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Kiyofumi Iwata

【#1399】Maintaining Taiwan’s Status Quo Is in Japan’s National Interests

Kiyofumi Iwata ／ 2026.09.03 (Thu)


August 31, 2026

　
Loss of Taiwan would shake Japan’s foundation

If Taiwan comes under Chinese control, Japan’s security environment will irreversibly deteriorate. Located almost at the center of the first island chain connecting Japan to the Philippines, Taiwan serves as a gateway for China to advance into the Western Pacific and as a bulwark for Japan to block the Chinese advance. If this bulwark collapses, China could deploy missiles on Taiwan, thereby putting Japan’s Southwest Islands, which stretch southwest towards Taiwan, within their range. China could also expand naval and air forces into the Pacific free of constraints, using Taiwan as a base. Japan’s Sakishima Islands, part of the Southwest Islands and lying closest to Taiwan, as well as Okinawa Island will become front bases facing direct Chinese threats, forcing Japan to fundamentally strengthen its defense posture.

The threats would not be limited to the military domain. Given that Taiwan accounts for over 90% of the world’s cutting-edge semiconductor production and stands at the center of the global semiconductor supply chains, its loss would directly hit Japan’s automobile and other core industries. Furthermore, Japan’s main arteries for crude oil and logistics depend on the stability of the waters surrounding Taiwan. As a hub for international submarine cables, Taiwan is a vital pillar supporting Japan’s energy security, industrial infrastructure, and digital economy. The loss of Taiwan would shake the prerequisites for Japan’s survival and prosperity.

Moreover, Taiwan’s value is not limited to military and economic dimensions. Taiwan ranks first in Asia and 12th in the world in the Democracy Index compiled by a British research and analysis organization, demonstrating that democracy characterized by freedom, elections, and government change can mature even within the Chinese world. This serves as a living rebuttal to the Chinese Communist Party’s claim that democracy does not fit the Chinese people. Taiwan’s presence itself serves as a bulwark against authoritarianism.

Clarifying intention to engage is the greatest deterrent

What is important here is the reality that Japan is not in a position to choose whether or not to be “drawn into” a Taiwan contingency. If Japan hesitates to engage and leaves its intentions ambiguous, it would cause misunderstandings for the other side and invite a greater crisis. The lesson here is that the Korean War is often attributed to the ambiguity of the Acheson Line that the United States outlined in 1950 as its defense perimeter seemingly excluding South Korea. A recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies has found that if Tokyo rejects the use of U.S. military bases in Japan and chooses not to engage in a Taiwan contingency, the defense of Taiwan would fail.

That is why it is meaningful for Japan to clarify its intention to engage in a Taiwan contingency. The fact that China has raised strong opposition to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remark that a Taiwan contingency could become a survival-threatening situation for Japan should be seen as a sign that the Japanese attitude is raising the cost of China’s aggression and working as a deterrent. Supporting Taiwan’s status quo is not an act of helping others, but is the most realistic form of Japan’s self-defense to protect its own survival and prosperity.

Kiyofumi Iwata is Vice President of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals. Formerly, he served as Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.