Japan Institute for National Fundamentals
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Speaking out

Fumio Ota

【#395】Apparent Use of Solid Fuel by North Korea

Fumio Ota ／ 2016.09.01 (Thu)


August 29, 2016

　　　　　When I watched the video footage of ballistic missile launch by North Korea from a submarine on August 24, I found white powdery smoke emitted from the missile and suspected that the missile might have used solid fuel. My suspicion became a confidence as an American expert told me it “appears to be solid fueled.” The use of solid fuel indicates North Korea’s missile development has entered a new stage.

Solid fuel features excellent readiness
　　　　　All North Korean ballistic missiles including Scud, Rodong, Musudan and Taepodong, except for 120-kilometer-range Toksa, use liquid fuel.
　　　　　Liquid fuel is injected into a missile along with an oxidizing agent to burn in oxygen-less outer space, which corrodes in several days after the injection. Therefore, liquid fuel must be injected into a missile just before its launch. As the injection takes time, a sign of missile launch preparations can be detected by reconnaissance satellites.
　　　　　However, a solid fuel missile can be launched right after being moved out from a magazine. Solid fuel also is easier to store and handle, featuring an excellent military usefulness.
　　　　　Given that the ballistic missile launched from a submarine this time has an estimated range of more than 1,000 kilometers, North Korea must be expected to improve the readiness of longer-range ballistic missiles launched from ground as well.

Progressing military cooperation with Iran
　　　　　North Korea’s Rodong is exported to Iran as the Shahab-3 and to Pakistan as the Ghauri. The Shahab-3 Iran launched on November 12, 2008, was emitting white powdery smoke peculiar to solid propellant.
　　　　　A series of media reports have pointed to military technology exchanges between North Korea and Iran. In a great explosion at a missile base in Iran in November 2011, five North Korean engineers died (Sankei Shimbun on December 30, 2011). In April 2012, a 12-member Iranian delegation secretly visited North Korea to observe a missile launch (Sankei on April 13, 2012). In late October 2012, Iran began to station a group of engineers from its Ministry of Munitions in North Korea (Kyodo News on December 7, 2012). These developments led me to suspect that it would be a matter of time before North Korea takes advantage of Iranian technologies to develop longer-range ballistic missiles propelled by solid fuel.
　　　　　U.S. policies on North Korea and Iran are unsatisfactory. The previous U.S. administration led by George W. Bush denounced North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the axis of evil when Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein. In its closing days, however, the Bush administration removed North Korea from a list of countries supporting terrorism. The present Barack Obama administration compromised on a nuclear agreement with Iran, taking an appeasement policy on that country.
　　　　　If North Korea can miniaturize nuclear warheads and put them on missiles, on top of adopting solid fuel to make it difficult for others to detect missile launch preparations, it will pose grave threats to Japan’s national security. Japan’s three non-nuclear principles of not producing, possessing or allowing nuclear weapons on Japanese territory have in fact developed into five non-nuclear principles, including neither discussing nor thinking of nuclear weapons, as noted by a member of the House of Councilors Masahisa Sato from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Realistically speaking it is impossible for Japan to possess nuclear weapons at present, but I question how long Japan can refrain from even discussing or thinking of nuclear weapons.

Fumio Ota is a JINF Planning Committee Member and retired Vice Admiral of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force.