad against the United States. It also showcased the DF-31BJ, believed to be a silo-based ICBM, that could lead to a significant buildup of strategic nuclear forces.

China took advantage of the military parade to promote its national prestige domestically, to warn against U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan contingency, and to demonstrate its determination to Taiwan that Beijing would definitely block the U.S. forces from coming to help Taipei. The parade has been mostly designed as a strong appeal, meaning that all showcased weapons have not necessarily been deployed in a full-fledged manner. In response to the demonstrated Chinese determination, however, we may have to pay close attention to the performance and deployment of the displayed weapons and evaluate Japan’s defense buildup.

Maki Nakagawa is a researcher at the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and a former commander of the Basic Intelligence Unit, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.