At the outset on March 5 of an annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s dummy legislature controlled by the Communist Party, Premier Li Keqiang announced to set a real gross domestic product growth target at 6.0-6.5% for this year. Such target must not be taken at face value. President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping as well as Premier Li is confident only that the target, even though being a fake failing to meet economic realities, would be attained statistically.
Statistical data being manipulated 
     Premier Li, when serving as Liaoning Province party leader, told the then U.S. ambassador to China that he would not trust GDP data that were artificially manipulated. In a contribution to the People’s Daily, a Communist Party organ, in December 2016, a general director of a state organization under instruction by President Xi accused local statistical manipulation for running counter to law and the Communist Party’s ideology and discipline. Recently, local authorities have canceled the announcement of economic indicators other than GDP one after another. China’s local authorities cover up any inconvenient statistical data.
     The Chinese government views local economic statistics as problematic because the aggregate of local GDP data far exceeds China’s GDP announced by the central government, which does not meet the central government estimate, thereby causing doubts about local statistics. The result has come from the party leadership’s basic practice to fix an annual GDP growth target by the end of the year before and make it mandatory to attain the target announced at the annual NPC session.
     In the Chinese-type market economy system in which finance and investment are controlled by the Communist Party, it is easy to manipulate a GDP growth rate that usually depends on the market supply-demand relationship. China’s GDP roughly consists of fixed capital investment, household consumption and exports. While the party cannot control household consumption and exports, fixed capital investment accounting for more than 40% of GDP can be planned by the party.
     The party leadership leads the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, to issue money that flows into state-run enterprises and local governments via state-run commercial banks. Massive investment in infrastructure, production equipment and real estate development is implemented as planned by the party leadership. If fixed capital investment is increased by more than 20% from the previous year, GDP growth may easily exceed 10%. Chinese GDP surpassed Japanese GDP in 2010 after the financial crisis and is now almost three times as large as the Japanese level. However, most of increased concrete and steel structures are nonperforming bubble assets that do not generate profit. A Great Wall of debt bubble has been built throughout China.
Incoherent fiscal and monetary policies 
     While Premier Li at the NPC session promised to stimulate the economy with infrastructure investment and tax cuts, the central government has requested local governments to cut fiscal spending by a uniform 5%, with quantitative monetary tightening being implemented. Fiscal and monetary policies are incoherent. If U.S.-China trade talks break down, the risk of China’s financial collapse will increase immediately.
Hideo Tamura is a columnist and a senior correspondent for the Sankei Shimbun newspaper.

 Tsutomu Nishioka
Tsutomu Nishioka Tadae Takubo
Tadae Takubo Fumio Ota
Fumio Ota Takashi Arimoto
Takashi Arimoto Yoshiko Sakurai
Yoshiko Sakurai Yasushi Tomiyama
Yasushi Tomiyama Yoichi Shimada
Yoichi Shimada Masahiko Hosokawa
Masahiko Hosokawa Hiroshi Yuasa
Hiroshi Yuasa Tadashi Narabayashi
Tadashi Narabayashi Kiyofumi Iwata
Kiyofumi Iwata Etsuro Honda
Etsuro Honda Kunio Orita
Kunio Orita Yujiro Oiwa
Yujiro Oiwa Hironobu Ishikawa
Hironobu Ishikawa Shiro Takahashi
Shiro Takahashi Katsuhiko Takaike
Katsuhiko Takaike Akira Momochi
Akira Momochi Maki Nakagawa
Maki Nakagawa Yoshihiko Yamada
Yoshihiko Yamada Akio Yaita
Akio Yaita Michio Ezaki
Michio Ezaki Seiji Kurosawa
Seiji Kurosawa Brahma Chellaney
Brahma Chellaney Nobuko Araki
Nobuko Araki James Auer
James Auer Yang Haiying
Yang Haiying Hiroshi Kimura
Hiroshi Kimura Sumihiko Kawamura
Sumihiko Kawamura Kenro Nagoshi
Kenro Nagoshi Takeshi Kudo
Takeshi Kudo Osamu Nishi
Osamu Nishi Koko Kato
Koko Kato Tadashi Saito
Tadashi Saito Shohei Umezawa
Shohei Umezawa Jason Morgan
Jason Morgan Arvind Gupta
Arvind Gupta Kichinosuke Ihara
Kichinosuke Ihara Hisashi Matsumoto
Hisashi Matsumoto Nobuyuki Sato
Nobuyuki Sato Sukehiro Hirakawa
Sukehiro Hirakawa Eriko Yamatani
Eriko Yamatani Koichi Furusho
Koichi Furusho Satoshi Hirano
Satoshi Hirano Lee Woo Young
Lee Woo Young Taro Yayama
Taro Yayama Tsutomu Toichi
Tsutomu Toichi Hideaki Karaki
Hideaki Karaki Andrii Gurenko
Andrii Gurenko Kazuhiko Inoue
Kazuhiko Inoue Katsutoshi Kawano
Katsutoshi Kawano Chung Dae Kyun
Chung Dae Kyun Toshio Watanabe
Toshio Watanabe Katsuya Tsukamoto
Katsuya Tsukamoto Kazuto Suzuki
Kazuto Suzuki Hirotaka Watanabe
Hirotaka Watanabe Akinaka Senzaki
Akinaka Senzaki Kevin Maher
Kevin Maher Yang Yi
Yang Yi Masanori Kondo
Masanori Kondo Hiroshi Ito
Hiroshi Ito Rupakjyoti Borah
Rupakjyoti Borah Seiichi Okutomi
Seiichi Okutomi Saburo Tsukamoto
Saburo Tsukamoto Yen-Hung Lin
Yen-Hung Lin Sanae Takaichi
Sanae Takaichi Haruhisa Nakagawa
Haruhisa Nakagawa Ryoichi Hamamoto
Ryoichi Hamamoto
