Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

　　　　　I have recently obtained surprising information that the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea has requested that the Islamist extremist organization Islamic State (IS) carry out terrorist attacks inside of South Korea. This information reveals that, since two years ago, North Korean special forces have been acting as instructors in military exercises of the Syrian government. The request for cooperation in terrorism may run counter to North Korea’s traditional relationship with the Syrian government.*
　　　　　According to the information I have obtained, First Party Secretary Kim Jong-un—who was incensed at the joint American-South Korean military exercises held in March and considers those exercises a training run for a “decapitation strategy” aimed at himself—ordered secret consultations with IS to request that terrorist attacks be carried out within South Korea in exchange for armaments support. While I have no information regarding whether or not IS accepted the North Korean request, this has all the makings of an “axis of evil” terrorist collaboration.
　　　　　Meanwhile, South Korean public safety officials are acting under the assumption that North Korea is attempting to carry out terrorist attacks within the South, and are shoring up bodyguard protection for key personnel and activist North Korean defectors accordingly.
　　　　　This month, the South Korean government announced publicly that, “Last year, a colonel from the reconnaissance directorate of the North Korean People’s Army defected to South Korea, and is providing detailed testimony regarding operations directed against the South.” Under normal circumstances, the existence of defectors possessing information of such a delicate nature is kept hidden. This time, however, South Korean authorities made a public announcement concerning not only the fact of the defection, but also “testimony regarding operations directed against the South.” This could be because South Korea has specific information about terrorism plans, and was attempting to prevent those plans from being carried out.

Chinese-North Korean Relations at a Nadir
　　　　　The relationship between China and North Korea has also reached a low point. When, in March, China agreed to a UN Security Council resolution placing strict sanctions on North Korea, First Party Secretary Kim Jong-un is reported to have said, “We will bring to completion nuclear warheads and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and will enter into serious negotiations with America only after the US has been truly gripped with fear. I am going to do what the Great Leader (Chairman Kim Il-sung) and the Dear Leader (General Secretary Kim Jong-il) were unable to do. Neither China nor South Korea are taking [the North] into consideration. If China were to try to topple me and set up a Kim Jong-nam [Kim Jong-un’s elder half-brother] regime in my place, then I would rain nuclear bombs down on Beijing and Shanghai.”
　　　　　First Party Secretary Kim Jong-un continues to be unnerved that Jong-nam is under Chinese protection. It is said that Kim Jong-un’s paranoia is producing its own enemies, such that the backstory to Kim Jong-un’s uncle Jang Sung-taek’s execution was the suspicion that Jang Sung-taek, China, and Kim Jong-nam were conspiring behind Kim Jong-un’s back to bring him down.
　　　　　Chinese leaders, exasperated by First Party Secretary Kim Jong-un’s utter refusal to heed their orders, have begun to conceive of establishing a new regime—whether by bringing Kim to heel by means of crippling sanctions, or else as a Kim-free “New Korea” which is pro-China and which will carry out reform and opening—that will not allow American and South Korean influence to extend any farther north.

The Alienation of the Cadres
　　　　　Within North Korea, not even the cadres in the military and the political organs are truly loyal to First Party Secretary Kim Jong-un. These cadres view a reform-and-opening regime as a not-too-distant inevitability. When that happens, these cadres may be able to maintain their comfortable lifestyle by using their foreign currency caches in order to buy up mines and other such commodities; if they fail at this, though, then they feel that even the military and party cadres will all be reduced to beggars.
　　　　　Finally, it appears that, as of February, distributions to the families of low-ranking personnel in the Ministry of State Security (the political police) and the Ministry of People’s Security (the regular police) have stopped. This is a terminal phenomenon, and we should not be surprised no matter what happens next, or when.

* The original version of the first paragraph’s second sentence (“This information reveals that, beginning two years ago, North Korean special forces entered IS-controlled areas, where they have since been acting as instructors in military exercises”) was wrong. It should have read: “This information reveals that, since two years ago, North Korean special forces have been acting as instructors in military exercises of the Syrian government. The request for cooperation in terrorism may run counter to North Korea’s traditional relationship with the Syrian government.”

Tsutomu Nishioka, Planning Committee Member, Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and Professor, Tokyo Christian University.