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Kunio Orita

【#1360】Defense Ministry Should Fully Explain Counterstrike Deployment

Kunio Orita ／ 2026.04.08 (Wed)


April 6, 2026

　
On March 31, the Japanese Defense Ministry deployed the Type 25 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (an improved version of the Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile) to the Ground Self-Defense Force Kengun Garrison in Kumamoto City and the Type 25 Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile, designed for island defense, to the GSDF Fuji Garrison in Oyama, Shizuoka Prefecture. They are the first weapons Japan has introduced as counterstrike capabilities. They have a range of about 1,000 kilometers, enough to reach North Korea or the Chinese mainland from Kyushu or Okinawa.

Japan decided on the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities under the Fumio Kishida government in 2022 in response to the deterioration of the security environment and advances in weapons technology. The first deployment of counterstrike capabilities has reportedly caused anxiety and backlash among local residents, helped by excessive media coverage. There are four main points of discussion on the matter, which can be summarized in a question-and-answer format as follows:

Indispensable for war deterrence

Q: Wouldn’t the deployment of the missiles make them prime targets in the event of a contingency?
A: These missiles are mobile and, in the event of a contingency, are normally deployed and operated outside their garrisons. Moreover, a situation involving strikes on the Japanese mainland would imply a full-scale war against Japan, in which targets would not be limited to military bases or urban areas. These missiles are intended to deter such a war.

Q: Wouldn’t these missiles be insufficient as a deterrent, given that China and North Korea possess nuclear missiles?
A: There are two types of deterrence: “denial deterrence,” which dissuades an adversary from taking action by making it doubt that it can achieve the expected results, and “punitive deterrence,” which discourages an adversary by making it believe that it would suffer damage equal to or greater than that caused by its own action. By combining missile defense with counterstrike capabilities, Japan seeks to strengthen denial deterrence and enhance overall deterrence in conjunction with the punitive deterrence provided by U.S. forces.

Q: Wouldn’t counterstrikes deviate from Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy?
A: The exclusively defense-oriented policy does not mean that Japan devotes itself to defense without possessing any offensive capabilities. It “means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense,” according to the Defense Ministry’s “Defense of Japan 2025.” Due to recent advances in missile technology and improvements in tactical capabilities such as saturation attacks, it is becoming difficult to defend Japan only with the existing missile defense system. Counterstrike capabilities are indispensable.

Q: Isn’t the range of 1,000 kilometers too long?
A: Stand-off capabilities to strike from outside an adversary’s ranges have traditionally been an essential requirement for weapons. Given the trend of modern weapons, a range of about 1000 kilometers can be viewed as the minimum necessary ability.

Dispel residents’ anxiety

While these discussions are long overdue, defense capabilities must be built on public understanding. The Defense Ministry should sincerely address the criticism that it has lacked sufficient prior explanations and should make every effort to provide thorough explanations to local residents to dispel their anxiety as much as possible.

Kunio Orita is a member of the JINF Planning Committee and a special professor at Reitaku University. He is a retired Lieutenant General of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.