Japan Institute for National Fundamentals
https://jinf.jp/

Speaking out

Kiyofumi Iwata

【#1379】Don’t Let U.S. Withdraw from Asia

Kiyofumi Iwata ／ 2026.06.25 (Thu)


June 22, 2026

　
The Iran War, for which a 60-day ceasefire agreement has been reached for the time being, has laid bare the strategic contradictions of the U.S. Trump administration. While giving priority to the Western Hemisphere, centered on the North and South American continents, the administration has been deeply drawn into the Middle East in reality, consuming massive military and diplomatic resources on efforts to block Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This diversion of U.S. resources to the Middle East has reduced the forces that should be directed to deterring China, thereby relatively weakening U.S. engagement in Asia.

Wavering U.S. Emphasis on Indo-Pacific

In this context, we cannot underestimate the meaning of the U.S. Defense Department’s recent reversion of the name of the “Indo-Pacific Command” to its pre-2018 title, “Pacific Command.” Although the Pentagon has described the reversion as indicating no change in the command’s jurisdiction, naming usually reflects strategic thinking. The term “Indo-Pacific” serves as the banner for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), a vision proposed by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and later adopted by the U.S. It also symbolized the idea of deterring China’s maritime expansion in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean, using the Quad—the quadrilateral security framework of Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India—as the central pillar. The removal of “Indo” from the name of the U.S. command for the region can be seen as a sign that the Washington’s strategic horizon may be narrowing.

The problem is the timing of the announcement of the name change. It came about a month after the latest U.S.-China summit and precisely on the day when the Group of Seven countries at their annual leaders meeting adopted a joint statement affirming the importance of the FOIP. It is unreasonable to dismiss this match as mere coincidence. This suggests that U.S. President Donald Trump may have prioritized a one-on-one deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping, while shelving coordination with U.S. allies and the principles of the FOIP.

Cracking the Quad unity and downplaying the strategic value of the Indian Ocean will, in the end, only benefit China’s hegemonic maritime expansion. If Washington gets complacent with the short‑term stability through direct bilateral negotiations with Beijing and reduces its substantive engagement in Asia, a power vacuum will emerge in the region. History has shown that China will move to exploit such a power vacuum.

Japan’s will and preparedness are challenged

For Japan, this is not someone else’s problem. The deterrent power of the Japan-U.S. alliance is vitally important for a country that faces three nuclear-armed states—China, Russia, and North Korea—and is under direct pressure from China’s expansion into the Western Pacific. When Washington leans toward one-on-one, deal-oriented diplomacy, the effectiveness of the alliance is not guaranteed automatically. The era when the U.S. remains engaged in Asia irrespective of Japan’s silence should be seen as over.

The question now is not whether the U.S. will remain engaged in Asia, but whether Japan can have the will and power to keep the U.S. in this region. Japan is required to make efforts to transform the Japan-U.S. alliance into a framework that the U.S. cannot withdraw. Only when Japan makes its due preparations and enhances its value as a U.S. ally will American engagement become a tangible reality.

Kiyofumi Iwata is Vice President of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals. Formerly, he served as Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.