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Maki Nakagawa

【#1375】China Conducting Simulation Exercises for Attacking U.S. Carrier Group

Maki Nakagawa ／ 2026.06.03 (Wed)


June 1, 2026

　
Since the dismissal of the commander and political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force in 2023, media reports have suggested a potential decline in its operational capabilities due to confusion in the chain of command amid a downfall of senior officials within the force and the PLA’s equipment procurement departments. However, analysis of satellite images of missile test ranges in inland China shows the PLA Rocket Force’s continuation of missile development tests and live-fire training, suggesting the gradual enhancement of its missile capabilities.

Suspected antiship missile live-fire training in April

At the Ruoqiang missile range in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, targets closely resembling U.S. warships in size and shape have been identified since 2019, and the number and types of these mock targets have been increasing each year. What initially involved firing at a single target modeled after a U.S. aircraft carrier later expanded to include targets shaped like Arleigh Burke–class destroyers placed ahead of and behind the carrier, and starting in 2025, a target modeled after the carrier‑borne E‑2 early warning aircraft was also installed. The installation of targets modeled after carrier‑borne aircraft appears to be intended to test whether anti‑ship missiles can avoid being diverted toward aircraft in flight and instead accurately home in on the carrier. China may be verifying its missile‑guidance capabilities under more realistic operational conditions.

In addition, since 2021, it has operated two mock warship targets moving along rails about 37 kilometers long. Satellite images from September 22, 2023, confirmed impact marks on one of the mobile targets. This means that the PLA Rocket Force has the capability to strike antiship missiles on moving warships. The mock target with impact marks was left on rails for about 10 months until it was repaired for the next live-fire test. It is conceivable that the Rocket Force tried to demonstrate a warning to the United States by leaving the target with impact marks to be recognized by U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

Satellite images show that these mock carrier strike group and mobile warship targets have been damaged and repaired about once a year, indicating live-fire tests have been ongoing. Images from April 17, 2026, confirmed that the repaired carrier and destroyer targets were damaged around the same time, indicating that antiship missiles were fired consecutively in April against the mock U.S. carrier strike group. The two mobile warship targets were found repaired and placed on rails on May 10 and 21, suggesting that preparations for this year’s live-fire training were complete.

Improved capabilities of the Rocket Force

The Military Balance 2026, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think tank, assessed that the DF-27 ballistic missile, which has a range of 8,000 kilometers and is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle, and the CJ-1000 ground-launched cruise missile, which has an estimated range of over 4,000 kilometers, were entering service this year.

China continues to develop new missiles and, after conducting live‑fire verification at its missile test ranges, is gradually bringing them into operational service. At the same time, it is maintaining live‑fire training with missiles already deployed to its units, thereby improving their ability to strike accurately under more realistic conditions. Judging from the missile test ranges, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been steadily enhancing its missile capabilities despite the confusion accompanying the senior personnel reshuffle.

Maki Nakagawa is a researcher at the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and a former commander of the Basic Intelligence Unit, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.